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Preface
The present collection of essays on the subject of Transylvania and its
peoples, especially the Székelys, has been in the making for a long time.
While a few of the papers in this anthology are the results of recent research,
others have been in the editing process for nearly a decade. And it is an
eclectic selection. A few of the papers deal with very specialized subjects
while one of them, Dr. Diószegi's, is an overview of nearly a century of
evolution. One paper belongs to the field of biography, or more precisely
still, historical diaries.
The focal point, if the volume has one, is the period of the Second
World War, perhaps the most traumatic age in modern Transylvania's history.
In the book review section an even larger period is covered, ranging from the
twenty-first century, in Dr. Kósa's essay, all the way back to the early
medieval period in the review of recent literature, including genomic research,
related to the ethnogenesis of the Székely people, in fact of the entire
Hungarian nation.
If apologies have to be made in connection with this volume they are
due to a few of the collections' authors who had waited an inordinate amount
of time to see it through the translating and editing process. If gratitude has to
be expressed it should go to people who ave helped with editing and
proofreading, above all Dr. Jason Kovacs of the University of Toronto. Even
greater appreciation has to be conveyed to Mrs. Éva Tömöry, of the
University of Toronto's Hungarian Program, who put aside her numerous
duties and took time out from her work of her doctoral thesis to help with the
resolution of major computer problems the editor of this volume experienced
during the preparation of this collection of essays. In the meantime work on
another special volume of this journal, a collection of papers and readings on
the modern art of László Moholy-Nagy continued to stall. I and the chief
editor of that volume, Professor Olivér Botár of the University of Manitoba
apologize for these delays to the contributors of that volume.
It would perhaps not be appropriate to talk about the affairs of the
Hungarian Studies Review in this preface as the situation can change in the
months that this volume will await being printed. But a few notes might be
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appropriate. Our journal has signed an agreement with EBSCO
communications company to the effect that current volumes of our journal
will be made available on the internet through EBSCO to the students and
faculty of a great many English-speaking universities. At the same time we
have a promise from the management of the National Széchényi Library of
Hungary that past volumes of our journal, those not already on a website, will
be archived and made available on the internet. Whether our journal will
survive until these two developments take effect remains to be seen.
Nándor Dreisziger
Kingston, July 2009
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Transylvania in Hungarian History:
An Introduction
Nándor Dreisziger
Few words arouse stronger emotions among Hungarians than the name
Erdély or Transylvania. While for most people in the English-speaking world
“Transylvania” conjures up the image of Dracula, for Hungarians it is
associated with a proud and time-honoured national past, as well as a real and
tangible present. This circumstance should not surprise anyone. Transylvania
is home to the largest Hungarian community living outside of Hungary. In fact
this community is one of the largest minorities existing in any country that is a
member of the European Union. Transylvania is also the place where Hun-
garian presence had existed uninterruptedly for at least eleven centuries, and it
is the place where Hungarian culture flourished even in times when in other
Hungarian lands it languished because of Ottoman Turkish or Austrian Habs-
burg rule.
The geographic limits of the land known as Transylvania have
changed with the passage of time. Before 1920 this term was used to designate
an area of the Carpathian Basin that was smaller than what the word describes
nowadays. For most Hungarians, the word Erdély today signifies the lands
that had been transferred from Hungary to Romania as a result of the Treaty of
Trianon of June 1920. Most of the time this rather inaccurate and unhistorical
definition will be used in this volume. When it will not be used, the context
and meaning will be explained.
Although Transylvania had always held a significant connotation for
Hungarians, it is since 1920 that they think of this land with an especially
heavy heart. It was in the post-World War I peace settlement, in particular in
the above-mentioned Treaty of Trianon, that the transfer of this land to Roma-
nia was inscribed into international law. The background of this event is
complex and is rooted in centuries of history.
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Early in the second century a.d. the Romans added this land to their
expanding empire and called it Dacia. Some fifteen decades later, in the early
270s a.d., they Romans evacuated the province. From that time on, and espe-
cially since the time of the barbarian invasions of the Roman Empire a
century-and-a-half later, until the thirteenth century, there is little concrete
evidence of peoples speaking a Romance language (similar to Latin, Italian,
French, Spanish etc.) in what is now Transylvania. Romance-speaking
peoples, in particular the Vlachs, did live in the central mountains of the
Balkans. In fact, maps of this age place the putative ancestors of the Roma-
nians south of the lands of the Bulgarians, exactly the opposite as we know
the locations of Bulgaria and Romania in the Modern Age.1
From their Balkan homeland the Vlachs began their migrations north
in the thirteenth century, migrations that were accelerated no doubt by the
beginning of Ottoman Turkish expansion into the Balkans. By the time of the
following century, they established themselves as the dominant ethnic popula-
tion in what became known as Wallachia, the land between the Transylvanian
Alps and the Lower Danube River. Here they converted to the eastern branch
of Orthodox Christianity. Their priests used Church Slavonic as the language
of liturgy. Under various leaders they at times served as a client state of the
Kingdom of Hungary, or acted as an independent principality.
One of the most famous, one might say infamous ruler of Wallachia
was Vlad III “the Impaler” (ruled in 1448 and from 1456-62). Myths and
legends about this man probably inspired the main character in the nineteenth
century English author Bram Stoker's book Dracula (1897). This work, along
with its Hollywood-produced film incarnations, did more than any other
media to immortalize this notorious individual.
Prince Dracula's connections to Transylvania were tenuous, even
though he was born there and grew up there.2 Whether he was mentally de-
ranged or only a ruthless ruler can be the subject of debate. According to one
legend, after coming to power for the second time in 1456, he wished to
impose order in a realm that had experienced much anarchy and rampant
crime as a result of internecine fighting and foreign invasions. In doing this
Vlad used cruel punishments, including the impaling of criminals — as well
as the prisoners of war captured in his wars with Wallachia's enemies. The
executions were public and gruesome, and instilled fear into the hearts of
Wallachia's and especially, Vlad's opponents.3
Legend has it that Vlad's demise resulted from his raids against the
prosperous and powerful Saxon (German) towns of Transylvania and, in
particular, the impaling of many (some sources say a few dozen, others say
thousands) of the residents of Kronstadt (Brassó in Magyar, Brasov in
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Romanian). The good burgers of southern Transylvania's ethnic German
community appealed to their overlord and protector King Mátyás Corvinus of
Hungary. Vlad had also alienated many elements of his country's aristocracy.
Their leader, Vlad's own brother Radu, also conspired with Mátyás. In the
end Vlad was captured and was imprisoned in Hungary. While in prison, his
supporters started a publicity campaign to have him released, while Vlad's
enemies spread vile rumours about him to justify his continued incarceration.
During the mid-1470s Vlad was allowed to return to his Wallachia,
where his brother had held the reigns of power till his death a few years earlier
and where another enemy of Vlad, Basarab the Elder, had been installed by
the Turks after Radu's death. Vlad, with the help of foreign support, was able
to regain power, but his new reign was short-lived. The Turks were deter-
mined to restore Basarab to power, and few in Wallachia seem to have rallied
around a man with Vlad's reputation. Several legends exist as to the circum-
stances of his death — or murder.4
Whether a demented madman or a protector of the Wallachian nation,
the true story of Vlad has been obscured by relentless propaganda against him
throughout much of his lifetime — as well as since the appearance of Bram
Stoker's Dracula over eleven decades ago. His image in the West portrays him
as a depraved man, while in his own country, as well as in other Orthodox
lands, he is more likely to be seen as a national hero.5
The Germans of Transylvania, as mentioned above, had been Vlad's
enemies and were probably the sources of the most strident of anti-Vlad
propaganda. Their connection to Transylvania has not been explained and it
should be for those who are not familiar with that land's history.
The ancestors of these German-speaking people immigrated to
Hungary in the middle of the twelfth century and were settled by King Géza II
in south-eastern Transylvania to bolster the region's ability to protect the
south-eastern frontier-lands of the Carpathian Basin. Though most of them
were not from Saxony but from the western parts of what today is Germany,
in time they became known as Saxons, in Hungarian Szászok. Later more
German-speaking immigrants came to this part of Transylvania. Eventually
they gave rise to a coherent ethnic community that was prosperous and had a
fair amount of economic and political clout. Some of their settlements
including the already-mentioned Kronstadt, became affluent urban centres that
are even today picturesque places with many distinguished buildings and a
great deal of charm. They include Hermannstadt (Nagyszeben for
Hungarians, Sibiu for Romanians) and Karlsburg (Gyulafehérvár or Alba
Julia), to mention the most obvious and the most charming.
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Transylvania's Saxon minority usually enjoyed a fair amount of
autonomy within the Kingdom of Hungary. In Transylvania itself, they consti-
tuted one of the three of the region's “founding peoples”, along with the
Magyars, and the Magyar-speaking Székelys. They were Catholics, the vast
majority of whom became Protestants by the middle of the sixteenth century.
But by then they were not the only non-Hungarian ethnic group in Transylva-
nia.
The immigration of Vlach tribesmen into Wallachia followed, and to
some extent co-existed with their gradual migration further north, into Tran-
sylvania. The new arrivals were slow to achieve economic and political
influence. Most of them were shepherds and lived in the most mountainous
areas. The Vlachs were not admitted, were in fact in no position to demand
admittance, to the ranks of the three “founding peoples” of the land. Their
descendants became a major factor in the political affairs of Transylvania only
in the modern era. However their influence very gradually grew, as their
numbers grew, and their numbers increased in a manner disproportionate to
the demographic growth of Transylvania's the other ethnic groups. Especially
slow was the natural growth of the Székely population. To prevent the impo-
verishment of their families through the subdivision of their land-holdings
with the passage of generations, they practiced birth control. So, while the
Vlachs kept increasing in numbers due to continued immigration and a higher
birth rate, the Székelys, and to a lesser extent Transylvania's Magyar and
Saxon populations, experienced limited demographic growth. Wars and inter-
nal strife also affected these groups differently. The Magyars, Székelys and
even Saxons were more likely to do military service in wartime and to suffer
casualties. They also bore the brunt of invasions as dwellers of urban centres
and of the valleys and other lowlands, while the Vlachs were more likely to
escape destruction and death in their highland hideouts.
From the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, Transylvania
witnessed the competition for influence of the two dominant empires of the
day: the Ottoman Turkish and the Habsburg. In this struggle the princes of
Transylvania often managed to play one side against the other with con-
siderable success. Still, repeated military struggles cost the population, and
especially the three privileged founding peoples, a great deal in terms of
material losses and lives lost.
The Ottomans were expelled from much of the Carpathian Basin at
the end of the seventeenth century. This victory of Christian Europe over the
Ottoman Turks resulted in the establishment of Viennese rule over the whole
of Hungary, including Transylvania. From this time to the nineteenth century
Vienna administered Transylvania as a separate province of the Habsburg
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Empire. More wars followed, including at least four wars of liberation fought
by Hungarians (mainly from the eastern and northern regions of the Car-
pathian Basin) against Habsburg rule. Added to this was the fact that the
Habsburgs, unlike the Ottomans before, wanted to control most aspects of
Transylvania's politics, and tried to inflict military conscription on its people.
This situation resulted in, among other things, the flight of tens of thousands
of Székelys and other Transylvanians to the lands beyond Habsburg control,
east of the Carpathian ranges.
Hungary emerged from Habsburg domination briefly in 1848-49, and
in a more lasting manner in 1867, this time as a result of the Austro-
Hungarian Compromise. From 1867 to the end of World War I, Transylvania
became an integral part of Hungary and was ruled directly from Budapest. By
this time, however, significant demographic shifts had taken place in the
region as the Romanians had become the most populous ethnic group. In the
meantime, to the south, Romania shook off the increasingly feeble tutelage of
the Ottoman Empire and emerged as an independent nation. The stage was set
for the growth of Romanian separatism in Transylvania that reached its zenith
during World War I.
As is commonly known, during the first two years of this conflict
Romania remained neutral. Both the Central Powers and the Allies hoped to
attract Romania to their side, but it was the Allies who were in a better posi-
tion to offer inducements to the government in Bucharest. They made a secret
offer to Romania of Transylvania, on the condition that the country join the
alliance against the Central Powers. The Romanians, encouraged by Russian
successes against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces on the Eastern
front, committed themselves. A few weeks later, in late August 1916, they
declared war on Austria-Hungary and began the invasion of Transylvania. By
then the Russian offensive had spent itself and some hastily assembled
German and Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the invading Romanian
armies.
The Central Powers collapsed in the fall of 1918. This provided
Romania with a new opportunity to attack, which she did — a few days before
the war's end. This time the Romanian armies were successful. They occupied
Transylvania and, for a brief time in 1919, most of Hungary. In the following
year, in the Treaty of Trianon between the victorious Allies and Hungary, the
peacemakers awarded Transylvania to Romania, along with the eastern por-
tions of the Hungarian Great Plain. In fact, more formerly Hungarian land was
given to Romania than was left to Hungary. Transferred with these lands were
about 1,700,000 ethnic Hungarians. Of all the territorial losses the Kingdom
of Hungary suffered it was this loss that left the deepest wound on the
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Hungarian psyche. There seemed little justification for detaching so much
territory with so many Magyar residents from Hungary. Although in the
transferred territories Romanians constituted the most populous ethnic group
(they made up a little over half the total population), many predominantly by
Magyar-populated cities and counties were included in the lands transferred.
The post-war peace settlement ushered in a new era for Transylvania's
Magyar-speaking population. From being the politically dominant ethnic
group, they became a reviled minority. Tens of thousands of them left and
migrated to a Hungary impoverished by the war, post-war revolutions, and the
economic devastation that the new territorial settlement brought for the
country. For the Magyars left in Transylvania the decades of Romanian rule
brought the loss of many of their rights and the beginning of relentless Roma-
nization of their communities. During World War II for three years a part of
Transylvania reverted to Hungarian rule, but with the war's end the pre-1940
borders were restored and the local Hungarian population once again became
a disfavoured minority. Just as over two decades earlier, thousands of
Hungarians left Transylvania. They fled their native towns and villages to
escape the return of Romanian rule and the anticipated “settling of scores” as
Soviet and Romanian armies advanced in pursuit of the retreating Axis forces.
After the war the policies of Romanization resumed in Transylvania's Magyar-
populated regions and continued with lesser and greater intensity until they
reached a climax during the rule of dictator Nicolai Ceauşescu. One especially
nefarious aspect of the new Romanization was the forced mixing of popula-
tions. Hungarians, especially professional people, were sent to work in predo-
minantly Romanian regions of the country, while Romanians were relocated
to work and live in Hungarian ethnic enclaves.
The end of communist rule two decades ago brought some relief for
Transylvania's Magyar-speaking populations, although the decades of strident
anti-Magyar propaganda and the vicious anti-Hungarian sentiments it engen-
dered in the Romanian population persisted for years and often caused much
grief. But with time conditions improved and at least the grinding poverty of
the Ceauşescu years gradually disappeared. Romanization continued
especially as the result of the re-emergence of the Orthodox Church as a
powerful social and political force in the country. And the exodus of
Hungarians continued, though never on the scale of the departure of
Transylvania's Saxon population during the time of the Great Dictator. There
is still a solid Hungarian presence in some areas of Transylvania, especially in
the Székelyland, while German-speakers have all but disappeared from the
beautiful Saxon cities and villages of south-eastern Transylvania. On the
whole however, Transylvania has become a predominantly Romanian land.
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The position of the majority population appears solid. Yet, there is a cloud on
the horizon for the future of Romania and its predominant Romanian culture.
It is posed by the same demographic processes which had caused the gradual
rise of Romanian ascendancy over a period of seven centuries. That cloud is
posed by Romania's rapidly growing Roma (Gypsy) population. It seems
rather ironic that a nation whose political fortunes were largely due to its high
fecundity compared to other peoples in the region, is now threatened by the
rapid demographic growth of an ethnic group within its midst. The process
also poses a threat to Transylvania's Hungarians — but only in the long term.
In the near future this situation might help to ameliorate the problems of their
minority status: it is becoming increasingly obvious to the majority Romanian
population that the long term threat to their social and political dominance is
posed not by the Hungarians but by another ethnic group, and this
circumstance should reduce the scale and prevalence of anti-Magyar
sentiments in Romania, sentiments that have, in the past, caused so much
strife and grief.
The papers and review articles in this volume focus mainly on the
history of Hungarians there in the past nine decades, as well as on the relation-
ship between them and the people — and governments — of Hungary. With
two of the papers and an excerpt from one Transylvanian's reminiscences
dealing with the era of the Second World War, one might say that the years
1939 to 1945 constitute the real focus of the volume. This might be justified
since these years were pivotal in the region's history. The war and its outcome
sanctified the territorial settlement reached with regard to Transylvania after
the First World War, while it contributed to the prolongation of bad relations
between Hungarians and Romanians. It also further weakened the demo-
graphic position of the Magyars in that land as a result of the flight of still
more thousands of people. We hope that discussions of these developments in
our volume will contribute to the rise of a more thorough knowledge of the
history of Transylvania and its peoples. One day perhaps in the English-
speaking world the name Transylvania will not conjure up the image of
“Count Dracula” but will elicit a desire for a greater knowledge of the
troubled past and difficult present of this land and its peoples.
NOTES
1 See for example map 3 in Magocsi, Paul R., ed., Historical Atlas of East
Central Europe (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 9.
2 The house that was his childhood home is in Sigishoara (to Hungarians,
Segesvár), Transylvania. Vlad's parents lived in exile there at the time, a situation
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that had often been the fate of Vlad's family. The building is a major tourist attraction
today.
3 The actual process of impalement requires great skills on the part of the
executioners, who were themselves punished, possibly impaled, if their victim died in
the process, rather than after suffering unimaginable agonies over a period lasting
sometimes days.
4 On Vlad's tempestuous life and times see the internet entry on him:
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Vlad_III_the_Impaler, accessed on 28
March 2009.
5 On the subject of Western stereotypes about East European history and
historical figures see Piotr Wandycz, “Western Images and Stereotypes of Central
and Eastern Europe,” in Vampires Unstaked: National Images, Stereotypes and
Myths in East Central Europe ed. André Gerrits and Nanci Adler (Amsterdam:
Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 1995), 5-23. Some of the
other papers in this volume relate more directly to Vlad the Impaler and his image.
See my review of this volume in The International History Review, vol. 18 (1996):
993f.
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Remembering Szatmár, Remembering Himself:
The Geography of Memory and Identity in
Ferenc Fodor’s “Szatmár Földje, Szatmár Népe,
Szatmár Élete”
Steven Jobbitt
In 1952, the Hungarian, conservative-nationalist geographer Ferenc Fodor
finished compiling his geographical “biography” of Szatmár-Németi (now
Satu Mare) a once-important Hungarian city located in the northern reaches of
the Partium, an historic region of the Kingdom of Hungary nestled between
Transylvania to the east, and the Great Hungarian Plain to the west. Begun
during World War II, and entitled “Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár
élete” (The Land, People, and Life of Szatmár)1 this introspective, 325-page
study sought to refresh memories of a lost city which, torn from the Hungarian
body in 1920 by the harsh terms dictated by the Treaty of Trianon, had been
briefly returned to Hungary during World War II, only to be re-attached again
to Romania after the combined German-Hungarian defeat of 1945. By tracing
the historical and geographical evolution of the city, and by carefully illus-
trating its fundamental Hungarian character, Fodor hoped to preserve a perma-
nent place for Szatmár in the Hungarian national consciousness. “Szatmár
lives within me,” he wrote in the introduction, “and memories from my youth
demand that I continue to feel this life, and render it perceptible to others.”2
The communists, he implied, might not appreciate his efforts, but future
generations of moral, nation-loving (and potentially nation-building) Hungari-
ans would.
Having spent his formative years in Szatmár, Fodor felt an “urgent
need”3 to testify, both as a Hungarian and as a scholar, to the profound Hunga-
rianness of the city, and to what he saw as the interconnected geographical and
historical forces which linked the land to the Hungarian people, and the
Hungarian people to the land.4 His education in Szatmár’s Catholic gym-
nasium at the turn of the century had given him his “first substantial glimpse”
into the complex moral, material, and spiritual make up of Hungary and its
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people, and more importantly had helped to make him who he was.5 Half a
century later, with Szatmár lost indefinitely to its “Romanian oppressors,” and
with his own health failing, Fodor felt compelled to write the city’s biography,
both for his own sake, and for the sake of Hungarian geographical science, and
by extension also Hungarian national memory.1
Shocked, as we shall see, by the dilapidated state of the city’s archi-
ves, and unable to trust the ethnic Hungarians of the region to protect and pre-
serve a “correct” memory of Szatmár, Fodor felt both obligated, and also justi-
fied, to draw heavily on his own memories and adolescent experiences in order
to ensure that the city would “live on” in the minds of his readers.7 Fodor, in
fact, presented himself as being ideally positioned to write a “biography” of
Szatmár. Underlining the importance of a morally-informed subject whose
ties to the land and its people served to enhance, rather than detract from, an
accurate biographical study of a particular place, Fodor wrote: “Every
biography stems from two fundamental sources, the life of the subject being
examined, and the life of the examiner himself.” The closer the two are
related, he continued, the more possible it is “to arrive at a faithful rendering
of the subject being studied.” Consciously writing himself into the geo-histo-
rical narrative he was creating, Fodor concluded that “only a researcher with
intimate ties to the land can faithfully construct the life of his native country.”8
Admitting that his study contained an unmistakable “subjective element,” he
defended his approach, writing: “If we want to depict the living being of a
country in place of its dead, dismembered body, we need to feel that life
subjectively; the soul of the land must dwell within us. Only in this way can
we come to know or recognize the essence of its life: only in this way can we
synthesize a biography.”9 Suggesting that an “outsider” could of course also
“examine and dissect the character of the land, and the history of the people,”
Fodor further attempted to underscore his own legitimacy as a biographer by
adding that such a study would inevitably “kill the life of the land with the
autopsy.”10
Fodor’s conviction that he, and perhaps only he, could breathe “Hun-
garian life” back into Szatmár was very much a product of his own synthetic
approach to geography, an approach that he had developed under the tutelage
of Count Pál Teleki and others during the Horthy period, and which ran
parallel to, and no doubt was inspired by, the idea of szellemtörténet popu-
larized by the interwar writings of the historian Gyula Szekfű.  Championed 
by Count Kunó Klebelsberg, Bálint Hóman, and others as the cornerstone of
neo-nationalist thinking in post-Trianon Hungary, the idea of szellemtörténet
sought to overcome the spiritual and moral poverty of the so-called “objective”
approaches of the liberal period.11 Indeed, if the liberal-positivist scholarship
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that dominated the Hungarian academy at the fin-de-siècle had been
predicated, as William Everdell has put it, on “keeping the ghost’s out of one’s
machines,”12 then the synthetic approach was about reintegrating these sub-
jective phantoms into Hungarian history and geography, at least to the extent
that they could resurrect and enliven the de-mystified, and thus spiritually
moribund, methodologies of modern Hungarian scholarship.
Beyond breathing life back into the memory of Szatmár as an “authen-
tic” Hungarian space, Fodor’s “underground” manuscript was also part of a
more personal effort to remember himself. Having been compelled to reinvent
himself as a socialist geographer in the post-WWII period, and recognizing
that he was nearing the end of his life, Fodor devoted much time and energy to
scholarly and autobiographical projects aimed at constructing, and ultimately
preserving, a “proper” memory of himself, one which would cast him in an
idealized conservative-nationalist light, and which would help to counteract
the charges of opportunism leveled against him as he offered his academic
services to the building of a socialist Hungary. Situating his manuscript within
the broader body of his published and unpublished socialist-era work, this
essay concludes by suggesting ways in which we can understand his geogra-
phical biography of Szatmár as an integral component of this much larger
autobiographical project.
Remembering Szatmár
As it was for many Hungarians, the return of Szatmár-Németi (and indeed the
rest of Transylvania) to Romania at the conclusion of World War II came as a
serious blow to Fodor, and would remain a source of considerable anxiety for
him until his death in 1962. Writing in 1952, Fodor lamented the fact that the
reinstatement of Trianon borders between Hungary and Romania had cut
researchers off from the resources and factual data needed to produce a truly
comprehensive geo-historical rendering of Szatmár and its environs. With
important documents left “dormant” in archives that had fallen once more into
foreign hands, how would it be possible to keep the memory of the city
alive?13
Though Fodor’s desperation over the uncertain fate of Szatmár no
doubt peaked in the wake of communism’s rise to power during the postwar
period, his concern over the fragility of Hungarian memory and, by extension,
Hungarian identity, had already been triggered by a three-day trip that he took
to the then newly-liberated city in July 1941. The short homecoming, in fact,
was deeply unsettling. Though he was undoubtedly relieved that his spiritual
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and intellectual “home town” had been returned to Hungary after twenty years
of Romanian “occupation,” and though he was pleased to have had the
opportunity to rekindle memories from his youth, Fodor could not shake the
unnerving feeling that much had changed, and that the very Hungarianness of
the city and its surrounding area had suffered untold damage in less than a
generation. The speed at which Hungarian memory had begun to fade in the
city appears to have startled Fodor. Having had the chance to finally go back,
he discovered, much to his horror, that “home” itself was very much in the
process of disappearing.
Indeed, two decades of Romanian efforts to suppress Hungarian histo-
ry and culture, and to claim the region as “their own,” had certainly taken its
toll.14 Though Fodor would attempt to downplay the lasting impact of Roma-
nian nation building in Szatmár, he was obviously concerned about both the
nature and nationalist implications of the changes that had already taken place.
The Romanian “occupiers,” he noted, had wasted no time in implementing
projects aimed at giving the cityscape a “new color.”15 As early as 1920, Ro-
manian officials had begun to rename streets, buildings, and other important
landmarks. According to Fodor, this process was deliberately provocative,
with the new names intended as an “obvious insult to Hungarian nationalist
sensibilities.” Szent István Square, for example, was renamed “Piata Trianon,”
while the Panonnia Hotel was rechristened as the Dacia Hotel (and this despite
“the sensational Hungarian style” of the building itself).16 Business signs in
Hungarian were redone in Romanian, and advertisements in Hungarian were
not allowed. Even gypsy musicians were forbidden to play the traditional
Hungarian csárdás.17 So thorough was the forced transformation, then, that
the city had literally ceased to “sound” Hungarian.
From Fodor’s point of view, the Romanians had stopped at nothing to
reinvent the city in the two decades that it was under their control. In fact,
beyond simply renaming existing buildings and spaces, city planners had
embarked on an ambitious program of “urban renewal” in the interwar period,
one that appeared to be directed more than anything else at wiping out “a
thousand years of Hungarian history and tradition” in the city.18 Identifying
certain structures as uniquely “Hungarian” from an architectural point of view,
Fodor lamented the fact that these structures had been targeted by the Romani-
ans for demolition, and had been replaced (or were scheduled to be replaced)
by “inferior” Romanian ones. These efforts to transform the city, he added,
were haphazard at best, and only proved, as far as he was concerned, the
civilizational backwardness of the Romanian people. In pointing this out,
Fodor noted that many of the projects undertaken by the Romanians in the
interwar period remained unfinished when the Hungarians took control of the
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city in 1941. In some cases, he wrote, the Romanians had only gotten as far as
destroying the buildings, and had made no apparent attempt to construct new
ones in their place. Underscoring this point, he concluded that, unlike Hunga-
rians, Romanians were “destroyers,” not “builders.”19
Responding indignantly to Romanian attempts to transform the region,
Fodor reeled at the audacity of a foreign people engaged in what amounted to
a harsh, and ultimately barbaric, re-coding of the land and its people.20 With
an unmistakable splash of bravado, Fodor initially rejected these Romanian
efforts as inherently superficial, maintaining that, though these foreign
occupiers could destroy Hungarian structures and change Hungarian place
names on paper, they would never be able to “write” these names successfully
and permanently “into the ground.” “There was no way,” he insisted, “that the
Hungarian spirit of the city would be transformed into a Romanian one.”21
But Fodor was perhaps less sure of himself than he would lead us to believe.
His confident pronouncement that Romanian efforts to re-imagine the city
would never succeed, in fact, was betrayed by a concern over the state of the
city’s archives. Having traveled to Szatmár in the summer of 1941 to collect
material for his comprehensive geographical study of the city, Fodor was
appalled to find boxes of irreplaceable maps and documents “mouldering
away on dusty shelves” in archives that Hungarians had not had access to for
some years.22 This obviously troubled Fodor. Indeed, without archival sources
— without these national narratives and symbolic representations of the land
— there was no enduring memory; no Hungarian past, and thus no Hungarian
present or future.
Fodor’s concern over the state of the documents as he found them in
1941 was exacerbated not only by the geo-political realities of postwar east
central Europe (and in particular by the silence imposed by the communists
over the Trianon question), but also by the questionable loyalties of the
Hungarians left in the city. Indeed, despite his obvious disdain for the Roma-
nians, a people he refers to throughout the manuscript as barbaric and unci-
vilized, he is careful to point out that the real blame for the disappearance of
Hungarian memory quite likely lay with the Hungarians themselves. Fitting
his own narrative into the critical-analytical framework laid out by Szekfű in 
Három Nemzedék, Fodor devotes much space to dissecting the history of
Szatmár’s moral and spiritual decline during the long nineteenth century,
pointing to the decadent liberalism of the post-1867 period as a regrettable, but
in retrospect inevitable, precursor to the “treacherous ethnic Hungarian oppor-
tunism” of the interwar period. Though he praised, on the one hand, the idea
of an undefeated Hungarian spirit, he was also critical of many of those who
remained in Szatmár after Trianon for their apparent willingness to assimilate
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and even collaborate with their Romanian “occupiers.”23 Such a state of
affairs, he argued, did not bode well for the future of Szatmár as a historical,
or even spiritual, Hungarian space.
Indeed, despite Fodor’s conviction that communism would not last
forever, and that Hungary would once again be given the opportunity to return
to its proper Christian-nationalist roots, there is a distinctly desperate quality
evident in his work; a melancholic, even elegiac element that betrays Fodor’s
own doubts about the possible rehabilitation of the city (and with it the nation)
in the future. Treacherous Hungarian elements, after all, had done much to
undermine the Hungarianness of the city, while Romanian efforts to re-code
the region had already transformed the landscape, if only in a superficial way.
Even the archives — those all-important reservoirs of national memory —
were in danger of disappearing forever. Perhaps, then, Fodor offered his bio-
graphy of Szatmár not so much as a template for the re-building of a reunified
Hungary, but as a time capsule, or “gift,” to be bestowed upon future genera-
tions of Hungarians so that they might properly “mourn” what had been lost to
the nation.24 Perhaps, in the final analysis, this is all that he could do. Having
devoted himself to what historian Susan Crane has described as “the presser-
vation of what would otherwise be lost both mentally and materially,” Fodor
could at least ensure that Szatmár, and the region as a whole, would be
remembered “properly” by future generations.
As limited as this form of remembering may have been in practical
nationalist terms, it was by no means inconsequential in an ontological sense.
As the literary scholar Aaron Beaver has pointed out in a recent essay, the type
of mournful, elegiac writing that runs through Fodor’s manuscript has pro-
found existential implications. Drawing on the ontological notion of being-
for-others that Jean-Paul Sartre develops in Being and Nothingness, Beaver
argues that the elegy (and Fodor’s work can certainly be read in this way) does
more than simply commemorate the object of one’s memory. In remembering
what has been lost, the elegy quite literally constitutes, and thus preserves, this
selfsame object. In the absence of elegiac memory, he argues, the dead “not
only cease to exist, but in a very real sense never existed at all.”25 For Fodor,
then, the biography of his “home city” didn’t simply ensure that the city would
be remembered. In a profoundly solipsistic way, it guaranteed the city’s very
existence for Hungarians — past, present, and future.
Remembering Himself
Though Fodor’s biography of Szatmár was obviously intended as an under-
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ground, socialist-era vehicle for the preservation of conservative-nationalist
memory, it was also intended as a vehicle for the remembering of himself.
Having been stripped of his teaching position and his academic credentials by
the postwar communist regime, Fodor struggled until his death in 1962 to
reinvent himself as a socialist geographer. Not unlike Czeslaw Milosz’s
“Alpha” intellectual outlined in The Captive Mind, Fodor found himself in a
position whereby a scholarly “conversion” to socialism was the only way to
remain relevant as an intellectual.26 Perhaps more importantly, it was the only
way he could continue to make a life for himself and his family as an
academic. Such a conversion was by no means easy for Fodor from a moral or
personal point of view, as it meant opening himself up to charges of
opportunism. This no doubt weighed heavily on him, and must be taken into
consideration when we analyze the underlying meaning of underground
socialist-era manuscripts like “Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete.”
As a time capsule, this study served not only to preserve the memory of the
city and the nation, but also to defend Fodor against those who might criticize
him of deviating from his conservative-nationalist values, and of betraying
Hungary and its people.
The careful packaging of his work, therefore, one in which nation,
city, and self were intimately linked, provides a useful glimpse into the
important connection that exists between memory and personal identity, or,
more accurately, the act of remembering and the act of identifying oneself with
a carefully selected set of narratives, images, objects, and even physical
spaces. As Paul Ricoeur argues in Memory, History, Forgetting, the act of
remembering something other than oneself is intimately tied to one’s percep-
tion of self—to how one sees oneself in the present, and to how this self-image
is projected into the future. Connecting this to his conceptualization of “prag-
matic” or “active” memory as being creative in a fundamentally phenolmeno-
logical sense, Ricoeur suggests that, in remembering an object (or, in Fodor’s
case, an entire city), one remembers oneself.27
This self-constructing or autobiographical function of memory out-
lined by Ricoeur was obviously present in Fodor’s socialist-era underground
work, and especially in his biography of Szatmár. Particularly relevant in this
light is how Fodor periodizes, and then analyzes, the modern era from the
beginning of the nineteenth century to World War II. Dividing this era into
three periods (namely Christian conservatism, 1800-1867; degenerate
“Jewish” liberalism, 1867-1920; and Romanian barbarism, 1920-1939), Fodor
suggests how Szatmár was first built into a modern but morally and culturally
conservative city by a string of visionary bishops, and then how this “brilliant,
shining” example of Hungarian morality and industriousness slowly decayed
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between 1867 and the First World War, a period of decadent liberalism and
aggressive assimilationist policies which only served to weaken, rather than
strengthen, the nation.28 Though he admits that this period brought unprece-
dented growth and economic prosperity to Szatmár, he laments the unprin-
cipled and immoral way in which the process of modernization was carried
out, and is even more critical of the adverse, degenerative impact that the
wholesale “Magyarization” of ethnic minorities had on the city socially and
culturally. Weakened by these factors, the city’s Hungarian citizens faced a
difficult struggle against the oppressive and ultimately crippling “occupation”
by the Romanians during the interwar period.
Layering and then analyzing the history of Szatmár in this way
allowed Fodor to do two things. First, it provided him with an opportunity to
identify an authentic Hungarian core, one which was at once Catholic, morally
conservative, and fiercely patriotic, especially when provoked. The real
heroes of Fodor’s narrative are undoubtedly the members of this ethnic body,
Christian men and women (but primarily clergymen, teachers, and scholars)
who functioned as the true builders of modern Hungary in the first half of the
nineteenth century, and who went on to serve as its principal defenders during
the subsequent periods of internal decline and foreign occupation. Second, it
allowed him to position himself, albeit indirectly, within this ethnic core, and
to tie his own identity as a conservative-nationalist Hungarian to the self-
image of this group. When read against other unpublished autobiographical
sources, it becomes readily apparent that he saw himself as being part of an
heroic Hungarian vanguard who, even when they were “barricaded” behind
the gates of their schools and churches, managed to hold back the forces of
degeneration and tyranny. In the introduction to yet another lengthy
underground study “A magyar lét földrajza,” for example, and also in a
number of autobiographical sketches written at different points in his life,
Fodor referred to his pedagogical work, his scholarship, and his social
activism as constituting part of a moral defence for Hungary. When he wrote,
therefore, that “it was from behind the gates of Szatmár’s Christian schools,
churches, and other institutions that the rootless and unpatriotic spirit of the
liberal period was held at bay,” it is easy to see how Fodor, who attended a
Catholic gymnasium in Szatmár, and who later taught in Catholic schools,
might have seen himself as being part of this line of nationalist defence.29
The fact that Fodor refers to Szatmár as his home city, even though he
was not born there, provides further insight into the autobiographical elements
that run through his study. Fodor was born, in fact, in Tenke (now Tinca), a
small village roughly 50 km from Szatmár, and only moved from there to this
much larger regional centre as a boy of ten to begin his studies as a gymnasi-
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um student. Given that a good number of his formative years were spent in
Szatmár, it is perhaps understandable that he would regard it, rather than
Tenke, as “home.” As he himself admits, “one’s home is not necessarily where
one was born, but where one gains self consciousness, an awareness of one’s
purpose in life, and a sense of one’s relationship to the outside world. Szatmár
is my spiritual and intellectual homeland.”30 Again, when read against other
unpublished autobiographical material, it becomes clear that Szatmár was not
simply a place in which he became aware of himself, but rather was a place
where he began to imagine or invent himself—as a scholar, as a man, and as a
nationalist.31 Szatmár was significant because it marked his first attempt to
“code” himself, to lay down roots, and to begin his lifelong struggle to dis-
tance himself from his impoverished, provincial, working-class origin in
Tenke. Though he would refer back to Tenke with fondness (especially during
the communist period, when it was politically astute for him to do so), Szatmár
was his true hometown, however imagined it may have been, and served as a
familiar symbolic space in which he could find meaning and solace, even
under communism.
Though central to the expression and preservation of his own sense of
self, Fodor’s scholarly work alone was by no means sufficient to satisfy the
autobiographical impulse which had become so acute during the war years.
Even the detailed and ethnographically-informed “Élettörténet” (Life History)
that he had begun writing in January 1941 was insufficient, especially in light
of his experiences in Szatmár in the summer of that same year. Recognizing
the fragility of narratives unsupported by factual evidence, Fodor began
collecting and organizing documents, letters, photographs, and other keep-
sakes to support, and even illustrate, the life narrative that he was so desperate
to write, and ultimately bequeath to the future. His own identity and reputa-
tion had often come under attack during his lifetime, and he certainly feared
what would happen after his death, an event that he felt was close at hand. If
his “narrative of self” was to have any staying power, therefore, it would need
to be as airtight and “ironclad” as possible.32
This need to provide an objective grounding for his life story mani-
fested itself most obviously in a series of twenty-one scrapbooks that he began
assembling sometime between the summer of 1941 and the end of the war in
1945. Though the bulk of the project appears to have been completed after the
war, and perhaps even during the communist period, the project itself was, at
least at the outset, an obvious response to the profound sense of existential
destabilization, and at times hopelessness, that Fodor felt during the war.33
Though devoid of excessive descriptions, the documents and photographs that
he included in his scrapbooks were nevertheless carefully organized so as to
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tell a particular story, one that would supplement, and help solidify, other
purely textual narratives of self. The documents and images in Fodor’s scrap-
books, in fact, overlapped and intersected with each other to create an
integrated network of meaning; a discursive and symbolic nexus intended to
establish a cohesive personal narrative by dispelling the forces of fragmen-
tation and dissolution that had plagued him throughout his life. Assembled
into a meaningful, organic totality, Fodor no doubt hoped that these scrap-
books would contribute to the “accurate” telling, and re-telling, of his life
story.
Organized more or less chronologically and thematically, the scrap-
books trace Fodor’s development through time, from his birth in Tenke in
1887, to his old age in Budapest in the late 1950s. Focusing either on a parti-
cular period of his life, or on a particular aspect of his nation-building work
(his boy scout activities, for example, or his pedagogical work in Pécs and
Budapest during the war), the scrapbooks rely on carefully crafted montages
and strategically positioned documents and photographs to construct a
“factually-based” narrative of Fodor’s personal history. Much like the
totalizing narrative of Szatmár-Németi constructed in “Szatmár földje, Szat-
már népe, Szatmár élete” — one which gave voice to a “timeless” Magyar
identity evolving teleologically over time — the life story that emerges from
this process of strategic positioning and careful layering is one of a creative,
moral, and fundamentally autonomous subject linked organically and
meaningfully to his own past, and to his own familial and geographical roots.34
As Hayden White has argued, autobiography itself is “the product of a
particular emplotment imposed on the facts of an individual’s life.”35 Paul
Ricoeur takes this idea a bit further, arguing that emplotment is what estab-
lishes the transition from the mere recounting of a life story to its explana-
tion.36 The first of Fodor’s twenty-one scrapbooks provides an excellent
illustration of this idea of “emplotment” suggested by White and developed by
Ricouer. Though the organization of the photos and documents is not chrono-
logically consistent, the self-conscious narrative that Fodor attempted to con-
struct is certainly evident. Answering questions of where he was from, and,
more importantly, of what he had become in the years leading up to the
beginning of World War II, Fodor intended this first scrapbook to serve as an
introduction to, and overview of, his life, at least up to 1940-41. Having
established in the opening few pages his “authentic” village roots, Fodor then
showed how he shaped this raw material into a fully-developed, productive,
and ultimately moral masculine self. Highlighting scholarly successes both as
a gymnasium student in Szatmár, and then as a university student in Budapest,
Fodor traced the trajectory of his academic career to the end of the 1930s.
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His inclusion at the end of this first scrapbook of congratulatory letters written
by officials at the Ministry of Religion and Education in 1938 and 1939
suggest a continuity between his early training, and his later work for the
nation. As it would be in each of the following scrapbooks, the focus here was
very much on himself, rather than his family. The family, in fact, when it was
represented, merely served as a passive backdrop against which his own
identity as a scholarly Christian male was fashioned.
Of course, Fodor could not help but include images which no doubt
reminded him of the more distressing and unpleasant events of his life. Photos
of his mother’s grave, for example, and of his son Zoli who died suddenly and
tragically in 1936 at the age of twenty, documented what had been lost to him
over the course of his life. And yet, despite the painful, and even negative
memories, that Fodor included in this and other scrapbooks — memories
which pointed to the fragility of his identity, and to failures and disappoint-
ments both major and minor — the project as a whole tended to gloss over his
lifelong struggle against melancholy, dissolution, and disappointment.
Focusing instead on his personal achievements, and especially on his academic
successes, Fodor’s scrapbooks projected an idealized image of a unified and
triumphant self. Much like his synthetic geographies, and especially his
underground socialist-era work, his scrapbooks functioned as a fetish of sorts,
an object of obvious symbolic import through which he could resolve his
lingering sense of ontological incompletion and existential anxiety. Though
intended primarily for his descendants, the scrapbooks also offered Fodor a
sense of solace and meaning during otherwise difficult and uncertain times.
Beyond being embodied in his personal papers and unpublished,
“underground” nationalist geographies, the autobiographical impulse was also
reflected in his published socialist-era scholarship, especially in biographical
and quasi-biographical studies which focused on the lives and work of
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Hungarian geographers and scientists. His
Magyar Vízimérnököknek a Tisza-völgyben (Hungarian hydrological engineers
of the Tisza Valley), which won an award from the Academy of Sciences in
1955, and was published in 1957, was an obvious example of this, especially
given the emphasis Fodor placed on the “heroic” nation-building work of the
conservative-nationalist icon Count István Széchenyi. Even more telling in
this respect was his 1953 study of the life and work of Antal Balla, an
important though little-known eighteenth-century Hungarian cartographer and
natural scientist who, much like Fodor, had cultivated other educated gentle-
manly interests such as archaeology, music, and art alongside his scholarly
work. Granted, the narrative of this short work is for the most part mechanical
and uninspiring, focused as it is on the more technical aspects of Balla’s
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cartographical and scientific endeavours. The brief glimpses that he provided
into Balla’s personal life, however, combined with the praise that he lavished
on the more creative, artistic side of his work suggests that Fodor projected his
own self-image onto the object of his study. The image of himself that he con-
structed in his own scrapbooks, in fact, runs parallel in many ways with the
image that he conveyed of Balla. Foregrounding the nation-building impor-
tance of his scholarly work, Fodor nevertheless integrated images and texts
documenting not only his talents as an artist, photographer, and musician, but
also his skills and achievements as a botanist and gentleman adventurer.
Water colours of birds and landscapes that he painted were included in a
number of his scrapbooks, for example, as were references to public perfor-
mances he gave playing the tárogató, or shawm (a double-reed instrument not
unlike an oboe). Textual accounts and photographs of his many scientific and
touristic excursions, moreover, reflected the self-image of a man who saw
himself as being deeply connected to the land through both his work and his
passionate love of all things natural.
A montage of three photographs taken in 1912 and mounted in book
four of his scrapbooks speaks volumes to the way that Fodor regarded himself,
and how he wanted to be remembered. Taken within a year of his arrival at
his first teaching post in the provincial town of Karánsebes (Caransebeş), the 
pictures capture a number of the more important, interconnected aspects of his
life which he regarded as being integral to his identity and sense of self. At
the top of the page is a photograph of Fodor posed with his tárogató. He is
outside, amidst nature, his weight on his left leg, a cape strung over his
shoulders. He appears to be playing the instrument, though the way he is
looking at the camera suggests that the photograph was definitely staged. The
caption reads simply: “1912, spring.” In the middle of the page is a photo-
graph of the room which served as Fodor’s study in Karánsebes. As in so
many other pictures of his living and work spaces that he included in his
scrapbooks, his desk is fore-grounded. The caption: “my bachelor apartment.”
On the bottom of the page is a photograph of Fodor obviously dressed for an
excursion. He is wearing a Bavarian-style hat, a cape, and leather boots which
come up to just above the calf. He is sitting at the base of a tree on one of its
exposed roots. In his hand is a walking stick, and on his knee a knapsack.
The photographer is slightly below him, giving the image itself an unmis-
takably noble and majestic air. The caption: “1912.”37
This sense of nobility and gentlemanly accomplishment is certainly
present in his study of Balla. Indeed, Fodor no doubt saw a kindred spirit in
Balla, a man motivated not only by the pursuit of science and the love of his
country, but also by the beauty and wonder of nature. Balla, he writes, was an
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artist rather than a mere technician, a highly-cultured scholar who illustrated
his maps with intricate drawings of Hungarian flora, and who inundated his
work with mythical and religious symbolism. “It was only after him,” Fodor
assures us, “that the profession [of cartography] became a dry [technical]
craft.”38
Such a statement ultimately says as much about the nature of
scholarship under communism as it does about the state of Hungarian carto-
graphy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In making this claim, Fodor
drew attention to his own situation, and to the situation of others who, like
him, were compelled to become mere political functionaries, bending their
scholarship to the pragmatic demands of socialist state-building. By praising
Balla’s maps and their artistic, humanistic content, and by further voicing his
contempt for the functional yet unimaginative cartography which followed in
his wake, Fodor was suggesting — if only implicitly — that he would prefer to
be remembered as a creative, free-thinking scholar, rather than as a com-
munist-era drone.
The fear, in fact, that he would not be remembered “correctly,” or that
he would be forgotten altogether after his death, underlines Fodor’s biography
of Balla as much as it does his biography of Szatmár. In a way very similar to
his anxiety that Szatmár would be remembered correctly, if at all, his lament
that Balla’s name had “disappeared without a trace from Hungarian intellec-
tual history,” and that German-speaking scholars had even attributed some of
his scholarly achievements to Austrian scientists, blends with Fodor’s own
anxiety that he himself would eventually be buried and forgotten by a regime
guided by a foreign political and ideological agenda. In preserving the memory
of a city like Szatmár, or an important Hungarian intellectual like Balla, he
was, if only by proxy, also preserving the memory of himself.
Appendix
Excerpts from “Szatmár’s földje…”
[Author’s notes:] The following passages are from Fodor’s work, “Szatmár’s
földje,…” They are reproduced here in English to illustrate the tone and
contents of his manuscript. The first part has been selected from his descrip-
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tions of Szatmár’s history, the second from his account of the city’s and its
inhabitants’ fate under Romanian rule from 1919 to 1940. The passages were
translated into English by Nándor Dreisziger in consultation with the author of
this paper.
Part 1
The Settlement of Szatmár-Németi and its Life in the Middle Ages
According to the all-knowing Anonymus, Szatmár pre-dates the [Hungarian]
conquest. He has to tell of course how the Hungarians took the city. His
story, in an old-fashioned translation, goes like this:
It was decreed that Tass, the father of Lehel, and Zámbók, the son of
Elend, from whom descended the Csakij clan, as well as Horka’s father
Töhötöm, and the grandfather of Gyul and Zombor, the ancestor of the
Maglót clan, marched against Mén Marót. With their army divided
into two, they go to the fort of Zothmár, which they took after a three-
day siege. On the forth day they entered the fort and captured Mén
Marót’s soldiers, put them into chains, and tossed them into the deep
dark dungeons. They also took the sons of the inhabitants hostage and
left the fort manned by their own soldiers and set out in the direction of
Mezes….
This is how Anonymus described the events. We now know that he projected
the geographic and political conditions of his own age back to the times of the
conquest.
The fact that Kér, Gyarmat and Szatmárnémeti were located on islands
free from the floods means that the grasslands that in the 10th century stretched
from Csap along the banks of the Tisza continued in the direction of
Transylvania along the banks of the Szamos. These islands served as location
for the eastern defence works of the region. Szatmár retained such a function
even after the flood-free area of the grasslands was enlarged. Hydrography
determined the location of the royal fortresses such as Szatmár. My own
researches have established the location of the earliest grasslands of this
region, they were east of the Nyirség and alongside the Szamos…. A third
such grassland, one that stretched from Huszt through Várfalu to Erdőszáda, 
was part of the lands occupied by the conquerors and is known as the Szamos-
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háta.
Ferenc Maksai came to similar conclusions when he suggested that the
eastern frontier of the lands occupied during the conquest was at the Láp and
that the Szamos watershed was taken over only in the 10th and 11th centuries, a
short distance beyond Szatmárnémeti. The eastern frontiers of the Szamos
drainage system up to the Tur creek, was occupied only in the 12th century.
This suggests, as Maksai argues, that in the lower valley of the
Szamos, with the exception of Kér and Gyarmat, all along the river we find
royal possessions, in addition to Szatmár and Németi, Olaszi, Jánosi, Csenger,
Óvári, Solymos, Dob, Recsege, etc. East of Szatmár in the Szamos valley we
find only a few villages that had been in the possession of the clans of the
conquerors, namely Krassó, Kolcs, Lápos and the estates of the Koplony clan,
and Romád of the Gutkeled, and in the direction of south, Erdőd of the 
Hontpázmánys. Among these Krassó dates from the 12th century, Lápos from
the early 13th,  Erdőd from the turn of the 11th and 12th centuries, that is all of
them are late settlements and definitely post-date Szatmár. From all this it
becomes clear that Szatmár began as a frontier post. The question then is
when and by whom it was established? But it is clear that it is not a fort that
pre-dates the conquest.
In this connection let us consider first the theories of János Kará-
csonyi. He says that by 1230 the fort had been definitely established, but he
considers the claim that by 1236 it was a royal city to be false. He believes
that king St. Stephen’s victory over the Bulgar eader Kean in 1020 resulted in
the region being made royal property. In the second half of the 11th century
some places in the Szamos region (Hermenszeg, Angyalos) were settled by
Flemish or Walloon immigrants. The name of Szatmár was for a long time
Szotmár (Karácsonyi derives the name from that of one of these settlers). The
name was changed to Szatmár only around 1400. In 1411 the settlement of St.
Egyed was part of the town. The use of this name points to the Walloons
among whom the worship of this saint was common, according to Karácsonyi.
In Szatmár’s neighbourhood there was once a village named Gelyénes
(according to old ways of spelling Gylianus, Gyleanus, Kelyanus). This
village must have been named after Saint Kilianus who was a respected saint
in the Rhine Valley. Southwest of Szatmár could be found the village of
Hédre which got its name from a settler named Hédrech (Chudruch) who was
of Germanic descent. All this points to the fact that the region of Szatmár was
settled by Germans.
The earthen fortifications in the bend of the Szamos must have been
built when King Béla had to defend himself from the claimant to his throne,
Boris of Kiev. From these beginnings started the fort of Szatmár. It became a
Steven Jobbitt30
county seat when the ispán [in Latin comes] was transferred here from Sárvár.
These are the theories of Karácsonyi, but they don’t stand up in the light of
evidence produced later.
According to Maksai the above speculations are wrong. He believes
that Szatmár as a settlement and as a county seat was established during the
reign of St. Stephen. The presence of any Germans here is not mentioned in
any documents before 1216. The residents of the settlement around the fort
were Hungarians. Szatmár’s origins are doubtless Hungarian. Its name comes
from the Turkic name of its first ispán. Contrary to the claim of Anonymus,
the settlement cannot be older than the 11th century. Maksai also points out
that all the villages around this place were Hungarian settlements. They were
all possessions of the original Magyar clans, except for the royal estates. Dara
was the possession of the Csák clan, established no later than the13th century.
Pete belonged to the Gutkeleds and was a pre-12th century settlement. Daroc
was a royal village dating from before 1100. Lázári belonged to the Káta clan
and dates from the late 12th century. This clan also owned Homok, which dates
from the early 1200s. Vásári at first belonged to the Káta clan; it is one of the
oldest settlements of the region. Batiz is probably a royal establishment that
later belonged to the Hontpázmány family. They owned Szentmárton also, a
pre-13th century settlement. Vértes belonged to the Kalony clan and was
founded between 1234 and 1241. The neighbouring village of Gelényes,
which later was abandoned, dated from the early 13th century….
These communities surrounded Szatmár and they were undoubtedly
Magyar settlements. There is also no doubt that Szatmár pre-dated all of them.
In conclusion, according to the best scholarly opinion, Szatmár was a
Hungarian settlement from the age of St. Stephen.
Maksai acknowledges that the Hungarians of the region assimilated
some Slavic populations. In this region about fifteen Slav villages existed in
the Middle Ages, but of these only two pre-dated the conquest. The Slavs
assimilated rapidly. In the Middle Ages there was no trace of the Vlachs [the
ancestors of the Romanians –ed.] in this region. In the late Middle Ages only
Berend and Bezence had any such populations, as well as the no longer
existing village of Medgyes. This is as close as the Vlachs came to Szatmár.
Let us now consider the origins of Németi and German settlement in
the region.
Karácsonyi thinks it possible that Németi was founded by settlers who
arrived in the country with Queen Gizella, the wife of King Stephen, but he
thinks they settled elsewhere first and only later moved here. Maksai also
believes that Németi’s population was originally German but he cannot
establish the time of the settlement’s foundation. There are no documents
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relating to the Germans there prior to 1216. In all probability the settlement
was established in the 12th century. The saying that the settlers came with
royalty is only a popular myth. Perhaps they arrived in various stages. Németi
could not have been established before Szatmár was….
Part 2
Szatmárnémeti as Satu Mare.
In the First World War the national strength of the Hungarian nation was
tragically sapped. The country could not hold on to its frontier regions and not
even the periphery of its very heartland. The glorious resistance by the Székely
division ended precisely at Szatmár. On the 21st of April, 1919, on Good
Friday, the division’s machine guns were still standing on Deák Square, but
because they were surrounded on one side by the Reds (vörösök) and the other
by the Romanians (oláhok), they had to retreat from there. They were soon
followed by the Romanians who entered the town with fixed bayonets. Thanks
to the Székely division communist rule in Szatmár lasted only a few weeks,
and as a result could do little damage. But then came, quite unexpectedly, an-
other barbaric rule. Szatmár became Satu Mare and remained such for 21
years, 4 months and 15 days…. [later in his manuscript Fodor writes 19 years,
5 months and 14 days].
It is difficult to understand how Szatmár became Satu Mare. In its
entire history the city was never known by that name. The name Satu Mare
was put in writing first in 1768, by mistake by a Hungarian man, József
Zanathy, the justice of the peace, an amateur philologist. When the Romanians
renamed city, they could hardly have been aware of that. So, with typical
Romanian rationale, they decided on Satu Mare (big village). The Romanians
no doubt were aware that this would present a problem, as places with such
name abound in Romania which gives rise to confusion. For this reason in
1922 the official state gazetteer of Romania named the city simply as “Sat-
mar”. At the same time the city itself requested that this name be used as the
name Satu Mare only created misunderstandings and did not do justice to the
fact that it is a city. In 1923 Romania’s Department of Interior decreed that the
city should be known as Satmar, but the government institute in charge of
municipalities did not agree to this and insisted on the name Satu Mare…. At
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the same time the county, which was not under the jurisdiction of this
institution, was named Satmar! In 1935, the Romanian Academy requested
that the city’s name be changed to Satmar, but this too was rejected.
We don’t want to deal with the political history of Romanian occupa-
tion but with our city’s evolution. We cannot even tell all the sufferings and
injustices that the Magyar inhabitants of this ancient city had to endure during
two decades. Besides, this was a fate that it shared with every city of Transyl-
vania ― everything happened here that happened elsewhere… for the 
purposes of breaking the Hungarian spirit. We will enumerate only the
measures that played a role in the city’s evolution. A pivotal event was the fact
that the city lost its ability to administer itself. For many years there was no
longer an elected body to enact bylaws, only a special committee appointed by
the [central government]. In 1934 even this apparent measure of self-
government was taken away, the government deciding that the decisions of
this special committee should be approved by the city’s [also appointed]
administrator, to make them binding. In any case the city’s fate became a
political football. The possibilities of developing the city were greatly limited
by the fact that the officials of the city kept changing with the changing
fortunes of the parties that ruled the country. That is, long-term plans for the
city’s development could not be implemented. In every decision the interests
of a certain political party played a predominant role. Since the decisions of a
particular government could usually not be implemented during the term of
that government, the next government failed to carry out or actually nixed the
pervious administration’s plans. Szatmár was awarded a number of state
institutions, but most of them on paper only since before the directive to this
end could be implemented the government responsible was removed from
power. To give an example, in 1920 Szatmár received the headquarters of the
no. 4 railway district, but this office never came to the city. Only a railway
inspectors’ office was brought to the city, but in 1939 it was moved elsewhere.
A most important administrative and political move happened during
the city’s two decades long Romanian occupation when in 1925 the
government in Bucharest moved the county seat here. [Prior to 1920] the city
had waged a long struggle for this to happen but Hungary’s government
ignored these aspirations…. Nevertheless, the possibility always existed that
this decision of the [Romanian] government was not final and that the county
seat would be transferred to Nagybánya. The struggle between the two cities
went on for years when finally the county seat was established in Szatmár. The
county administration’s various departments were located in the Hotel
Pannonia [that had been renamed Hotel Dacia] and in the City Hall. In the end
Nagybánya was transferred to [another] county….
Remembering Szatmár 33
A few administrative offices [related to agriculture, commerce, etc.]
were established in the city. The situation of these was not stable. There were
always plans to move one or the other somewhere else. The life of the city
was characterised by the fact that nothing was steady, everything was insecure,
everything was in a state of flux… as party politics determined all decisions,
everything was subordinated to it.
The city almost lost Szatmárhegy, as it was completely neglected. In
1934 the people of [this city district] seriously wanted to separate from Szat-
már….
Among the city fathers… we often find renegade Hungarians; they
had names such as Chereches [Kerekes], Pogacias [Pogácsás],… At other
times newcomers became mayors; for example, the man who was appointed
mayor in 1938 had lived in Szatmár only for two years. Only [later] did inter-
national events elsewhere in Europe have an impact and a Hungarian man,
István Antal, was appointed deputy-mayor. It often happened that when a
mayor or city perfect was replaced, the new government brought charges of
corruption against him….
A great blow was received by the city in 1938 when it was demoted to
the rank of a town, with the excuse that its population had fallen below
50,000. This, despite the fact that in 1920 the city’s population was estimated
to be 58,000, and in 1930, 51,000….
Even though throughout the entire period of Romanian rule there was
never a municipal election in the city, the municipal voters’ list was
maintained. Just how this was done is illustrated by the fact that in January of
1940 the number of eligible voters was said to be 4,134!
In 1935 Szatmárhegy again tried to separate from the city, i.e. from
the town of Satu Mare…. In December of 1938 all men of 30 and over were
allowed to vote on whether they wanted to separate. 20 voted yes as opposed
to 218 who voted no.
The special committees were appointed to administer the city so that
the Hungarian majority could not use its numerical weight to control its own
destiny, and to make sure that it would be at the mercy of the [city’s]
Romanian minority. By 1938 the result of this was that out of the 76 municipal
officials 59 were Romanians, i.e. 77.6%, this at a time when, even according
to [Romanian] statistics, out of the city’s total population only 27.1% spoke
Romanian….
[Translator’s note: Fodor next begins to enumerate the incidents that
resulted in the arrest and imprisonment of Szatmár’s people for real or alleged
pro-Hungarian activities.]
Already in 1921 four of Szatmár’s inhabitants became victims of a
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show trial: Kamil Irányi (a Lutheran minister), János Szücs (a Lázárite Roman
Catholic priest), Ilona Varga and János Varga. In 1922, Irányi received a five-
and-a-half year jail sentence, as did Szerafin P. Szabó (a Franciscan priest) and
Imre Sándor. In 1933 three students [accused of anti-Trianon agitation] were
banned from all the schools of the country.
From 1932 on, the city was terrorized by the so-called “anti-
revisionists”. On the 20th of March that year these people destroyed the
premises of the paper Szatmári Ujság (Szatmár newspaper) and beat up its
editor. From this time on Szatmár’s Hungarians would dread the gatherings of
these people….
In December of 1938 [the Romanian authorities] arrested the former
notary public István Csengery for [alleged] revisionist contacts and spying. In
January of 1939 two young men, István Zagyva and István Antal were arrested
on the ground that they were trying to establish a [secret] Hungarian armed
unit. In 1937 the Reformed minister of Szatmárhegy was interned because he
walked out of his church before the singing of the Romanian anthem was
finished.
Unfortunately, the various Romanian political parties were always
able to divide Hungarians between themselves and Hungarian political parties.
Only at the end of the 1930s could the Hungarians be rallied around an
organization called Magyar Népközösség (Hungarian People’s Bloc), but this
was only the Hungarian version of a Romanian right-wing movement….
The Romanians carried their chauvinism so far as to pass a decree in
1940 that compelled people attending a theatre or movie production to not
leave before the singing of the anthem of the Romanian royal house was
finished. Whoever disobeyed this edict was immediately arrested on grounds
of being disrespectful to the sovereign….
[end of the appendix]
NOTES
1 The correct Hungarian name for Fodor's "hometown" is actually Szatmár--
Németi, a city which was created in the eighteenth century by the amalgamation of the
"sister cities" Szatmár and Németi. In spite of this, Fodor insists on referring to the
city after the amalgamation almost exclusively as Szatmár. This is potentially con-
fusing, since Szatmár is also the name of the county in which Szatmár-Németi was
historically located. His constant use of "Szatmár" as the name of the city, however, is
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by no means insignificant. Szatmár was developed as a fortified position, and was
inhabited from the beginning, or so Fodor argues, predominantly by Magyars, or
ethnic Hungarians. Németi, by contrast, was founded and was for centuries populated
primarily by Germans, and served as a commercial centre rather than as a defensive
position. It played, in many ways, a decadent, capitalist "Pest" to Szatmár's morally-
stable "Buda," and was dependent on the latter for its safety and security (at least this
is how Fodor portrays it).
2 Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtár Kézirattára (MTAKK) Ms
10.740/1, Ferenc Fodor, “Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete” (Budapest,
1954), 2.
3 Ibid., 1.
4 See also MTAKK Ms 10.739/1./1-2, Ferenc Fodor, “A magyar lét föld-
rajza” (Budapest, 1945).
5 Reflecting on his schooling, Fodor would later write that he had been
politicized from a very young age. See Magyar Vizügyi Múzeum Dokumentaciós
Gyüjteménye (MVMDGy) H-20/1 28-97. Ferenc Fodor “Életem eseményei (1887-
1959),” (n.d. 1959?), 4.





11 On Klebelsberg's importance to the development and dissemination of
szellemtörténet, see Steven Béla Várdy, Modern Hungarian Historiography (Boulder,
CO: East European Quarterly, 1976), 50-61. See also Bálint Homan, “A történelem
útja,” in A magyar törtenetirás új útjai, ed. Bálint Homan (Budapest: A Magyar
Szemle Társaság, 1932). This volume of essays was the first comprehensive work
outlining and explaining the principles of szellemtörténet.
12 William R. Everdell, The First Moderns: Profiles in the Origins of
Twentieth Century Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 15.
13 Fodor, "Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete," 1.
14 For an excellent discussion of Romanian cultural politics during the
interwar period see Irina Livzeanu Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regional-
ism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1995).




19 Ibid., 255. Fodor's disparaging assessment of the Romanians as stewards
of the city, it should be noted, was far reaching, so much so that it even included a
sophisticated ecological critique of the “hydrological management” of the city and its
water supply. Arguing that all the city's hydrological problems had been solved by
Steven Jobbitt36
Hungarian engineers in the pre-Trianon period, Fodor contended that “no one had to
worry anymore about flooding,” or about the quality and abundance of drinking
water. The Romanians, however, had been delinquent in the upkeep and continuation
of earlier Hungarian hydrological work. Any thought they had give to flood control
remained, “like so much else,” merely a plan (and this despite the fact that they had
the benefit of drawing on the existing plans of experienced, and thus also culturally
and intellectually “superior,” Hungarian experts). It was for this reason, he argued,
that in February and March of 1940, the city and region suffered some of its worst
flooding since the “big flood of 1888.” Though not as destructive as this earlier flood,
the damage was considerable, and would have been worse if it were not for the work





24 Susan Crane, “Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory,”
American Historical Review 102/5 (December, 1997): 1372.
25 Aaron Beaver, “Lyricism and Philosophy in Brodsky's Elegiac Verse,”
Slavic Review 67/3 (Fall 2008): 600. The italics are Beaver's.
26 See Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (New York: Vintage Books,
1990), trans. Jane Zielonko, 82-110.
27 Drawing on the distinction made by the ancient Greeks between "mneme"
and "anamnesis," Ricoeur distinguishes between passive or cognitive memory, and
active or pragmatic memory. “To remember,” he writes, is either “to have a memory
or to set off in search of a memory.” See Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 4.
28 Ibid., 169.
29 Besides “A magyar lét földrajza,” see MVMDGy H-20/1 28-97. 1/1,
Ferenc Fodor, “Önéletrajza/Curriculum Vitae” (Pécs, 1940); and MVMDGy H-20/1
28-97. 1/3, Fodor Ferenc, “Élettörténet," (written in Pécs and Budapest between 1941
and 1950). On the nature of conservative Christian nationalism in Hungary in the first
half of the twentieth century, see Paul Hanebrink, In Defense of Christian Hungary:
Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890-1944 (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 2006).
30 Fodor, “Szatmár földje, Szatmár népe, Szatmár élete,” 2. It is interesting to
note that in an autobiographical sketch written in 1931, Fodor referred to Szatmár as
his “second homeland” (második szülőföldem). See also MVMDGy H-20/1 28-97. ¼, 
Ferenc Fodor, “Emlékezetül” (Budapest, 1931), 4.
31 See in particular Fodor's “Élettörténet” noted above.
32 There is a strong sense in Fodor's autobiographical work, in fact, that he
was well aware of the long-standing scepticism in certain scholarly circles over the
veracity and objectivity of autobiography as an historical source. It was as if he
sought to address what Jeremy Popkin describes as “the anxiety that comes from the
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fact that the autobiographical author is caught in the process of defining his or her
own narrative identity without being sure that readers will accept the result.” See
Jeremy Popkin, History, Historians, and Autobiography (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2005), 47. The first two chapters of this book deal in great detail with
the relationship between history and autobiography, and the problem of objectivity
and veracity in autobiographical sources. For a sustained discussion of the notion of
an “ironclad identity,” see Thomas Ort “Men Without Qualities: Karel Capek and His
Generation, 1911-1938” (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 2005).
33 In the absence of any supporting documentation, Fodor's scrapbooks are
difficult to date. Only the first and last books can be dated with any degree of cer-
tainty. The first book contains photographs of Szatmár taken in the summer of 1941,
and therefore could not have been assembled any earlier than July of that year. A
caption under one of these photos, furthermore, indicates that the picture is of “Deák
Square, which is now called Horthy Square.” Since the square in question was re-
named after Admiral Miklós Horthy, the regent of Hungary in the interwar period
who was still in power when Szatmár was reclaimed by Hungary early in World War
II, it is very likely that the book was put together before the city fell to the Russians
on October 26, 1944, or at the very least before it was officially returned again to the
Romanians in May 1946. The last book, numbered “twenty-one,” contains documents
dated between March 1955 and September 1959, the year his health deteriorated to a
point that he could no longer do things on his own. 1959, then, marks the end of the
project. There is at least one other clue which helps determine the progression of this
ambitious autobiographical undertaking. In book eight, Fodor includes a photograph
of Vira and their son Zoli, taken in May 1927 on the occasion of his confirmation.
There are two ragged holes in the top half of the picture. Written across the bottom of
the photo is the following: “This picture, which once hung on our wall, was hit by a
bomb fragment during the siege [of Budapest] in 1945.” We can surmise, therefore,
that at the very least this and all subsequent scrapbooks were put together sometime
after the siege of Budapest.
34 There is, in fact, a real sense that Fodor sought to resolve in his scrap-
books a quintessentially modern problem identified by Ricoeur, namely the paradox
of how an individual, like the nation or any group, can be seen as the same even as it
changes over time. Narration, argues Ricoeur, plays an important role in this attempt-
ed resolution. As he writes: “Without the aid of narration, the problem of personal
identity is... an antimony without resolution.” Of course, unlike Fodor, Ricoeur is too
much of a postmodernist to hold out hope for resolution, and rejects the possibility
that the negotiation of identity could ever lead to a stable result. See Paul Ricoeur,
Time and Narration, 3:355 and 3:356-58. Commenting on this, Jeremy Popkin adds:
“[One] distinctive characteristic [that] Ricoeur attributes to autobiography is its lack
of closure. Autobiographical narratives necessarily lack a real beginning or ending,
and they are therefore always subject to revision and reinterpretation.” Popkin,
History, Historians, and Autobiography, 47.
35 Ibid., 35.
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37 This is a common masculine motif that runs through his scrapbooks.
38 Ferenc Fodor, Balla Antal élete és műszaki munkássága. 1739-1815
(Budapest: Budapesti Műszaki Egyetem Központi Könyvtára, 1953), 53. 




in Northern Transylvania, 1940-1944
Balázs Ablonczy
In this study I try to present the history of the region of Transylvania that was
returned to Hungary in the Second Vienna Award of 1940 from a point of
view that has been quite neglected hitherto.1 More precisely, my aim is to
outline aspects of the policies of nation-building that were implemented by the
region's Hungarian administration and explain how the development of
tourism combined with and fitted into the policies of nation-building and on
occasion, exclusions from it. I base my research on source materials that had
come to light two years ago. At first glance the policies of promoting tourism
and nation-building appear not to be related but as my research progressed I
became increasingly convinced that I was dealing with two closely related
phenomena. The subject of the build-up of Northern Transylvania's tourism
by itself is worth investigating but in covering it there is the risk that the
analysis deteriorates into an enumeration of plans, budgets, jurisdictional
quarrels, and unfulfilled deadlines. But the whole story of how the officials
involved in this enterprise, along with community leaders and people involved
in tourism, envisaged the revitalization of a relatively backward (in
comparison with Hungary proper)2 region, tells a lot about the Hungarian
government's and public's approach to nationality policies as well as concepts
about modernization — and also about the Hungarian image of Transylvania.
Primary sources for the study of this subject are few as the records of the
ministries dealing with the promotion of tourism in Northern Transylvania of
the times had been destroyed during the 1944-45 siege of Budapest.
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National Pilgrimages
The number of monographs dealing with the history of tourism in Hungary is
rather small, and as far as I know no one has explored the interconnection of
tourism and nation-building, despite the fact that this subject is extensively
covered in literature dealing with Western Europe and the New World.3 Some
of the observations made in these works are relevant to our subject. One of
these is the fact that tourism as a notion of economic activity is the product of
the nineteenth century. In this connection we should mention the date 5 July
1841 when Thomas Cook, the father of modern tourism, sent off from one of
London's railway stations the first touring group — whose members paid him
one shilling each. The success of this experiment prompted Cook to establish
his tourist bureau, one which by the 1880s was organizing overseas tours.4 His
activities defined the relationship between the tourist industry and the state not
only in the English-speaking world but also on the European continent:
tourism became considered part of the realm of private enterprise and was
treated as such. This despite the fact that the development of tourism was not
unrelated to state activity such as government regulations regarding paid
holidays for employees or the mandating of health insurance for them. In
Central Europe, in particular in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, first it was
some of the Austrian provinces that discovered the importance of the promo-
tion of tourism. The province's authorities, with their limited resources, tried
to foster travel for recreational purposes.5
The growth of European and overseas tourism had an impact beyond
its immediate effects on economic activity. In Britain and France for example
the existing practice of relaxation at baths and spas was expanded by the idea
of recreation at seaside resorts.6 In France the discovery (actually, re-dis-
covery) of the “terroir” is linked closely to the evolving of the bourgeois
image of the world: it was through this that a synthesis emerged between the
republican ethos and the long-standing public attachment to France's diverse
regions.7
In searching for parallels with the development of the image of
Transylvania in Hungary and its impact on tourism the following case seems
relevant. In central Sweden the cult of dalecarlia that began emerging among
city dwellers at the end of the nineteenth century signified a desire to return to
one's roots. The archaic peasant world of this region (where people still wore
the old folk costumes abandoned elsewhere) and its image as unspoiled
wilderness, combined with the democratic traditions of the local inhabitants
coincided with the liberal ideals of Swedish society and its budding cult of the
national heritage. Not surprisingly, the first skanzen opened in Stockholm as
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early as 1892. In 1909 came the first suggestion for the establishment of
national parks. Visits to Dalarna, that “Valhalla of Swedish peasant life,” were
facilitated by the building of the country's railways, and pilgrimages to the
region became a compulsory aspect of identifying with Swedish national
character. The proliferation of the bicycles in the country in the interwar
period gave rise to massive bicycle touring in the region. With the accession
of the Social Democrats to power in 1932, tourism became identical with
modernity, and recreational travel began receiving funding from the state.8
Closer to the region studied in this paper, in pre-war Austria the
concept of the love for ancient German lands was put in the service of tourism
to promote the greater-German or all-German ideal. Tourists were expected to
visit German lands that had come under foreign rule as the result of the post-
war peace settlement. They were advised to seek accommodation in German-
owned establishments. Their guide-books even told them which hostels were
owned by non-Germans: Czechs, Slovenians, Italians, etc. In former Austrian
lands attendance at religious (Roman Catholic) events had the blessing of the
promoters of such tourism, even though elsewhere they cared little for the
Church.9 In Austria, however, unlike in Transylvania of 1940-1944, the state
remained neutral in the conflicts generated by such nationalist tourism.
We have only limited information about the national aims of the
Hungarian movement to encourage tourism and other return to nature activi-
ties. Nevertheless a recently-published study points out that in this pheno-
menon too nationalist elements had appeared rather early and in time such
tourism became a project to promote national interests through which
“knowing your land” increasingly transmuted into “military expedition”.10
The change can be observed in the history of the organization Erdélyi Kárpát
Egyesület (Carpathian Association of Transylvania). It was founded in 1873
in the ethnically mixed region (Slovak, German and Magyar) of Szepesség
and confined its activities to the promotion of tourism until 1889-90 when
nation-building ideas entered into its rhetoric. But, the encouragement of
tourism for the sake of recreation and learning always remained an aim of this
association. It was the Magyar Tanítók Turista Egylete (the Tourist Club of
Hungarian Teachers), an organization established in 1896 that implemented
most the idea of using tourism to promote the nation. Soon after its founding
it began to sponsor tours of Transylvania for middle-class visitors from central
Hungary who were given the impression that through their visits they were re-
claimers of the land in face of a local population who cared little for the cause
of the Magyar nation or was hostile to it.11
If we have to sum up the European, and in a sense the overseas expe-
rience in tourism before the time dealt with in our paper, we can say that it
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began in a natural way as an economic activity based on the increasing desire
of people for recreation. It had certain historical antecedents: the tradition of
the “Grand Tour” by members of the upper-classes and the ideal of the return-
to-nature espoused by some writers during the Age of Enlightenment. In time,
however, the aims of modern tourism would incorporate not just recreation
but an assortment of ideals such as the promotion of national interests and the
preservation of the simple peasant life and culture — as well as of other socio-
political and economic values. These concepts of tourism varied from one
region to the next as did the approach to them by various state authorities.
Tourism in Interwar Hungary
Between the two world wars Hungary's practices in the promotion of tourism
stood about half-way between the Western European and the early Dual
Monarchy's model of tourism sponsored by community associations (even if
they didn't reject help provided by the state), and the model characterized by
the totalitarian state's desire to control all aspects of the population's activities
that developed in contemporary Italy and Germany.12 The community-based
tourist clubs founded before World War I were joined in the 1920s and 1930s
by similarly inspired organizations as well as commercial travel bureaus. As
these establishments had limited financial means, the promotion of tourism
called for the intervention of the state. Such intervention was not new in
Hungary. Before World War one, when tourism in Hungary consisted mainly
of visits to mineral baths or spas, the state apparatus that developed in post-
Compromise times (1867) tried to regulate the legal and health aspects of such
activity.13 In 1902 the Idegenforgalmi Utazási Vállalat was established in
Budapest (in 1926 it became known as IBUSZ). In the mid-1920s it gained
the monopoly of selling tickets for MÁV (the Hungarian state railways) and
became an important player in organized tourism.14
The onset of the Great Depression further deepened the Hungarian
tourist industry's dependence on the state — especially in the creation and
maintenance of infrastructure, and in advertising. It also led to attempts at the
promotion of tourism at home. Efforts to this effect were implemented by the
Országos Magyar Vendégforgalmi Szövetség or OMVESZ (National
Hungarian Tourist Federation). One of OMVESZ' successful slogans was
“Utazgassunk hazánk földjén” (Let's keep travelling in our native land) which
resembled the “Come to Britain!” and “See America First” movements in
Great Britain and the USA respectively.15
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Hungary's government established the Országos Magyar Idegen-
forgalmi Hivatal (Hungarian National Tourist Bureau, hereafter OMIH) in
1935. This was the most influential organization created in the country for the
regulation of the tourist industry. OMIH was to coordinate and oversee the
promotion of tourism, the investments in infrastructure, tourist propaganda, as
well as the training (starting with 1939) of tourist guides. It was also respon-
sible for establishing guidelines for the promotion of internal and international
tourism. OMIH soon established offices in various parts of Europe and even
overseas, then in Hungary, and after 1938 when the country began regaining
some of the territories that had been detached from it in the post-war peace
settlement, in these lands as well. OMIH was headed by the politician Géza
Tormay. After his death in May of 1940 the organization's scope of activities
was revised.16 It became a part of the Ministry of Commerce. In the period
examined in this study it functioned as section XIV of that Ministry, first
under László Gál and after March 1944 under Baron Gyula Brandenstein. In
1937 the organization's budget reached almost 700,000 pengős.17
The primary task of the OMIH and its branches was propaganda. This
was produced not only through the traditional means of posters and flyers but
through the novel means of film (shown occasionally in movie theatres in
various cities) travelling picture exhibitions, and the sponsoring of photogra-
phy competitions or folk-costume shows.18 A few months before the Hungari-
an re-acquisition of northern Transylvania, a Hungarian tourist official by the
name of István Hallóssy identified the main aim of tourist propaganda as
being the fostering of a favourable attitude to travel. In a speech he called for
the spreading of authenticity that is the rejection of gaudy superficiality. In its
place, Hallóssy suggested the injection of that “ancient Magyar force that
assimilates everything...” He called for “Hungarian national tourist propa-
ganda” as well as the more effective presentation of the various regions'
natural beauty, of their flora and fauna, as well as the folk-costumes of the
local population.19
It is not possible to estimate the impact of Hallóssy's admonitions on
the propaganda activities of OMIH but from the surviving official record of
this institutions two facts become evident: 1.The propaganda produced in con-
nection with Northern Transylvania concentrated on three regions: Kalotaszeg
(the region around Kolozsvár [today's Cluj]), the Székelyföld, and the winter
playgrounds of the Radnai and Borsai mountain ranges. 2. In this tourist
propaganda emphasis was given, as it was done in connection with Hungary
proper, to the theme of folk traditions: rituals, costumes etc.
From February of 1941 on, the Hungarian tourist organizations
(OMIH, MÁV and IBUSZ) published the Hungária Magazin edited by the
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popular radio announcer Lili Filotás. This glossy, illustrated monthly publi-
cation closely reflected its sponsors' philosophy of tourism. It tried to offer a
picture of recreational life in wartime Hungary as well as elaborate on the folk
costumes and traditions of the above listed regions of Transylvania.20 The
regions that fell outside of the area identified by the promoters of tourism was
ignored, often in face of the protests of local officials from the communities
involved. One such official complained in 1943 that “since our liberation” the
Székelyföld received much help in the realm of the promotion of tourism, but
Northern Transylvania “got nothing so far in this respect.”21
”We all have to know the eternally Hungarian Transylvania” pro-
claimed an OMIH publication of the times.22 The idea that travel in Transylva-
nia was a national pilgrimage was further reinforced by the identification of
that land as the Kalotaszeg and the Székelyföld. Some of the traditional
products of these two regions (including the székely pálinka, a locally
produced brandy) reminded people of pine forests and snow-capped moun-
tains.23 Sometimes tourist posters and publications about Transylvania were
filled with pictures only of the people in Kalotaszeg and/or Székelyland
costumes or buildings characteristic of only these two regions.24
What confrontations these in certain cases Budapest-induced practices
inspired, is aptly illustrated the by the dispute that arose in 1941-42 between
the OMIH leadership and Károly Kós, writer, noted architect and the custo-
dian of the ethnographic artefact collection of the Reform Church of Kalota-
szeg. At the end of 1940, OMIH made plans for the building of a bureau in
the community of Kőrösfő. The building was to house a tourist office, a
museum for the Reform Church's artefact collection, a store to sell tourist
memorabilia, as well as a hostel for travellers. OMIH had Győző Nagy
prepare the buildings plans — he had planned many other such buildings for
other places in Hungary. Then they asked Kós to modify the plans to reflect
the architectural character of its surroundings; in effect he was told that he
should plan a “peasant house”. This task Kós accepted, free of charge, and
planned a building on land provided by the village for a nominal fee. But he
could not explain to the officials in Budapest that their plan could not be
implemented through building a “peasant house”.25 Arguments went back and
forth with OMIH officials insisting on a traditional, one-story building while
Kós felt that such a structure could not accommodate all the functions planned
for it.26 In the end the building wasn't built. This coupling of tourism and
ethnographic traditions was not the predilection of OMIH officials only. This
is illustrated by a speech made in the House of Parliament in the fall of 1940
by József Varga, the minister in charge of tourism:
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I have always supported and will continue to support folk-art that
is significant from the point of view of tourism. I propose to build,
in addition to the existing structures featuring ethnographic
collections, additional such buildings in the most important
regions of folk-art. These structures will be entrusted with the
displaying of ethnographic artefacts as well as with their
preservation.27
There can be little doubt that, through its policies, OMIH had a major
impact on the evolution of the image of Transylvania, or at least, on those
who were creating that image for Hungarians. Through the publications
inspired by it, through books, placards, a Transylvania was mirrored that
reminds us of the image, still prevalent in Hungary, of that land as a idyllic
“garden of fairies.”28 This image was counterbalanced only by the emphasis
on the Magyar (and civilized) nature of the region's cities. Unlike some other
scholars I don't consider this image in itself harmful, but it leaves the question
what political approaches and deeds it inspires and whether and to what extent
it allows the people espousing this open to other views.
Pictures from the Tourist Guides
Before we examine the activities of the Kolozsvár office of OMIH and its role
in nation-building, we should examine the “Transylvania image” promoted by
contemporary Hungarian tourist guides, and the reception these got from the
public. We should also survey what image of this land the above-mentioned
publication Erdély tried to project, how this “little Hungarian world” tired to
represent itself to its local readers and the outside world.
Between 1940 and 1943 no fewer than eighteen works appeared in
Hungary about Transylvania. Incidentally, this is the same number that
appeared about the subject between 1788 and 1940, and 1944 and 1986.29 It
must be stressed that these eighteen publications were not all travel guides,
among them there were travelogues,30 breviaries,31 learned essays,32 and flyers
pertaining to a particular city or district.33 Comprehensive tourist guides to
Transylvania were few and varied in quality and political outlook.
First off the mark with such a publication was the author from Nagy-
várad [today's Oradea] Sándor Aba, who was no doubt aware of both the
political and commercial advantages of publishing on the subject. His work
appeared in the spring of 1941, and it filled 320 pages. Its author claimed that
the book was designed to inform Hungarians and Transylvanians, especially
young readers, about their country.34 Forty-five percent of the pages covering
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Transylvania were filled with ads. Although Aba claims to have visited all the
regions he described, officials of the OMIH were not happy with the volume.
They described it poorly organized and edited. They couldn't refrain from
mentioning that the work's author was of Jewish background. They also tried
to hinder the book's distribution by calling on people involved in the tourist
industry not to promote the book.35 Yet Aba was more fortunate than József
Dávid, the author of Székelyföld írásban és képben [The Székelyland in
writing and pictures] whose publication was banned on the initiative of OMIH
and against whom court proceedings were started by the government.36
Aba's book, it should be mentioned, did not use, with a few excep-
tions, the nationalist rhetoric of most other tourist publications. The official
tourist guide of OMVESZ dealing with eastern Hungary and northern
Transylvania was also neutral in language.37 The nationalist discourse in this
volume was represented by the introduction that was written by the noted
writer Zsolt Harsányi. He did what many other authors of travel guides had
done: compare the region returned to Hungary to Switzerland. He saw the task
of the promoters of tourism there in stressing winter sports, travel in the
countryside and the spending of time at mineral spas. He concluded his
introduction with the wish that his readers will visit Transylvania with the
feeling that “they are visiting the land of unbreakable racial strength where a
free man [becomes] freer and the Hungarian spirit more Hungarian.”38 This
illustrated hardbound book contained only essential tourist information and
did not get into the subject of historical analysis. Yet in this guide what is not
there says a lot: this OMVESZ volume presents us with a Hungarian
Transylvania in which we get a hint of the existence of other ethnic groups
only when an orthodox church or a synagogue is mentioned.39 Still, this book
creates the impression of a tourist guide rather than a publication designed to
influence the political attitudes of its readers.
The book of János Tulogdy, Erdély kis turistakalauza [The little
tourist guide of Transylvania] placed emphasis on brevity and described the
main stations of a tour of Transylvania that are still most frequented today.40
In Ödön Nagy's book about Lake Gyilkos and its vicinity the various ethnic
groups of Transylvania appear — and in positive light. This dedicated tourist
writes for example that on the eastern pastures of Fehérmező the pastors of
three nationalities tend their flocks in peace in the “spirit of Transylvania.”41
The author Milton Oszkár Reich revised and re-published a 1910 tourist guide
of his. In this he still gave the population data of the 1900 census and in dis-
cussing the history of the Székelys he endorsed the idea of their Hun descent,
even though in once place declared this theory a “myth”.42 The new edition
made use of most of the tourist guides that appeared in the two years before its
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publication. The work was outdated though balanced, one that didn't offer
much new for tourists. In this it resembled the work of Gyula Gáspár, A
visszatért Erdély útikönyve [The travel guide to the returned Transylvania].43
Several publications went much further than these in their analysis of
the nationality problem in Transylvania. One of these was the book edited by
geographer Gyula Prinz and written mainly by faculty members of the Univer-
sity of Kolozsvár. In his introduction to the volume Prinz deemed Transylva-
nia, the “Switzerland of the East”, a utopia since its life didn't concentrate in
one place but spread out to several centres. As such, it had no chance of
becoming a political unit of its own.44 For this reason, Prinz argued,
Transylvania had to belong to Hungary. He described the years of Romanian
rule as a transitory period that brought no benefits. Interestingly this work that
justified Transylvania's absorption by Hungary through mythical geographic
explanations got an unexpected reception by OMIH officialdom: the head of
the OMIH office in Marosvásárhely likened it to Sándor Aba's supposedly
inaccurate book. This official even called for radical measures to curb the
proliferation of such tourist guides.45
The Budapest office of OMIH could hardly disapprove of the tone of
most of these tourist guides as it published the most stridently nationalistic of
guides to Transylvania in 1941. This pamphlet-sized publication didn't have
its author identified. It went beyond some of the other guides as it listed
hotels and other accommodation available to tourists. On its pages there were
often crude statements such as “Romanians don't belong among the historical
nations of Transylvania.... They crept into the land's empty mountainous
regions as sheep shepherds from the Balkans, occupying first the mountains
and then the valleys. From the 17th century on, their numbers grew con-
tinuously.” Only in its introduction did the publication mention the positive
aspects of centuries of peaceful coexistence among the various ethnicities. But
from other parts of this work we learn that Transylvania is the home of “unal-
terable Magyar folk-art” where the “temetői kopjafák” (carved wooden head
“stones” characteristic of the region's cemeteries) speak of the “uninterrupted
Hungarian past”. And the publication's author or authors go on:
The Székelys speak the purest Magyar language, full of ancient
phrases and spoken virtually without local accent. Their poetry... is
uniquely colourful. Their music is one of the earliest products of
Hungarian folk music, one that has inspired many great musicians
([among them] Bartók and Kodály). Their cities and towns are
orderly, their yards and houses are exceedingly clean. Their folk-
costumes are not overly elaborate... and everybody wears these....
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Their architecture is ancient... their woodcarvings are world
famous... Their pottery offers the best of Hungarian folk art...
Through the author's rhetoric the past and present merge while the heroes of
the past enter present-day life to reinforce the idea of the continuity of national
evolution while he (or she) proclaims that getting to know Transylvania is a
patriotic duty for Hungarians:
Whoever travelled the land of Transylvania yearns to return there.
Besides the awe-inspiring scenery, their soul becomes filled by the
marvellous flavour of the unalterable ancient Magyar life.
Through Transylvania we can behold the thousand-year-old
Magyar past. We can understand that endless selfless struggle that
our nation... had fought for Transylvania's soil. We can understand
the sacrifice brought by the valiant warriors of Saint László, the
heroes of Hunyadi, the soldiers of Gábor Bethlen, the [followers]
of Rákoczi, the honvéds of Bem, and we understand the supreme
sacrifice of the young Hungarian intellectual giant Sándor Petőfi...
We all have to know the eternally Magyar Transylvania.46
Not all the local OMIH officials liked this work and we have to note in their
favour that some of them were not reluctant to voice their opinion to the
organization's Budapest headquarters. The first draft of the publication's
manuscript was in fact severely criticised by the head of OMIH's Kolozsvár
bureau, but he mostly censured what was missing from the volume and not its
tone.47
The above mentioned organization, the Erdélyi Kárpát Egyesület or
EKE, had been active during the last decades of the nineteenth century and
indeed to the First World War, but declined in importance as a result of the
war and the transfer of Transylvania to Romania. It experienced a revival in
the early 1930s but in 1935 the Romanian authorities closed its offices and
expropriated its collections. EKE was re-born in 1940 and its journal Erdély
reported abundantly on the organization's life till 1944. This life included
tours but also the creation of tourist infrastructure (the marking of walking
paths, the building of safe stations, places where skiers could warm up, etc.) as
well as the organization of folk-dance festivals and the development of folk-
art collections. The editor of Erdély in these years was first the noted linguist
Attila T. Szabó and then János Xantus. Among its authors were university
teachers (including Ernő Balogh) as well as such legendary figures as Gyula
Merza (1861-1943) one of the founding fathers of tourism in Transylvania.
The joy associated with northern Transylvania's return to Hungary
and the regaining of the old EKE headquarters soon gave way to despair in
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face of the behaviour — lack of understanding and even outright enmity — of
the tourist organizations of Hungary, especially Magyar Turista Szövetség
(Hungarian Tourist Federation, hereafter MTSz). As Géza Polgárdy, an
influential official of this organization, pointed out:
[The Transylvanian branch of the MTSz] was inundated by its
Budapest “supporters” and “well-wishers” as water floods the
fields after the dykes break. Everyone was giving advice and
everyone wanted to help, every tourist official visiting [northern]
Transylvania felt duty-bound to shower his liberated co-workers in
the tourist industry with help.... All these well-wishers... brought
only chaos to the Kolozsvár EKE headquarters. In the end the
local officials had to find ways to bypass the Federation.
Furthermore, they even tried to set up their own tourist
organization.48
There were even disputes over jurisdiction: which tourist organization had
control over the so-called Zichy Cave? And, members of EKE were not
invited to a banquet in Budapest because “they were too poor and would not
want to take part in any case.”49 Further, a map produced by EKE was
severely criticized in Turista Élet for alleged inaccuracies. And then in March
1941 MTSZ cancelled EKE's membership for “non-payment” of dues.
The situation improved later to the extent that some MTSZ officials
(among them the above mentioned Géza Polgárdy) even wrote for Erdély,
among those who previously had criticized EKE. And, by 1943 this same
author took the side of this organization in one of its disputes. EKE also made
concessions, possibly in response to pressure from Budapest: It agreed to the
exclusion of Jews from its membership. Seventeen people were affected.50
We have to note that militantly anti-Semitic diatribes never appeared in this
periodical between 1941 and 1944. On a few occasions though, certain
accommodations were identified as being owned by Christians while others
were not recommended for “obvious reasons”.51 Such restraint was rare at the
time and must be commended. It should be added that the coverage in Erdély
was limited to things Hungarian. The activities of the well-organized and
dynamic (at least until 1942) Siebenbürgischer Karpathenverein are not
covered in the periodical.52 Nor are the activities of Romanian tourist
organizations alluded to. Romanians, if they are mentioned at all, are noted as
shepherds who might be approached for directions by tourists who had
become lost. Beyond this, in the Transylvania of Erdély, Romanians don't
exist. They were there as oppressors, as the people who persecuted EKE
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before 1940, but they then disappeared: they are not friends, not enemies, not
rivals — they simply did not exist.53
This subconscious/conscious negating stance coexisted with the
discourse, which though not overwhelming in the periodical, aimed at making
tourism a Hungarian nation-building experience. The theoretical reflections of
theologian Sándor Tavaszy about the subject (equating the knowledge of
nature with the knowledge of one's homeland, with patriotism, with public
and self-education that of necessity leads to the refinement of one's soul)54
others simplified and took them out of their context, while still others turned
them into a programme of action.55
It would be unjust to accuse the contributors of Erdély of narrow-
minded nationalism: they we happy about being re-united with Hungary, they
became disappointed in the tourist organizations of the mother country, and
they were concerned that their new-found “Hungarian” existence might come
to an end. Since they were financially dependent on the various Hungarian
agencies in charge of travel, tourism and even sport, they tried to meet the
expectations of these through adjusting their own political discourse including
the use of nationalist phraseology. It seemed that the spirit of the age
demanded these dubious concessions, but if these writers had doubt about
what they wrote, these dissipated with the growing flood of tourists from
Hungary. Even the veteran tourist promoters among them resigned themselves
to the demanding behaviour of these visitors, their boisterousness, their noisy,
all-night parties, and the habit of the women from Budapest of wearing pants
and heavy makeup.56
The Economics of Nation-Building through Tourism
Tourism can be not only an instrument of spiritual nation-building,57 it can
also be — as many people at the time believed — a means of economic
advancement. After the Second Vienna Award the Hungarian authorities saw
in the development of tourism and small crafts the vehicle of lifting northern
Transylvania, and especially the Székelyföld, from economic backwardness.
Already after the re-acquisition of Sub-Carpathia Premier Pál Teleki
appointed a special commissioner for tourism in the region the person of Béla
Padányi-Gulyás, one of his former students. After the re-occupation of
northern Transylvania the question of the economic development of these
lands was discussed at a special “Transylvania conference” at which Teleki
saw the future of the Székelyföld's economy in the fostering of small crafts,
medium-sized industries and mining, all of which required a great deal of
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investment.58 Hungarian plans for infrastructure development included new
railway lines, highways, new bus and airline services, the construction of spas,
everything that was needed for the development of tourism.59 Not all of these
projects were realized, yet much was accomplished at the cost of millions of
pengős of investment. There was even money found for the modernization of
the telephone system and the repair of bridges.60
The Hungarian government also invested in the building of hotels and
the development of spas, especially in the Székelyföld and the Radnai Moun-
tains (today's Muntii Rodnei). The building and repair of tourist stations went
on throughout Hungarian Transylvania. Ski resorts were also developed, and
OMVESZ began organizing visits to Transylvania's villages. To coordinate
tourist activities OMIH opened its Kolozsvár office.
It is interesting to know how Elek Horváth, the person appointed to
head this office, reacted to directives from headquarters. He says little about
the subject in his autobiography.61 Horváth had a good education and had a lot
of experience in journalism and administration. By 1940 he was working for
the Ministry of Commerce's Office of National Tourism. After the Second
Vienna Award he was sent to Kolozsvár with a mandate to oversee the
development of tourism in the returned territories. In the spring of 1941 his
mandate was reduced and confined to four counties in central Transylvania,
including the Kolozsvár area.
Horváth probably had good personal contacts in the Ministry and
even the office of the prime minister. He was an exception in the management
of Hungarian Transylvania's tourism. Most of the directors of the other
bureaus had their training locally, mainly with EKE. Horváth, despite his
relative youth, also had good contacts with many of Hungary's populist
writers, including Géza Féja and Gyula Illyés — for the latter he even
organized a Transylvanian holiday. Horváth also developed good relations
with local writers, among them Áron Tamási and Albert Wass.62
Horváth tried to create the impression that he was a determined and
innovative bureaucrat, yet he failed to gain the good will of his superiors in
Budapest. His office's activities and financial affairs were repeatedly invest-
igated, and though no major breaches of regulations or lapses in duty were
discovered, these procedures often led to him being reprimanded.63 His
monthly reports were often rejected, in September of 1942 for example,
because the accounting was out a fraction of a pengő.
The scope of the Kolozsvár office's authority was determined by the
order of the Ministry of Commerce of early 1941. This order required the
bureau to gather information, respond to requests from headquarters, report to
OMIH each month about its activities including its financial transactions.64
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The office's records suggest that more than this was involved: the office's staff
prepared travel plans, took plans in the supervision of hotels and hostels,
provided guiding for out-of-country visitors, and from February of 1942 on,
was directly in charge of the management of OMIH's 120-bed youth hostel in
Kolozsvár. This hostel was part of the program that was designed to provide
inexpensive accommodations for students visiting the regained territories.
This hostel functioned till 1944 when it was converted to an improvised
hospital for victims of Allied bombing raids. And the office had still other
functions: it trained tourist guides and held photo competitions. It also
sponsored folk-costume festivals, such as the one organized in June of 1941 in
Kőrösfő, which was attended by several hundred people as well as celebrities
such as the writers János Kemény and Zsigmond Móricz, as well as the
French consul of Kolozsvár.65 The aim of holding such an event became
obvious from a report on another folk-costume festival that was held two
years later in Szék: “In my opinion [reported on the event Elek Horváth] the
folk-costume show of Szék was a very fortunate event from the point of view
of national politics as it supported the Magyar [ethnic] island in Szolnok-
Doboka County with its 85% Romanian population.”66 To discharge all these
functions, the Kolozsvár office had a staff of five, including a secretary and a
caretaker.
Although a large gap existed between the plans for developing tour-
ism in Transylvania and what was becoming accomplished, and the land was
not turning into a “Székely Switzerland”, huge sums were invested in the
region by the Hungarian government, despite the country's ever increasing
military expenditures. The railway-building and the start of air traffic
between Budapest, Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely (today: Tirgu Mures) both
aimed at facilitating tourism. Tourist travel was often subsidized and the
owners of resorts were offered loans to help finance their investments. Many
tourist hostels were renovated, expanded or newly built.67 Construction work
on one of these structures continued even in September of 1944 by which time
the front had reached Transylvania.68
The influx of Hungarian tourists started in December of 1940, after
the military administration of the region came to an end. This happened
despite warnings from OMIH that tourist infrastructure in the region was not
on a par with that in Hungary. First there were conducted tours — one of
these, by IBUSZ, had been organized already in October of 1940. Individual
tourists began pouring in during the first half of 1941. Local tourist offices
were inundated with requests for advice regarding travel and accom-
modations. Such inquiries also came from travel bureaus and associations, on
behalf of groups interested in visiting “our beautiful Transylvania” seeking a
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vacation above all in the mountain or lake-side resorts of Székelyföld.69 At
first the local tourist offices recommended all resorts, even ones with limited
resources. Later, in response to complaints, smaller places were omitted and
only the ones that could accommodate larger number of visitors were
publicized. Among the cities only ones that could offer “cultural treasures”
(above all Kolozsvár and Marosvásárhely) were recommended.
There were a number of reasons why tourism managed to grow at a
seemingly high rate in Transylvania. The war had led to higher incomes for
Hungarians. At the same time the war also limited their opportunities for
foreign travel. As a result, tourism grew exponentially from 1941 to 1943.
We don't have complete statistics, but we can site examples. Visitors to
Kolozsvár in 1943 increased by 27.5% over the previous year's number. Some
60,000 visitors spent 140,000 days in the city. In the same year even some
small resorts reported 100% occupancy rates.70 The increase in visits to rural
areas was also remarkable. While in Hungary proper such activity grew by
only 4%, in northern Transylvania this growth was 56%.71 The official in
charge of the IBUSZ office in the resort town of Szováta (today's Sovata)
remarked in the summer of 1943 that getting a room for a day was impossible
there, and those who wanted a room for a week or for a month had to book it
many months in advance. “Such masses are vacationing here as [we] never
had before,” and that many new arrivals without reservations had to spend the
night outdoors.72 War conditions forced even some prominent Hungarian
celebrities to take their vacations in this region. Included among them was the
well-known actress Gizi Bajor.
The records of the Kolozsvár tourist office indicate that the vacation
season of 1944 started with the same promise and tourism suffered a decline
only in the second half of the summer when Romania switched sides in the
war and the front soon arrived to Transylvania. Elek Horváth's enthusiasm for
his work had not been sapped by the Nazi German occupation of Hungary in
March of 1944. “In the second half of the month,” he reported late in March,
“[we] distributed a large number of Transylvania flyers [among the German
troops].”73 Horváth was soon drafted into the Hungarian army, but was
allowed to return to his job later. In the early summer he was still inspecting
hotels. Records of his activities become thinner for the mid- and late summer
but suggest that the office's activities became curtained. On the 14th of
September the order came from OMIH in Budapest that the office with its
staff should evacuate to western Hungary. By this time the guns could be
heard not far from Kolozsvár. The evacuation could not take place, perhaps
the required trucks could not be obtained, and the office's records remained in
Kolozsvár. Horváth's last instruction to István Láposi, the staff member who
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planned not to flee, was to safeguard the office's belongings and to continue
wearing his OMIH uniform.74 He was obviously oblivious to the danger that
would await a uniformed man when Soviet troops arrived.
“Eminent National Interest”
How the activities of Hungary's authorities in charge of tourism fostered both
the cause of recreational travel and nation-building in Hungarian Transylvania
from 1940 to 1944 can be better appreciated after an examination of overall
Hungarian policies in the region.
For Hungary's leaders the elimination of all traces of a Romanian past
in for example Kolozsvár was a primary requirement. Even Premier Teleki
made a derogatory remark about the architectural heritage of Romanian rule,
especially in reference to Orthodox church buildings, at a sitting of the
Transylvania conference, for which he immediately apologized. In case of
government buildings he thought of the removal of Romanian ornamentation,
but for church buildings he suggested not uniform treatment but case-by-case
handling that left the door open to their preservation as they were, their
remodelling and also their demolishing.75 his approach was implemented first
in Kolozsvár: the removal of the visible traces of Romanian rule. Romanian
commercial signs in obvious places were deemed unacceptable by OMIH.
The same office saw to it that preference was shown to taxi drivers who were
bilingual and insisted that taxi meters be switched to the Hungarian pengő.76
A delegation from Hungary visited the spas of Székelyföld to gain an
idea how much investment was needed for their improvement. The people in
charge came to the conclusion that, in addition to the loans that some resorts
had already requested, 1,500,000 pengős were needed in terms of loans to
finance the planned modernization. To lighten the burden on the Hungarian
state, the delegation's members divided those who had already applied for
loans (the total of which approached a million pengős) into three categories.
Into the first belonged those resorts whose owners were Hungarians (95
applicants). Into the second those whose owners' ethnic status was not clear
(13 applicants), and into the third those whose proprietors had left northern
Transylvania either before or after the Vienna Award. The delegation also
recommended the control of prices in the tourist industry since these were 30
to 50%, but sometimes 100% higher than those of Hungary — even though
accommodations in the region were often not on the same standard as those in
Hungary. They also urged that permits for the rental of rooms in private
homes be made mandatory — they were not needed during Romanian rule. In
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extending Hungarian practices to northern Transylvania the members of the
delegation hoped to gain a firmer control over tourism i.e. the means of
excluding “undesirable elements” from it. The delegation concluded that the
prospects for improving tourism in the Székelyföld's spas were good.77
On April 3, 1941 the Hungarian government issued a decree concer-
ning the fate of tourist establishments that were owned or had been abandoned
by Romanians. These could be leased through the local OMIH offices, after
approval by county authorities. The directives in this regard specified who
could be considered for these establishments' new managers: priority had to be
given to Hungarian applicants.78 From OMIH's records it becomes obvious
that this recommendation was closely observed by the officials in charge.79 At
the same time it occasionally happened that these officials tried to
compromise in the case of Romanian-owned establishments. For example,
Elek Horváth tried to convince the authorities in Budapest that a villa owned
by one Marius Sturza, a Romanian University Professor, should be converted
into an OMIH-run property, but was told that state sponsorship should not be
used to create competition for private enterprise in a resort town.80
The fate of Kolozsvár's Romanian-owned Astoria Hotel deserves
special attention. For a while after the change in ownership of the city, the
hotel escaped harm probably because it was the headquarters of the local
Hungarian army command. After the soldiers left, in January 1942 the hotel's
permit was withdrawn, yet at the end of the year the Astoria was allowed to
resume business. Yet neither the local city government nor OMIH officials
allowed the hotel to carry on in peace. They conducted regular inspections,
demanded accounting reports monthly (which they asked for from no other
establishment) and from time to time discussed the possibility of converting
the building into a hospital. The hotel's owners fended off such plans through
their connections in high places and their use of resourceful Hungarian
lawyers. Attempts to convert the hotel to other use had to come to an end in
March of 1944 when the newly-arrived Gestapo established its local head-
quarters in the hotel.
After the hotel had re-opened in December of 1941, Horváth had to
admit, with some reluctance, that Astoria was the best hotel in the city, it filled
an important function in reducing the chronic shortage of tourist accommoda-
tion, and that its owner satisfied all the regulations governing hotel manage-
ment.81 In fact, the Kolozsvár OMIH office used to direct its visitors to the
hotel.
Other minority-owned establishments were not so fortunate. In the
review of permits the first priority of the Hungarian authorities was the
exclusion of Jewish-owned businesses from the tourist industry. This was
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above all the doing of the city administrations, but OMIH records suggest that
the staff of this establishment went along. As a result of the re-assessments of
permits of 1941 many hotels and resorts changed management or closed
down. By early 1943 there remained only one Jewish-owned hotel in
Kolozsvár, and only one first class, and one second class inn.82 By then a
campaign was being prepared in Budapest for further restrictions.
Conclusions
In this study I tried to take a glance at a hitherto neglected aspect of the “little
Hungarian world” of northern Transylvania that was re-united with Hungary
during 1940-1944. Here the euphoria of “returning to the motherland” was
soon replaced by the routine of everyday existence and the people of this
region became acquainted with some of the darker aspects of life in interwar
and wartime Hungary: an all-pervasive bureaucracy, a highly hierarchical
social order, and a culture of political intolerance. The ambitious plans to
develop the region's tourist industry had to be abandoned or scaled back
because of the lack of sufficient funds, but even these revised schemes often
proved difficult to achieve.
When we examine the ideology that hid behind the planned invest-
ments of millions of pengős we have to come to the conclusion that the ideas
of nation-building through the development of tourism corresponded with the
general nation-building and sometimes exclusionist ideology of official Hun-
gary. The result was the concept of travel to Transylvania as a “patriotic
pilgrimage”. The idea of a summer vacation that was part of people's patriotic
duty was fostered by national propaganda and was endorsed in the over-
abundant tourist literature of the times. Travel to this region was also fostered
by the increasing difficulty of travel abroad in a war-torn Europe.
The policies of Hungary's agencies in charge of tourism strengthened
the process that had been in existence ever since the beginning of the century
that identified Transylvania as two distinct regions: the Székelyföld and
Kalotaszeg (including Kolozsvár). This Transylvania was perhaps never
before or since on the minds of Hungarian to the same extent as between 1940
and 1944. The tradition of travelling through Transylvania via the Nagyvárad
(today: Oradea) – Kolozsvár – Marosvásárhely – Székelyföld route developed
at this time and persists for Hungarian tourists even today. This image of
Transylvania as consisting of these regions coincided with the vision of this
land as an ethnically pure one in which Romanians, Jews and Saxons
(Germans) did not exist. A cause and effect relationship should not be
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implied, but this image of Transylvania probably contributed to the trend of
these people, especially Romanians and Jews, becoming excluded from the
tourist industry — and even deprived of their properties.
The concept of Transylvania as an archaic and folkloric — and half-
modern community (where there are also ski-hills, spas and house-crafts)
continues to persist even in today's Hungary. This, despite the fact that the
“bastions” of Magyar culture and civilization — the cities — that were
supposed to be there in 1940-44, are now devoid of any Hungarianness.
Today the Magyar character of Transylvania is increasingly a rural one and
the Hungarian image of this land relates less and less to the reality. It is not an
image any more — it is just an illusion.
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A Story of Survival:
the Hungarians of Romania,
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László Diószegi
The story of the Hungarian minority of Romania during the seven decades
covered in this study is a sad one. It is a tale of uncertainties, mistreatment,
deprivations of rights, and in general, a seemingly hopeless struggle for cul-
tural survival. During these seventy years there had been few periods that
gave cause for optimism. The strategic goal of successive Romanian regimes
— whether ostensibly democratic or blatantly authoritarian — had always
been the establishment of a homogeneous Romanian nation state. Never-
theless, the prolonged struggle of the Hungarians for the preservation of their
ethnic identity cannot be considered to have been in vain. There had been set-
backs for them, especially as a consequence of a population explosion in
Romania combined with the forced resettlement policies of the country's
immediate pre-1989 regime, but they had survived what will hopefully be the
worst of the periods of mistreatment since they had come under Romanian
rule nearly nine decades ago.
True, from 1919 to 1989 there had been a decline in the proportion of
Hungarians in the population in Romania, in particular in Transylvania. In
absolute terms, however, their numbers increased. This development is
noteworthy in view of the fact that elsewhere in the post-1919 history of the
Hungarian diaspora of the Carpathian Basin there has been a regrettable dec-
line not only in ratios but in absolute numbers as well. It is also important that
the decrease in the proportion of the Hungarian population in Romania did not
translate into a commensurate decline in their influence in cultural and
political life. The results of the recent national elections in Romania — from
the point of view of Hungarian political parties in the country — repeated the
electoral patterns that had been established in the interwar period, and gave
the Hungarians of Transylvania a stable representation in the Parliament in
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Bucharest. The past several decades have witnessed partial successes even
though the general trends — and unfortunately this is undisputable — are
unfavourable from the point of view of demographics as well as social, econo-
mic, and cultural developments.
The Demographic Situation
The vast majority of Hungarians in Romania became Romanian citizens as a
result of the boundary changes imposed by the Peace Treaty of Trianon (June
4, 1920). The Hungarian census of 1910 listed 1,661,805 citizens whose
mother tongue was Hungarian in the regions that the peace settlement
transferred to Romania. These regions included historic Transylvania and the
Bánát, i.e. the districts of Körös and Mármaros, a geographic area that in time
acquired the name Transylvania in popular parlance.1
Among the Magyar-speaking citizens of post-1918 “Greater” Roma-
nia, the number of Hungarians living outside of Transylvania was also
signifycant. In this connection we can rely only on estimated figures because
of the incompleteness of statistical data. According to these, in 1920 about
150 thousand Hungarian residents of Romania lived outside of Transylvania.
These people had settled, in the distant or not-so-distant past, in Bukovina,
Moldova, and in the cities of the Regat (Wallachia), mainly Bucharest.
According to the Romanian census of 1930, the population of
Transylvania was 5,548,363. This particular figure can be considered fairly
realistic. The Romanian ethnic group had increased by 400,000 compared to
the census of 1910 and constituted the majority in Transylvania with a
population of 3,207,880. The census recorded a total of 1,353,276, Hunga-
rians, a figure which indicated a decrease of almost 200,000. This finding can
not be considered realistic even when one considers the fact that 197,000
Hungarians had left Transylvania between 1919-1927.2 The Romanian census
was manipulated for political reasons. The number of those whose mother
tongue was Hungarian had decreased as a result of the classification of the
Jewish, Gypsy, Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox population as Romanian.
In reality there can be little doubt that there were at least 1,600,000
Hungarian-speaking persons living in Transylvania in the interwar period.
The third largest ethnic group in Transylvania was the German. In the
interwar years it numbered about 500,000. From the point of view of their
political, economic and cultural situation, the Germans were the natural allies
of the Hungarians. However, this alliance was rarely realized because of the
two groups' often differing political outlook and perceived interests.
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The ethnic map of Transylvania was very varied. The Hungarian
administrative map of 1910 indicated that there was only one county in which
an ethnic group made up more than 90 percent of the population — the
County of Udvarhely (Odorhei), where the Hungarians made up 95 percent of
the population. In four counties Rumanians made up the majority with
population ratios between 75 and 90 percent, and in two counties the same
was true for Hungarians. Rumanians were the majority in nine counties with
populations making up 50-75 percent of the total, while Hungarians had such
majorities in two counties. In the five remaining counties there was no clear-
cut majority for either of these ethnic groups. As far as the geographic regions
are concerned, Hungarians were significant in Székelyföld (south-eastern
Transylvania), in the borderland between Hungary and Romania, and in the
central Transylvanian regions of the Szilágyság and the Kalotaszeg. In
addition, there were several smaller “ethnic islands” with Hungarian majori-
ties. Many of Transylvania's urban centres used to be such places.
Two v-shaped areas, with their base on the northeastern and southern
frontierlands of Transylvania and their apex in the Bihar or Apuseni moun-
tains, had Romanian majorities. Both of these regions were forested and
mountainous where a relatively low number of people lived on a relatively
large area, with 75-85 percent of them being Rumanians — the predominant
majority of them being shepherds and peasants. There were significant areas
of mixed population, where none of the nationalities formed a majority.
Transylvania's Germans lived mostly in such areas. The most important area
of mixed Hungarian-Romanian population was the large Transylvanian basin,
and a belt near the western border, behind a zone with Hungarian majorities.
An examination of the distribution and settlement pattern of the
Hungarians in Transylvania reveals striking anomalies and abnormalities.
While the predominant majority of the Rumanians lived in small villages
spreading over huge areas, about 30 percent of the Hungarians lived in towns
located in areas populated mainly by other nationalities. The statistics show
that in 1910 there were 28 — and in 1930, still 19 — Transylvanian urban
centres where the proportion of the Hungarian population was over 50 percent
(Arad [Arad], Bánffyhunyad [Huedin], Csíkszereda [Miercurea-Ciuc],
Dicsőszentmárton [Tirnaveni], Felsőbánya [Baia Sprie], Gyergyószentmiklós
[Gheorgheni], Kézdivásárhely [Târgu Secuiesc], Kolozsvár [Cluj],
Marosvásárhely [Tîrgu-Mures], Nagyenyed [Aiud], Nagykároly [Carei],
Nagyszalonta [Salonta], Nagyvárad [Oradea], Sepsiszentgyörgy [Sfîntu-
Gheorghe], Szatmárnémeti [Satu-Mare], Székelyudvarhely [Odorheiu],
Szilágysomlyó [Simleu], Torda [Turda], Zilah [Zalâu]).
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This pattern of settlement would heavily influence the future of
Transylvania's Hungarian community. The fact is that urban populations were
far more susceptible to assimilative pressures and the manipulation of their
ethnic identity by the authorities. In towns with predominantly non-Hungarian
hinterlands the Magyar communities were culturally isolated and soon
underwent the processes which in the long run resulted in the erosion of the
Hungarian character of these places.
The religious make-up of post-1920 Transylvania was even more
complex than its ethnic composition. As a result of the centuries long co-
existence of ethnic groups there had developed some overlaps, but in general
it can be stated that the region's Unitarians and Calvinists were Hungarian,
whereas the majority of its Greek Catholics and almost all the Orthodox
Christians were Romanian — while the Lutherans were all German.3 The
majority of Roman Catholics were also Hungarian — most of them lived on
the eastern territory of Székelyland, in Csík (Ciuc) county, but there was also
a significant number of German Catholics who lived in the Bánát. The pre-
dominantly Romanian population of the above-mentioned north-eastern
triangle was Greek Catholic, whereas that of the southern Romanian-
populated region war Orthodox.
Statistics on the migrations of Romania's Hungarian community are
scarce. Romanian demographers, working with incomplete data, have arrived
at the conclusion that the population growth of Transylvania's Romanian
population exceeded that of the Hungarian by such margin that a fundamental
change in the region's ethnic balance was inevitable. This suggestion, which
was widely advertised, was posed not only as a question of demography but
also a scientific theory. Later on, Romanian propagandists attributed changes
in Transylvania's ethnic balance to this discrepancy in natural population
growth. In reality, the difference between the rate of increase of Transylvania's
Romanian and Hungarian populations was not so much the result of varying
rates of demographic growth but of the Bucharest government's policies of
forced assimilation and large-scale resettlement.
The Legal Situation
The Greater Romania that emerged from the First World War was highly
centralized state whose administration was patterned on that of the pre-war
Romanian Kingdom. Nothing came of the promises that had been made
regarding autonomy for the country's newly-gained territories: Transylvania
and Bessarabia. The protection of the new Romania's minorities was supposed
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to have been guaranteed by the resolutions of Gyulafehérvár (today's Alba
Julia)4 and the minority protection clauses of the post-World War I peace
treaties, but these national and international agreements were, more often than
not, disregarded. The Gyulafehérvár resolutions in particular, offered exten-
sive guarantees to all of Romania's minorities in religious, economic and
political affairs and in the realm of education. The Romanian constitution of
March 29, 1923, however, guaranteed only the civic rights of individual
citizens. The new constitution that was proclaimed after the establishment
royal dictatorship by King Carol in February, 1938, went no further. These
constitutions proclaimed the equality of Rumanians (but not of the citizens of
Romania) in the realm of race, language, religion; the freedom of assembly
and association as well as of the press; and the right to education. Neither of
these constitutions guaranteed any collective rights to the national minorities.
On August 4, 1938, King Carol's regime, in its desire to gain wider
support both domestically and internationally, passed a new nationalities
statute which gave national minorities equal rights with Rumanians in matters
of race, religion and language. The new Minority Statute, however, was
limited in its effect by the fact that its provisions were not reinforced by other
legislation. Furthermore, the High Commission on Minority Affairs estab-
lished by this statute did not possess powers to enforce its provisions.
The legal regime for the protection of minorities in interwar Romania
was in practice circumscribed and provided limited benefits. Nevertheless the
very existence of minority protection provisions gave comfort to minorities
and encouraged them in their struggle to obtain at least partial protection for
their cultures.
The fundamental issue determining the fate of the Hungarians in
Romania was their right to citizenship. The Romanian state, in its quest for the
creation of a homogeneous nation state, tried to decrease the number of
minorities through denying citizenship to their members, or making it difficult
for them to attain the status of citizens. Accordingly, even though the minority
protection agreements signed by Romania called for the granting of citizen
status to all people born in the country as well as those who were permanent
residents there, the statute of February 24, 1924, made the right to residency
status — and not the place of residence — a condition of citizenship.5 The
right to citizenship, specified in the minority protection agreement signed by
Romania after the war, was eventually implemented in October of 1939
through an amendment to the legislation dealing with citizenship rights.
During the intervening two decades huge number of Hungarians had been
forced to leave the country.6
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As far as the rights of the minorities were concerned, the constitution
of 1923 endorsed the idea of the equality of all citizens. Nevertheless, Roma-
nia's Parliament passed many laws that violated the rights of minorities.
Among these was Bank Act of 8 May 1934, and the Act of 16 July 1934,
which specified that 80 percent of the employees, and 50 percent of the
directors of banks had to be Romanians.7
The situation was similar in regard to the use of minority languages.
The constitutions of 1923 and 1938 — despite the provisions of the minority
protection treaties — did not address the issue of the rights of the minorities to
the use of their mother tongue. Furthermore, Romania's Parliament passed
numerous acts that restricted the use of the Hungarian language. In the courts,
for example, lawyers were not allowed to use any other language but
Romanian, and accountants had to do their book-keeping also in Romanian.
Education
In the focus of political struggle of Transylvania's Hungarians between the
two world wars stood education which was of fundamental importance from
the point of view of the survival of their culture.
The right of minorities to education in their own language was
proclaimed by the Gyulafehérvár declarations as well as the Minority Protec-
tion provisions of the post-war peace settlement. At the beginning of the
1919-1920 school-year, the Romanian authorities in charge of education tried
to delegate authority over the teaching of minorities to church-run schools. As
a result of this policy, the Hungarian language lost ground in the state schools,
whereas the number of Hungarian denominational schools increased rapidly.
The restriction of the mother tongue education of minorities living in
Romania began in 1921 after the ratification of the peace treaties. The authori-
ties in charge of education, under the leadership of Minister of Education
Constantin Anghelescu, strove to reduce the influence of the still rather
powerful network of denominational schools. Romania's land reform, imple-
mented through the legislation of 30 July 1921, deprived the Hungarian
churches of their basic income and precipitated a crisis that threatened the
existence of their schools.8 The functioning of these beleaguered church-
operated schools was exacerbated by a series of discriminative measures. With
the deprival of the right to publicize themselves and their activities, a great
many long-established Hungarian schools had to close.9
Greater Romania's primary level state schools were first regulated by
the act of 26 July 1924. The legislation stipulated that elementary schooling
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had to be uniform in the whole country, that its direction and control was the
function of the state, and that no school could be established without the prior
approval of the Ministry of Public Education. The act also specified that the
language of education had to be Romanian, except in communities where the
language was non-Romanian. In these, the Ministry of Education could estab-
lish primary schools to function in the language of the minority, to the same
extent as those in Romanian communities.
When it came to the implementation of this act, the provisions
regarding these ratios were not realized. The proportion of Hungarian
elementary schools was much below what it should have been according to
the results of the 1930 Romanian census — and the situation was even worse
in the case of kindergartens. According to the calculations of Árpád Kiss, at
the end of the 1934-35 school year there were a total of only 112 Hungarian-
language state elementary schools in Romania, and by the 1936-37 school
year this number had decreased to 44, that is, to one percent of the total
number of schools in the country. This meant that, out of the total of about
96,809 Hungarian pupils registered in state elementary schools, in 1934-35
there were only 11,485, and in 1936-37 only 4,527 who could study in their
own language.10
In the Romanianization of the state schools prominent role was played
by the provisions of article 159 of the law of July 26, 1924. These provisions
provided any teacher who moved to a county with a large non-Romanian
population with a 50 percent pay bonus, a parcel of land of 10 hectares, as
well as improved pension benefits. Counties in which teachers were qualified
for these incentives included Csík (Ciuc) with 85.7 percent Hungarian
population, Háromszék (Trei Scaune) with 86.6%, Udvarhely (Odorhei) with
95.1%, Maros-Torda (Mures-Turda) with 45.9%, Bihar (Bihor) with 33.8%,
Szatmár (Satu-Mare) with 31.9%, Szilágy (Sǎlaj) with 36.6%, Kolozs (Cluj)
with 32.6%, Szolnok-Doboka (in east-central Transylvania) with 15.8%,
Torda-Aranyos (Turda) with 22.2%.
Minorities were further burdened by the fact that the state expected
the local communities to shoulder all the costs of maintaining the elementary
schools (school construction, maintenance, the upkeep of the headmaster's
residence, etc.) except for the wages of the teachers. Considering the fact that,
contrary to the provisions of the law, minority denominational schools did not
enjoy any state support, it becomes obvious that the communities of
Romania's minorities were burdened with a double than the normal share of
education costs. They had to pay for the denominational schools that taught in
the minority’s language, and they also had to pay most of the costs for the
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maintenance of the state schools that were increasingly Romanianized — the
latter amounted to 14 percent of the taxes collected in a particular settlement.11
The decrease of the number of state schools that taught in Hungarian
had a very negative impact on Transylvania's Hungarian community. The
threat existed that the implementation of the regulations of the law governing
denominational schools (which barred students with Romanian family names
or ancestry from attending), and the closing of more and more of these
schools, would force an increasing number of Hungarian students to attend
state schools that were gradually becoming Romanianized.
As far as the legal status of denominational schools was concerned,
the framers of minority protection treaties had not been aware how important
Hungarian denominational education had been in the past in Transylvania.
Because of this these treaties did not include any provisions for the protection
of denominational schools from state regulations, Romania's legislators could
classify the denominational minority schools into the same category as private
schools that were operated for profit.12 The exceptions to this were the
schools of the Orthodox Church which enjoyed all the benefits extended to
state schools.
Many of the regulations governing education in Romania of the 1920s
had a negative impact on the country's minorities. Although these measures
caused concerns and difficulties for the Hungarian community, they failed to
disrupt the Hungarian elementary school system. In 1931 for example, nearly
75 percent of Hungarian children were still receiving education in their
mother tongue. Almost 62 percent of these students attended church-affiliated
schools where they received a high-quality education and one that was
Hungarian in spirit.
The restriction of such education began in earnest in the early 1930s.
Between 1931 and 1937 the number of Hungarian public schools declined
from 427 to 44. This meant that a very large percentage of Transylvania's
Hungarian pupils, that is close to hundred thousand students, no longer
received their education in the mother tongue.13 Statistical data of the Hun-
garian denominational education reveal that after 1932, negative tendencies
occurred there as well. This was manifested above all by the fact that instead
of experiencing growing enrolment as had been the case previously, from this
time on these schools faced a decline.14
The combined enrolment of the Hungarian religious and public
schools in 1935 was 77,346 — two years later it was down to 62,000. By that
time in the state-supported schools only 4,527 students received education in
their Hungarian mother tongue. With nearly 93 percent of Transylvania's
Hungarian students receiving their education in the Magyar minority's church-
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affiliated schools, the burden of culture maintenance had shifted over-
whelmingly to this sector of the minority educational network.
The Churches
The Churches play a fundamental role in the preservation of ethnic identity
and culture in minority populations. This was especially the case in Transyl-
vania where the Churches had for many centuries played an important role in
education and culture maintenance. Such long-standing traditions of freedom
of religion and equality among the denominations helped Transylvania's
churches to serve the interests of minorities without which their survival could
have been jeopardized.
The tradition of religious freedom in Transylvania included the right
for denominations to maintain their religious and cultural institutions. After
the acquisition of the region by Romania, that country's government
undertook to respect the religious autonomy of the Székely (Hungarian) and
Saxon (German) minorities, and to support their institutions financially. At
first, the country's constitution even guaranteed the equality of religions in
Transylvania. A revision of the constitution in 1923 however, declared the
Orthodox Church to be supreme in the country and accorded preferred status
to the Greek Catholic Church.15
In the meantime the process of depriving Transylvania's Hungarian
minority churches of their assets continued. Romania's Land Reform Act of
30 June 1921 violated the concept of equality of religion proclaimed by the
country's first post-World War I constitution. Pursuant to this law, the
Hungarian churches were deprived of most of their landholdings. The Roman
Catholic dioceses of Nagyvárad (Oradea), Gyulafehérvár (Alba Julia), Temes-
vár (Timişoara), and Szatmár (Satu-Mare) lost 95 percent of their holdings,
while the Reformed Church elsewhere had to part with 45 percent of its lands.
All-in-all, Romania's Hungarian churches lost a total of 84.5 percent of their
estates.16
The loss of these lands, and the income from them, confronted these
Churches with grave difficulties. From this time on the churches had to
maintain their religious services and support their schools from their much




Confronted by such difficulties the leaders of Transylvania's Hungarian
minority tried to organize themselves politically. After several failed attempts,
in December of 1922 they established the National Hungarian Party (Országos
Magyar Párt, hereafter NHP). The party accepted as member every citizen of
Romania over the age of 20 who considered himself Hungarian by descent,
mother tongue or cultural background. This party represented the interests of
Transylvania's Hungarians in Romania's Parliament until its dissolution at the
time of the establishment of a royal dictatorship in Romania in 1938. It fought
a continuous struggle for the maintenance of Hungarian schools. On fifteen
different occasions it registered its complaints in this matter with the League
of Nations. Though it functioned as a political party, the NHP tried to rep-
resent the collective interests of the Hungarian minority. After its dissolution
in 1938, the Hungarians of Transylvania tried to voice their concerns through
the organization known as the Front for National Re-birth (Nemzeti Újjászü-
letés Frontja). The effectiveness of the Front was limited by the fact that
during King Carol's dictatorship the role of Parliament was severely restricted.
According to the country's new constitution, the government became respon-
sible to Parliament but to the King, and most legislation was promulgated not
by Parliament but by a cabinet appointed by Carol.
The Second Vienna Award of 30 August, 1940, brought dramatic
changes in the life of the Hungarian community in Transylvania. The award
returned the northern and eastern parts of Transylvania, an area of 43,104
square kilometres, to Hungary. In devising the new frontiers between Hungary
and Romania the arbitrators tried to implement the principle of nationality.
As a result, in the new “Hungarian” half of Transylvania, Hungarians
(numbering 1,380,507) became a majority; at the same time, a sizeable
Romanian minority, 1,029,469 inhabitants, found themselves included in the
newly-enlarged Hungary. In southern, “Romanian” Transylvania, the
Romanian majority became more predominant (with 2,274,569 individuals)
while the Hungarian and German minority population amounted to “only”
363,206 and 490,640 respectively.
Transylvania's August, 1940 partition better reflected the region's
ethnic realities than did the post-World War I settlement, but it did not solve
its accumulated problems — nor did it resolve the fundamental issue of
intolerant nationalism. Problems were not resolved, only modified. Before the
Second Vienna Award, Europe was faced the explosive dilemma of a 1.6
million-strong Hungarian minority in Romania; after it there was the equally
acute problem of a million-strong Romanian minority in Hungary. At the
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same time, the issue of nearly a million Germans, Hungarians, South Slavs,
Gypsies etc. remaining in Romanian Transylvania, persisted.
In reflecting upon the experience of the Hungarian minority in
Romania in the interwar period we can conclude that Romanian policy toward
minorities was characterized by an impatient and aggressive nationalism that
permeated all of East Central Europe at the time. Throughout these two
decades the situation of Romania's minorities kept worsening. The main-
tenance of minority culture and identity was becoming more and more
difficult. The contradictions of Romania's parliamentary system, the restric-
tions on minority political organizations, the expropriation of much of the
minority Churches' estates, the systematic Romanization of the educational
system all threatened the long-term survival of the country's minorities. Yet,
this period was also characterized by the minorities' struggle for their survival
and by their faith in the positive outcome of this struggle. The minorities
couldn't hope to win the contest against the Romanian state, but on occasion
they managed to wring some concessions from Bucharest that gave them hope
for the future.
With World War II everything changed. At war's end, the provisions
of the Second Vienna Award were annulled: Transylvania was reunited under
Romanian rule. Furthermore, the whole region, with its myriad problems,
became a part of the Soviet sphere of interest. The arrival of communism
didn't improve the prospects of Transylvania's minorities. The maintenance of
national or ethnic identity was not a priority according to communist
ideology. At the same time, the new communist state began to deal with
nationality problems with little understanding but strident determination.
Especially threatening was the attitude of Romania's communists toward
private property. As has been pointed out above, land ownership had been the
financial underpinning of Transylvania's minority Churches and their schools.
The total expropriation of these assets meant that the Romanian state gained a
complete monopoly over all aspects of education and could promote the
interest of the country's majority without any restrictions. Romania's socialist
transformation had negative effects on the whole Romanian population, but
the country's majority disadvantaged less than its minorities.
Post-World War II Demographics
Obtaining reliable data on the demographic evolution of Transylvania's
minority populations in the period surveyed in this study is made difficult by
the fact that during Romania's age of communism statistics were manipulated
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with impunity. Even the terminology used to determine the inhabitants'
minority status kept changing. The term “minorities” first became “nationali-
ties” then “citizens of the homeland,” and finally in the case of Hungarians,
“Rumanians of the Hungarian nationality.” The manipulation of the data
reinforced certain natural tendencies such as the high birth-rates among the
country's Romanian population. Not surprisingly under the circumstances, the
demographic data reveal the ever increasing predominance of the Romanian
population in Transylvania, and the corresponding relative and sometimes
absolute decline of the minorities.
Especially remarkable is the decline of Transylvania's Jewish popula-
tion. In 1930 3.2 percent of the region's inhabitants declared themselves to be
Jewish, while in 1977 only 0.1 percent did. The Holocaust during World War
II and the post-war mass emigration of Jews meant that this minority had
virtually disappeared from Transylvania despite the fact that, from the middle
of the 19th century to the middle of the 20th, this ethnic/religious group had
played a influential role in the region's cultural and economic evolution. This
development had a serious impact on Transylvania's Hungarian minority as
the Jews, especially the intelligentsia, had often made substantial contributions
to Hungarian community and cultural advancement.
From the point of view of the Hungarian minority, the Romanian
authorities' manipulation of demographic data regarding Transylvania's
Gypsies was also disadvantageous. Romania's Gypsy population has always
been one of the largest in Europe, numbering over a million. Despite this,
Romania's communist governments, taking advantage of the Gypsies' ambi-
guous cultural status, often determined their numbers ridiculously low, in
1966 at 49,000 for example. In most cases Gypsies were listed as Rumanians,
even those who lived in Hungarian communities and considered themselves
Hungarian Gypsies.
Very dramatic was the decline of Transylvania's German minority. In
1930 this ethnic group numbered 544,000. By 1966 its numbers had declined
to 372,000. This largest of German communities in Eastern Europe
experienced a further drastic decline following a deal between Romania's
Ceauşescu's regime and West Germany, as a consequence of which, by the
end of the 1980s, Transylvania's German minority had declined to under
200,000.17
The decline, more precisely the relative decline of the Hungarian
minority was continuous throughout these decades, though it was not nearly
as dramatic as that of the German. In 1930 there were 1,353,000 Hungarians
in Transylvania, making up 24.4 percent of the region's total population. In
1966 this number had grown to 1,597,000 and in 1977 to 1,651,000, but these
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numbers represented only 23.8 percent and 22 percent of the total population
respectively. Other unfavourable tendencies were also apparent. In regions of
formerly mixed (Romanian-German-Hungarian or Romanian-Hungarian-
German) populations, Hungarians began to assimilate to the Romanian
majority. The emigration of Germans also had a negative consequence. They
were replaced mainly by Romanian immigrants from southern Romania (the
former Wallachia) — people who had no experience in co-existing with
people of other ethnicities. Similar trend prevailed in Transylvania's cities.
The influx into such urban centres of masses of Romanian and other non-
Hungarian workers inevitably altered their ethnic makeup. Even cities that had
been traditionally Hungarian lost their Magyar character in the course of a few
decades. Cities such as Arad (Arad), Brassó (Braşov), Kolozsvár (Cluj),
Nagybánya (Baia-Mare), Nagyvárad (Oradea), Szatmárnémeti (Satu-Mare)
Temesvár (Timişoara) and other historic centres lost their Hungarian majority
and Hungarian character.
The Post-1945 Political and Legal Situation
Throughout the period surveyed in this study Romania's policies regarding the
political activities and legal rights of minorities have been characterized by the
increasing limitation of their opportunities and the encouragement of their
assimilation to the country's Romanian majority. Occasionally such policies
were interrupted by a tactical retreat in the quest for assimilation, only to be
followed by renewed efforts in this direction.
Such tactical retreats were often caused by internal and/or external
political considerations. In the elections of November 1946, for example, the
Communists in Romania needed the support of the Hungarian People's
League (Magyar Népi Szövetség, hereafter HPL). Until the signing of the
Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947, the government in Bucharest was
anxious to prove its “accommodating” attitude towards the minorities, mainly
to make sure that the peacemakers would legalize the restoration of Romania's
pre-1940 western borders. Later concessions made to the minorities were
proclaimed not “rights” but “privileges” and gradually many of them were
withdrawn.
In a similar manner, some concessions were made by the Ceauşescu
regime in the spring of 1968 when it feared Soviet intervention and needed
the support of all of the country's peoples. As communist Romania became
more and more isolated within the Soviet empire, it avoided the political thaw
that was experienced by some of the Soviet satellites. In an increasingly
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totalitarian atmosphere there were fewer and fewer occasions when the regime
tried to solve the country's problems through the building of consensus as
opposed to dictatorial decrees.
During Romania's evolution since the end of World War II, for
Transylvania's Hungarian minority a memorable period was the time of the
leadership of Petru Groza that commenced in March of 1945. Many Hun-
garians look back on this early post-war era with some nostalgia. First of all,
Groza, a Transylvanian by birth and upbringing, spoke fluent Hungarian. His
government made many concessions to the region's minorities. This was the
time of the restoration of many of Transylvania's minority theatres. The small
Turkish and Tatar minorities received their own schools, for the first time in
their evolution. It was in this period that the Hungarian university of Kolozs-
vár (Cluj) reopened, and the Hungarian-speaking Csángós of Moldavia
received their own schools.18 Unfortunately for the Hungarians, these conces-
sions proved ephemeral.
We may ask the question whether there is real ground for a positive
assessment the Groza government's deeds. Indeed, the above-mentioned
concessions certainly indicate some empathy with the minorities, empathy that
has been usually lacking in Romanian policy throughout the decades. But we
have to keep in mind the other developments that had taken place in this
period that had a negative impact on the Hungarian community. During the
late 1940s and the early 1950s there had been a purge conducted by the
government in the ranks of the HPL, as well as among Hungarian intellectuals
and educators. It was in this period that numerous community leaders were
imprisoned, among them Edgar Balogh, Márton Áron, Kurkó Gyárfás, József
Meliusz, Ede Korparics, Lajos Csőgör, Lajos Jordáky and János Demeter.
This was the beginning of the abolition of the independent Hungarian
economic institutions and the disruption of the Hungarian co-operatives. The
forced Romanization of Transylvania's Hungarian cities also accelerated. The
edict of 9 May, 1947, restricted the right of Transylvania's inhabitants to
change the place of their habitation, a restriction was abolished only in 1989
with the fall of the Ceauşescu regime. Communication with Hungary was
made more and more difficult. For travel abroad special permits became
compulsory and the number of border-crossing points was drastically reduced.
These measures had a very negative impact on Hungarians. To be fair,
however, it is important to note that the developments of the 1950s afflicted
all inhabitants of Romania regardless of nationality. The nationalization of
private enterprises, the arbitrary arrests, the fear of imprisonment did impact
every citizen of the country. For Hungarians however, these losses came on
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top of those suffered between the two world wars, and the new hardships had
more serious consequences.
The establishment of the Maros Hungarian Autonomous Area can be
deemed to have been a continuation of the Groza government's policy of
pretending accommodation with the country's minorities. The events of the
1980s suggest that this indeed had also been an empty gesture. In fact, it can
be argued that this development had a negative effect on Transylvania's
Hungarian community. First of all, it coincided with what might be called the
“decapitation” of the region's Hungarian intelligentsia. No Magyar
intellectual critical of the regime was safe from imprisonment, whether he or
she was a liberal, a social-democrat or a communist. The establishment of the
“autonomous region” gave the government an excuse to abolish the HPL. The
regime argued that where such “enlightened concessions” had been made to
the minorities, there was no need for an organization to speak on their behalf.
The creation of the “autonomous region” also served as the starting
point of the isolation or ghettoization of Transylvania's Székely region. The
region's existence gave an excuse to Romanian authorities to transfer here
certain educational institutions from such cities as Kolozsvár (Cluj) thereby
reducing the chances of Hungarian culture maintenance in those mainly
mixed-population cities. Certain rights that the Hungarian minority had
enjoyed (such as the right to bilingual traffic signs, and the right to public
services in Magyar) outside of the region were also abandoned with the
excuse that these rights or services existed in the autonomous region. These
losses were not counterbalanced by any advantages, since as far as
administrative self-government was concerned, the autonomous region had no
more autonomy than any other local jurisdiction in the country.
The 1956 anti-Soviet uprising in Hungary was deemed an extremely
dangerous development by Romania's authorities. The political thaw that
preceded the revolution had certain reverberations in Transylvania especially
among the Hungarian intellectuals who hoped that a similar thaw might come
to Romania. The authorities in Bucharest took steps to intimidate the openly
defiant intelligentsia of Kolozsvár (Cluj). The large party delegation that
appeared in the city in August, found such a defiant atmosphere that it felt
best to offer some concessions, including the launching of two new Hungarian
papers the Korunk (Our Age) and Napsugár (the Sun's Ray).
The suppression of the revolution in Hungary was followed by
reprisals against Hungarians in Rumania as well. No exact statistics exist
regarding the proportions of the retributions, but anecdotal evidence suggests
that thousands and even perhaps tens of thousands were persecuted. Taking
advantage of the anti-Hungarian sentiments in the communist party and the
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country, the authorities abolished many of the Hungarians' existing rights. In
the country's communist party the new view was that the previous “lenient”
policies toward the Hungarian minority had been mistaken and the toleration
of Hungarian schools had been a mistake.
In the 1960s the processes of de-Stalinization and economic de-
centralization became more marked in some of Eastern Europe's Soviet
satellites. Romania's Hungarian intelligentsia kept hoping that the same might
happen in their country too. In particular, they expected the government of
Nicolae Ceauşescu, which had just replaced that of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej,
to embrace the idea of de-Stalinization and abandon the ultra-nationalistic
minority policies of its predecessor. Ceauşescu's first pronouncements
quickly dashed these expectations. The new leader promised change and a
new ideology but his statements offered no ground for hope on the part of
Romania's minorities. Indeed it was under the new leader that the concept of
the socialist national state became prevalent. Already in these early speeches
Ceauşescu proclaimed that the problem of the minorities in Romania had been
solved implying that the process of the Romanization of Romania's nationali-
ties had been completed.
Of course in Bucharest the “project” of the assimilation of the nation-
alities was not considered completed. In the records of the Communist Party
of Romania the idea of the “homogenization” of the country's population
crops up repeatedly. In this process there were only temporary, tactical retreats
in the process, the ultimate goal remained the same.
In the increasingly dictatorial times of the 1980s, Ceauşescu, who
now called himself Romania's “Conducator”, didn't even make any tactical
retreats any more. Under him began a campaign of hate mongering against
Hungarians.19 This came on top of increasing economic disorder and a
worsening of food distribution in the country. In the media, the crisis was
blamed on the Hungarians. Soon they became seen as a threat to Romania's
unity. These accusations allowed the problem of the minorities to become a
problem for the country's security and police agencies, in particular for the
much-feared Securitate.
The prime target of the new anti-Hungarian campaign became the
minority schools. This was the time that the process of the “relocation” of
Hungarian intellectuals. Hungarian educators (as well as members of the
professions) were assigned jobs in non-Hungarian communities outside of
Transylvania, while Rumanians were offered positions in Hungarian com-
munities. These measures resulted in the dramatic decline of Hungarian-
language education and the complete eradication of Hungarian secondary
schools — and, within secondary schools, of courses offered in Hungarian. In
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certain parts of Transylvania, such as Mezőség and the Bánát, by the mid-
1980s all Hungarian secondary schools had been closed. In the predominantly
Magyar-speaking counties of Hargita (Harghita) and Kovászna (Covasna),
students found it nearly impossible to get a secondary education in Hungarian.
What courses remained offered in Hungarian were often assigned Rumanian-
speaking teachers making minority-language instruction impossible.
During the second half of the 1980s Bucharest became more an more
intolerant in its dealings with the Hungarian intelligentsia. After all, a minority
deprived of its educated leaders became much weaker and could offer far less
resistance to the authorities. All this was done under the direction of the
communist party leadership in Bucharest. The number of Hungarian students
allowed to proceed to Romania's colleges and universities was increasingly
curtailed. At the same time, many of Transylvania's Hungarian intellectuals
were offered exit-visas and were blatantly admonished to emigrate to Hun-
gary.20
As a symbolic part of these processes, the name of the National
Council of Hungarian Workers (Magyar Dolgozók Országos Tanácsa) was
changed to the Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality (Magyar
Nemzetiségü Dolgozók Tanácsa).
To the planned elimination of the Hungarian presence and future in
Transylvania came the diabolical plan for the destruction of the Hungarian
past. The government talked of the need for agricultural reform, of the need
for an increase in the acreage cultivated, about industrialization and the
systematization of settlements, but the actual aim was the destruction of non-
Romanian villages, all in the name of progress. Members of minorities moved
out of their villages, settled among people of other ethnicities in the newly-
established, large agro-settlements, would have had no chance of hanging on
to their ancestral cultures. With the elimination of the traditional village
network came the abandonment of cemeteries and the destruction of
monuments reminding people of their ancestral culture. Romania's “Condu-
cator” could not complete the last of his plans for the total Romanization of
Romania. It was not international protest against his ideas that stopped him
but the revolutionary process that began in East Central Europe in 1989. It
spread to Bucharest and swept Ceauşescu from power.
Conclusions
In summing up the fate of Romania's Hungarians in the twentieth century, let
me make a few observations with the unavoidable bias of my own experi-
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ences. Transylvania used to be the most beautiful and brightest pearl of the
Hungarian Crown. This phrase does not simply represent the great power
pretensions of some Hungary's past governments as Transylvania has a special
place in the hearts of Hungarians even today. One explanation is the fact that,
during the times of the Ottoman occupation of much of Hungary,
Transylvania was basically independent and assumed the role of the guardian
of Hungarian culture and even of the concept of a continuing Hungarian state.
We should also keep in mind that many of Hungary's leading intellectuals,
scientists and politicians hailed from Transylvania. Many elements and
components of Hungarian culture, in particular of literature, are also of
Transylvanian origin.
What is the situation today? The Hungarian factor in Transylvania
has for all intents and purposes been restricted to the land of the Székelys.
The Hungarian word is rarely heard in such cities as Nagyszeben (Sibiu),
Déva (Deva), Segesvár (Sigishoara) and Brassó (Braşov). At the same time
places such as Nagyvárad (Oradea), Bánffyhunyad (Huedin) and Beszterce
(Bistriţa) have also become romanized. The vast number of monuments
commemorating the Hungarian reformation, the last battered towers of the de-
populated villages of the Szilágyság and Mezőség in the Transylvanian Basin,
are only dilapidated ruins.
The Hungarian community in Transylvania had suffered great losses
in the last decades of the twentieth century. Apart from the attacks on the
intelligentsia and the mass emigration, one sore spot is the fact that the genera-
tions Hungarians who had grown up in Transylvania's Romanian age, keep
getting closer and closer in mentality to that prevailing in Bucharest since —
being Romanian citizens — this is the only way for them to become equal
partners — or adversaries — of the members of the country's majority.
Is this really the destiny of Transylvania's Hungarians? Despite the
sad facts, we may safely state that it is not. The Hungarian community of
nearly two million will stay a mass that is too big to assimilate, even if the
potential partners in minority existence, such as the Germans and the Jews
have virtually disappeared from the nationality map of Romania. The events
in December, 1989 opened up new opportunities for Transylvania's
Hungarians, despite their contradictions. The restoration of private property
offers the prospect of the Hungarian Churches regaining at least some of the
assets they had owned during the interwar years. The re-establishment of the
cultural, academic and communal institutions of the pre-communist era has
also started. Contacts with Hungary have also improved. Many predominantly
Hungarian-speaking villages have been paired with communities in Hungary
which has helped them culturally and even in the realm of economics.
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The prospects of Transylvania's minorities are further improved by
the fact that international public opinion nowadays has a greater influence on
policy-making in Romania. In Bucharest there is an increased understanding
that continued good relations with the members of the European union is
predicated on Romania's acceptance of European norms and values.
Nevertheless, a marked decline of strident nationalism in the country, and a
rapprochement between Hungary and Romania on the pattern of Franco-
German friendship in recent times, is still far in the future.
In the struggle of Transylvania's Hungarian minority for cultural
survival, Hungary once again can play a role. Alas, the much desired
cooperation between Budapest and Bucharest is still plagued by old
suspicions and attitudes. In dealing with the Romania however, Hungary
might be able to use her somewhat greater economic prosperity and closer
links to Europe to her — and the Hungarian minority's — advantage.
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Transylvania in International
Power Politics during World War II
Nándor Dreisziger
...in the Transylvanian question...
[Hitler] held the most perfect instru-
ment... of blackmail.
Alexandre Cretzianu
From earliest times, the land known today as Transylvania has been coveted
by various nations and empires and has often been the object of diplomatic
wrangling or the scene of wars of conquest. What made the region attractive
to both masses of migrants and conquering armies have been its central
location in the heartland of Eastern Europe and its fertile land complete with
abundant resources. The years of the Second World War were no exception to
this time-honoured tradition of keen competition for, and conflict over,
Transylvania.
From September of 1939 to the war's end, the struggle for Transyl-
vania continued, intensified if we consider the fact that during the interwar
years the governments of neighbouring lands conspired to gain (or retain, as
the case might be) control over Transylvania. This paper will point out that,
in this struggle, at first two of Eastern Europe's small nations, Romania and
Hungary, played influential roles; however, as the war progressed, increasing
interest was displayed and influence was exercised by certain Great Powers,
especially the Third Reich. In the end, the deliberations over Transylvania's
fate were concentrated in the hands of the powers that emerged victorious in
the war, and the final settlement of the “Transylvanian question” was imposed
by the country that achieved preponderant influence in Eastern Europe at
war's end: the Soviet Union.
Some eighteen-and-a-half centuries before the occupation of Transyl-
vania by the Red Army in the fall of 1944, the Roman Empire — the
superpower of the early Christian Era — conquered this land and held it for
over 150 years. Barbarian incursions into the Empire later prompted the
Romans to abandon most of their frontier provinces: Dacia was evacuated in
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271 a.d. In the centuries that followed this land served as home to a succession
of nomadic and semi-nomadic nations, including (in rough chronological
order) the Goths, the Huns, the Gepids, the Avars, the Bulgars, and proto-
Magyar tribes. After the Hungarian conquest of the Carpathian Basin late in
the ninth century, Magyar control was gradually extended over Transylvania.
Incursions by nomadic peoples from the east — first by the Pechenegs and the
Cumans and then, in the thirteenth century, by the Mongols — usually proved
quite destructive, but did not lead to lasting occupations.
More important than these military incursions was the immigration of
new ethnic groups during the Middle Ages. Beginning with the early years of
the eleventh century, Hungary's kings encouraged the transmigration of the
proto-Magyar Székelys from other frontier areas of the Carpathian Basin to
southeastern Transylvania where they were expected to serve as guardians of
the Kingdom of Hungary against attacks by nomadic tribes. To strengthen the
defences of southern Transylvania even further, in the following century
German-speaking settlers from the Rhineland and elsewhere were invited to
settle there and establish fortified cities that were to serve as defensive out-
posts as well as centres of commerce and industry. In time, the Hungarians,
Székelys, and Germans (Saxons) of Transylvania would constitute the three
founding nations of the land, and established a kind of a political condo-
minium there while maintaining varying degrees of autonomy within the
Kingdom of Hungary. Later immigrants to the land, Vlach tribesmen from
the Balkans — the predecessors of modern-day Romanians — failed to
achieve such a privileged status and became a major factor in the political
affairs of Transylvania only in the modern era. In the meantime, from the late
sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, the region witnessed the
competition of the two dominant empires of the day for influence: the
Ottoman Turkish and the Habsburg. In this struggle the princes of
Transylvania often managed to play one side against the other with
considerable success until the decline of Ottoman influence in East Central
Europe led to the establishment of Viennese rule over the whole of Hungary,
including Transylvania, which the Habsburgs administered as a separate
province of their empire.
The Hungarian nation emerged from Habsburg domination briefly in
1848-49, and more effectively in 1867 as a result of the Austro-Hungarian
Compromise.1 From 1867 to the end of World War I, Transylvania became
an integral part of Hungary and was ruled directly from Budapest. By this
time, however, significant demographic shifts had taken place in the region as
the Romanians had become the most populous ethnic group.2 In the
meantime, to the south, Romania shook off the increasingly feeble tutelage of
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the Ottoman Empire and emerged as an independent nation. The stage
became set for the growth of Romanian separatism in Transylvania which
would reach its zenith during World War I.
From the First World War to the Second
The keen struggle for Transylvania during the Second World War can only be
explained by developments that had taken place during and immediately after
the First World War. As is commonly known, for some time during this
conflict Romania remained neutral. Both the Central Powers and the Allies
— and, especially, Russia — hoped to attract Romania to their side of the war,
but it was the Allies who were in a better position to offer inducements to the
government in Bucharest. In fact they made a secret offer to Romania of
Transylvania, on the condition that the country join the alliance against the
Central Powers. The Romanians, encouraged at first by the successes of the
Russians against the German and Austro-Hungarian forces in the so-called
Brusilov offensive, committed themselves, and a few weeks later, in late
August 1916, declared war on Austria-Hungary and began the invasion of
Transylvania. By then the Brusilov offensive had spent its fury and hastily
assembled German and Austro-Hungarian forces defeated the invading
Romanian armies and, within a few months, they occupied much of Romania.
The collapse of the Central Powers in the fall of 1918 gave a new
opportunity to Romania to attack, which she did — a few days before the war'
end. This time the Romanian armies were successful. They occupied
Transylvania and, for a brief period of time in 1919, most of Hungary. In the
Treaty of Trianon between the victorious Allies and Hungary of June, 1920,
the peacemakers awarded Transylvania to Romania, along with large portions
of the Hungarian Great Plain. In fact, more formerly Hungarian land was
given to Romania than was left to truncated Hungary. Transferred with these
lands were about 1,700,000 ethnic Hungarians.3
Of all the territorial losses the Kingdom of Hungary suffered in the
wake of World War I, it was the severing of Transylvania that left the deepest
wound on the Magyar psyche. The lands awarded to Romania constituted the
largest of the dismembered chunks of the ancient Kingdom of Hungary, and
they served as the homeland for the largest number of ethnic Hungarians with
the exception of the area left to Hungary herself. Though Romanians consti-
tuted the most populous ethnic group (they made up close to 54 percent of the
total) in the transferred territories, many counties and some cities were
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populated predominantly by Magyar-speaking residents (while a few other
centres had German majorities).4 Furthermore, Hungarians both in Transylva-
nia and elsewhere generally considered that land to be the cradle of the
modern Hungarian nation. Indeed, during the centuries when central Hungary
was under Turkish occupation, and North-western Hungary was ruled by
Vienna, Hungarian culture — and, at times, even political influence — thrived
only in Transylvania. But there was more to the interwar Hungarian pre-
occupation with the loss of Transylvania than such sentiments. During this
period many of truncated Hungary's leaders were of Transylvanian stock. The
two most prominent were Count István Bethlen and Count Pál Teleki. The
former served as Hungary's Prime Minister from 1921 to 1931 and remained
an “elder statesman” thereafter. The latter was Prime Minister just before
Bethlen, and again from 1939 to 1941. Both of them were convinced that the
loss of Transylvania dealt a mortal blow to Hungary's strategic interests and
constituted a grave threat to the survival of Magyar culture in Transylvania
itself.5
It should not be surprising under the circumstances that Hungary's
foremost foreign policy aim during the interwar years and early war years was
the revision of the territorial settlement imposed in 1920, in particular the
regaining of much if not all of Transylvania. Until 1938 this aspiration was
frustrated by the existence of the Little Entente — a political and military
alliance of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, backed most
persistently by the French — that was designed to frustrate Hungarian ambi-
tions. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the onset of war in Europe,
however, made conditions increasingly ripe for attempts to re-draw the map of
Eastern Europe.
While Hungarians were eager to undo the post-war territorial settle-
ment, Romanians were determined to hold on to what they had gained. They
had convinced themselves that Transylvania was rightfully theirs not only
because of the fact that they constituted the largest ethnic group there, but
because of the historical legitimacy of their claim. According to one school of
Romanian historiography — one which had gained wide popular acceptance
among Romanians — Transylvania had been Romanian ever since the days of
Roman Dacia. Accordingly, Hungarians were only “latecomers” there and the
Treaty of Trianon only ended a long “foreign domination” of the land.
Furthermore, that treaty did not satisfy all Romanian aspirations as it did not
award to Romania the boundary promised by the Allies in the Treaty of
Bucharest of 1916, nor did it restore all the lands to greater Romania that
Roman Dacia was supposed to have had. While not all Romanians were
ready to press even greater territorial demands against Hungary, they were
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steadfast in their belief that what they had gained, was rightfully theirs. An
indication of this attitude is the reaction of the masses in Bucharest to the
news of the Second Vienna Award that in 1940 returned part of Transylvania
to Hungary. According to some reports, it was not uncommon to see people
cry in the streets, while others (or the very same people) called on Romania's
leaders to defy, by force of arms if necessary, the German-Italian decision.6
There was even another parallel between the situation in Hungary and that in
Romania. While in the former (as has been pointed out above) men of
Transylvanian birth had at times come to dominate the government, in
Romania the same happened though less frequently. After the end of World
War I, former Romanian-Transylvanian politicians, such as Julius Maniu and
Alexander Vaida-Voevod, gained prominence in Bucharest politics — the
former was prime minister twice, in late 1918 and again from 1928 to 1930,
and the latter was government leader in 1932-33. Both of them were ardent
believers in a Romanian Transylvania. Nothing illustrates better the
irreconcilability of the Hungarian and Romanian positions regarding
Transylvania than the slogans that were popular at the time in the two
countries. In Hungary, the cry was “Mindent vissza!” ([we want] everything
back), while in Romania the national slogan was “Nic'un brazda!” ([we yield]
not one furrow).7
The international developments of the second half of 1938, of 1939,
and the first half of 1940, made many Hungarian leaders confident that the
long-awaited opportunity to regain some or all of Transylvania would soon
present itself. They had good reasons to think so. After the summer of 1938
Romania's international position kept deteriorating. The so-called Bled
Accords with Hungary and, especially, the Munich settlement between
Czechoslovakia and Germany, emasculated the Little Entente. Romania's
diplomatic position further deteriorated in the late summer of the following
year. At the time, Bucharest was aligned with Britain and France, but the
sudden rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia at the end of
August and, especially, the occupation of Poland by these two powers in
September, greatly weakened Romania's strategic situation. The country's
predicament was further exacerbated by the fact that Hungary was not the
only country eager to press territorial demands against it. In the wake of the
Great War, Romania had gained lands not only from Hungary but also from
Bulgaria and Russia. The Bulgarian claim to Dobruja probably did not alarm
Bucharest unduly, but much more threatening was the desire of the Soviet
Union to regain Bessarabia. Furthermore, Romania was also a possible target
for an attack from still another quarter: Germany. The Ploeşti oil-fields were
one of the most important sources of energy in Europe, and Hitler could not
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afford to allow them to fall into hostile hands. Against these dangers the
Romanians had few defences. France and Britain were hardly in a position to
offer serious help. Although they had issued a guarantee to Romania in the
spring of 1939, but as German influence throughout Central Europe grew, this
commitment gradually lost its credibility.
Wartime Hungarian Plans
Bucharest's increasing difficulties gave rise to various plans in Budapest to
solve the “Transylvanian question” in a manner satisfactory to Hungary's
interests. How differently Hungary's civilian and military leaders approached
this issue is illustrated by the plans that were advanced by ex-Premier Count
István Bethlen and Chief-of-the-General Staff, Henrik Werth. The scheme of
the former — outlined in a long, secret memorandum to the government —
started with the premise that Germany would lose the war against the West
European democracies. Accordingly, Bethlen argued, Hungary should remain
neutral in the European struggle and preserve her strength for the attainment
of her national aims at the end of the war. Bethlen hoped that by participating
in some kind of a security arrangement for post-war Europe, and by not
annexing Transylvania but allowing it to become an autonomous member of a
loose East European federation, Hungary could obtain Western diplomatic
support for her plans.8 General Werth's plans for Transylvania were quite
different. The Chief-of-Staff was not willing to wait until the outcome of the
war was settled. When the Russian threat against Romania surfaced in the
winter of 1939-40, Werth urged his government to prepare for the recovery of
Transylvania by force should an armed conflict develop between Moscow and
Bucharest.9
In April of 1940 Werth approached Regent Miklós Horthy and the
government with a memorandum. The Chief-of-Staff began by asserting that
Germany would more than likely emerge victorious in the war. Werth, who
had just held discussions with members of the German General Staff,
informed his civilian superiors that the Germans had offered their
co-operation against Romania. But simple military co-operation was not
sufficient according to Werth. Hungary had to abandon her neutrality and
become an ally of Berlin so that she could regain the lands she had lost in the
wake of World War I. Knowing that certain members of his audience were not
convinced of Germany's invincibility, Werth added that even if Germany did
not win the war, Hungary could retain her conquests because at the end of an
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exhausting struggle the Allied Powers would be “too weak to send large
forces in the Danube Valley.”10
The approach that the Hungarian leadership after some delay adopted
towards the question of Transylvania differed from that advocated by Werth.
Teleki was repelled by the idea of abandoning the country's neutrality. Unlike
Werth, he was doubtful about the prospects of a German victory. He felt that
the superiority of moral strength and physical resources was on the Allied
side. In a letter to Horthy, he rejected the Chief-of-Staff's proposals and
accused him of not seeing the problem of Hungary's interests from the point of
view of a Hungarian (Werth was an ethnic German). Teleki also asked Horthy
to see to it that soldiers did not meddle in politics.11
Although Teleki rejected Werth's plan of regaining Transylvania with
German military help, he did not give up hope of attaining a revision of his
country's eastern boundaries through other means. The opportunity seemed to
have presented itself in the summer of 1940. At the time Hitler was still
hoping to force Britain to her knees and thereby ending the war in Western
Europe. To do this Hitler needed peace elsewhere in Europe, especially in the
south-east, from where came many of the foodstuffs, fuel and raw materials
needed by the German war machine. In the meantime, the Russians had
decided to act. At the end of June they confronted Romania with an ultimatum
demanding the return of Bessarabia. The Soviet move caused hectic activity in
Hungary.12 The honvéd was mobilised and frantic efforts were made to
ascertain Rome's and Berlin's attitudes to a Hungarian occupation of Tran-
sylvania in case of a Russo-Romanian conflict. But that conflict never came
about. Romania surrendered Bessarabia without a fight. And from Berlin
came word that Germany would be most unhappy about any disruption of
peace in Eastern Europe.13
Even though the best opportunity for regaining Transylvania was now
gone, the Hungarians continued their threatening attitude towards Romania,
demanding at the same time that the dispute be submitted to a conference
attended by the statesmen of Germany, Italy, Hungary and Romania. Teleki's
aim was evident: threatened by a Hungarian-Romanian conflict at the time
when Germany's interest demanded peace in Eastern Europe, the Axis powers
would be forced to support the Hungarian claims in any negotiations on the
issue. But, for the time being, Hitler did not wish to act as a mediator in a
territorial dispute between Hungary and Romania. At a meeting of the
German, Italian and Hungarian leaders in Munich during mid-July, he rejected
the idea of a four-power conference and told the Hungarians to negotiate with
the Romanians on a bilateral basis.14
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In order to counter the threats to his country, Romania's King Carol
took steps to improve his country's international position. In the spring of
1939, after the German occupation of Prague and Hungary's re-annexation of
Ruthenia, King Carol mobilized Romania's army and, to imbue his people
with a spirit of resistance, proclaimed the above-mentioned slogan “not one
furrow” — referring to Hungarian aspirations regarding Transylvania. It was
at this time that Bucharest accepted an Anglo-French guarantee, but balanced
it with an economic agreement with Germany which, in the words of one
historian, “assured a dominant position for Germany in the Romanian
economy.”15 While King Carol had realized the need to appease the Germans
already in 1939, most of his subjects did not do so until the fall of Paris to the
Wehrmacht in June of 1940. This development caused disappointment and a
great deal of soul-searching in Bucharest. Its lessons were not lost on King
Carol and his advisers. Soon, Romania renounced the Anglo-French
guarantee. Next, the government sought a rapprochement with the extreme
rightist Iron Guard, against which it had just carried out a bloody persecution
campaign in the wake of the assassination of the country's Prime Minister by
Gardist fanatics. At the same time, more right-wing politicians were co-opted
into the country's leadership and, anti-Semitic laws were introduced with
conspicuous references to the example shown by Nazi Germany.16
As could be expected under the circumstances, the Hungarian-
Romanian discussions, mandated by Hitler in July, achieved nothing.17 There
was no real reason for Bucharest to make substantial concessions: by this time
Romania had acquired a new friend in Germany. The Hungarians could do no
more than continue their threats against Romania and hope that Hitler, for the
sake of peace in south-eastern Europe, would intervene in the dispute. They
did not have to wait long. In August the Führer decided, for reasons that will
be explained below, to settle the question of Hungarian-Romanian relations.
This was almost what the Hungarians desired, but they wanted Hitler to act as
a mediator in the dispute and not as an arbiter. They did not want to see
another Vienna Award announced in which Germany and Italy imposed a
settlement favourable mainly to German interests. If everything else failed,
Teleki was prepared to accept arbitration, but he wanted the Romanians to ask
for it: if Bucharest called for arbitral award, Budapest could insist on certain
preconditions. Moreover, if the revision of the boundaries came about through
arbitration requested by Romania, the settlement would have greater legiti-
macy in the eyes of the West, and Hungary would have a better chance to
retain the territories gained at the end of the war, even in case of an Axis
defeat.
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This was Teleki's plan. Its essential feature was to threaten war in
south-eastern Europe and compel the Romanians to request Hitler's diplomatic
intervention. But in this plan Teleki was double-crossed. At the critical
moment, Werth informed the Germans that, as a final measure, Hungary was
willing to accept arbitration rather than go to war.19 After such a disclosure,
it was not difficult for Berlin to call Teleki's bluff. In the end the fate of
Transylvania was settled by another German-Italian dictum, one which
transferred northern Transylvania and the “Székelyföld” (easternmost Tran-
sylvania) to Hungary.20 The new territorial arrangement, as well as the
manner it was imposed, left both sides bitterly dissatisfied.21
The events of the summer of 1940 amply demonstrated the fact that
the ambitions and feelings of Hungarians and Romanians regarding
Transylvania mattered little. What tended to determine the course of events in
Eastern Europe at the time were the plans and machinations of the two great
powers in the area, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Accordingly, our atten-
tion might well turn to an examination of these two states' approach to the
“Transylvanian question” during the war.
Soviet Intentions
At the time of the outbreak of World War II neither the Third Reich nor the
USSR had direct ambitions concerning Transylvania. Both of them, however,
had indirect interests in the region that began surfacing in the winter of 1939-
40, and became quite obvious in the months thereafter. These interests stem-
med from the fact that both dictatorships had concerns about and ambitions in
areas abutting Transylvania, especially in certain other regions of Romania.
Russia's designs on Bessarabia have been noted. The region had been
assigned to the USSR's sphere of influence in the secret protocol to the
Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact of August of 1939. Throughout
the winter and the spring following, Soviet spokesmen made no secret of their
government's interests in the region. Soviet motives for expanding to the
southeast have been the subject of controversy and have been interpreted in
widely different ways. According to some, Stalin and his associates were
interested only or primarily in forestalling possible German moves in that part
of Europe. Others have described Soviet intentions differently. Vojtech
Mastny, in his Russia's Road to the Cold War, acknowledges that in part the
Soviet moves were basically defensive: “Stalin sought to offset the growth of
the German domain in the west by expanding his own in the east.” Mastny,
however, adds that another Soviet motive was Stalin's desire to “extend his
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tyranny into neighbouring countries...”22 Another historian, Adam B. Ulam,
points to still another Soviet motive. In his view, the Soviet leadership was
painfully aware of the fact that in a possible war “the Ukraine was the
Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union...” and, a move to detach this fertile and
resource-rich land from the USSR “would be facilitated by the existence of
sizable pockets of Ukrainians” beyond the Soviet borders. In this respect,
“Romania occupied a vital strategic position....”23 Writing more recently,
British authors Anthony Read and David Fisher have stressed that Stalin was
so intent on pressing his demands for Bessarabia, and even for Bukovina —
which had never been part of Russia, and had not been mentioned in the secret
protocol of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact — that he was willing to
risk a crisis in German-Soviet relations.24 Stalin's more than purely defensive
posturing, in fact his often blatantly expansionist ambitions, are emphasized in
a still more recent work, in historian R. C. Raack's Stalin's Drive to the West,
1938-1945.25
While during the winter of 1939-40 the Soviets satisfied themselves
with more-or-less veiled threats against Romania, in the late spring of 1940
they stepped up their preparations. The Red Army began concentrating its
divisions along the Romanian frontier and began staging border incidents “at
the rate of two or three a week,...”26 These preparations, however, did not
result in either drastic diplomatic action or a military assault against Romania
for the time being. Hitler's successes in the West probably discouraged the
Soviet leaders from undertaking the latter. Moscow finally made its move at
the end of June, 1940, at the time of Hitler's triumph over France. Bucharest
was given an ultimatum to hand over Bessarabia, as well as northern Buko-
vina. The latter region (as has been mentioned above) had not belonged to the
Russian Empire before 1918, but had a large number of Ukrainian inhabitants.
The ultimatum was well timed. Romania's traditional ally, France, had just
collapsed, and the Hungarians as well as the Bulgarians were also pressing
their irredentist claims for the lands they had lost to Romania in the wake of
World War I. Under the circumstances, the Romanians were not likely to
resist. In fact, it seems that Stalin and his associates had great expectations
when they presented their ultimatum. They had hoped that Bucharest would
not only surrender the regions in question without resisting, but would then
proceed to request a Soviet guarantee of the rest of Romania and thus become
client state of Moscow.27 They, however, were to be greatly disappointed. In
the summer of 1940 Romania would not become a satellite of Soviet Russia,
as the leaders in Bucharest would find a seemingly much more powerful —
and, possibly, a more congenial — protector for their country in Nazi
Germany.
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Hitler and Transylvania
From the summer of 1940 to August of 1944 the country that had the greatest
influence over the fate of Transylvania was the Third Reich. More precisely,
the destiny of this land was in the hands of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler. The
Führer's interest in Transylvania was a function of his interest in Romania, in
Hungarian-Romanian relations, and in his dealings with the Soviet Union.
Numerous factors helped to shape Nazi German attitudes to Romania. Some
of these resulted from events in the distant past, others were the consequences
of more recent developments. Many Germans probably remembered that
Romania had entered the First World War on the Allied side, despite the
dynastic and other links that it had to the countries of the Central Powers
before 1914. Furthermore, post-World War I Romania had been a beneficiary
of the despised Versailles system and had been a client sate of France (and
more recently also of Britain). In contrast, Hungary had fought alongside
Germany to the bitter end in 1918, had been a victim of the post-war peace
settlement, and had been friendly to the Axis powers ever since the beginning
of the Italo-German rapprochement in 1937. There were also Nazi German
grievances on account of Romanian domestic affairs. The extreme right-wing
and anti-Semitic Iron Guard movement had had a checkered history in King
Carol's Romania. What many Nazis probably remembered was the campaigns
of persecution that were visited upon Iron Guardists, usually after one of their
assassination attempts on the life of a Romanian leader.28 They would also
recall the fact that, in November of 1938, Corneliu Codreanu, the leader of
this movement, along with 13 of his associates, were shot while in police
custody. In comparison, the Hungarian government's occasional persecution
of right wing extremists in Hungary must have appeared to Nazi German
observes an insignificant and bloodless affair. Hitler and his associates also
had a reason to look upon King Carol with derision. Despite his royal
(Hohenzollern) background, this playboy king scandalized many by divorcing
his queen (the mother of the future King Michael) and living with his Jewish
mistress, Helen (Magda) Wolff, alias Madame Lupescu.29
Though these sentiments were in the minds of Hitler and other Nazi
leaders at the time, what determined their day-to-day attitudes to Romania and
their plans for action there were the immediate political and strategic
circumstances of the times. The most important consideration for Hitler was
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undoubtedly his concern for the energy requirements of his armed forces, in
particular the Nazi war machine's need for Romanian petroleum from the
Ploeşti oil fields north of Bucharest. At the time, Romania was already the
Third Reich's largest supplier of oil, in contrast to the Soviet Union, which
was a distant second.30 Germany, in Hitler's view — and his generals no
doubt agreed with him wholeheartedly — could not afford to risk losing this
absolutely vital war material. It was for this reason that the Soviet military
build-up in Western Ukraine made the German leadership anxious.31 As a
result, various plans were made by the Wehrmacht to occupy Romania or, at
least, the Ploeşti region.32 The plan involved moving troops through Hungary,
which did not perturb Hitler's generals as they considered it an easy task — a
mere matter of marching.33 It might be recalled that it was these plans that
had prompted General Werth, Hungary's Chief-of-Staff, to request that his
government offer an alliance to the Germans.34
In the end, no German attempt was made at the time to pre-empt a
possible Soviet move to occupy Romania and her all-important oil fields. One
reason for the about-face in German strategic planning was undoubtedly the
beginning of Hitler's Western offensive. But even more important might have
been the fact that, faced with the Soviet threat, the Romanians began to draw
closer and closer to Nazi Germany — quite “swiftly” as some commentators
have observed.35 An important step in this process was the start of new nego-
tiations between Berlin and Bucharest during early March, 1940, aimed at the
reaching of an agreement which was to provide for the delivery of German
arms to Romania in return for additional quantities of oil.36 After considerable
delays, a new regime of petroleum deliveries was agreed upon. The Germans
even established a line of credit with the Romanians for purchase of increased
supplies from the Ploeşti oil fields.37
Although Hitler seems to have been irked by Soviet machinations
against Romania, and would have probably have preferred to curb them, he
was reminded by Ribbentrop that Bessarabia had been promised to the
Soviets, and that the Pact of 1939 had also proclaimed Germany's “disin-
terestedness” in that part of Europe.38 Evidently, some concessions had to be
made to Stalin. The first of these would be German acquiescence to the
Soviet demand for northern Bukovina, and the second would be German
pressure — supplemented by similar advice from Rome — on Bucharest to
yield to the Soviet ultimatum regarding Bessarabia. The Romanians were told
that a part of the price of German friendship would be their compliance with
Soviet territorial demands.
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The Second Vienna Award
With the Bessarabian question out of the way, the road was cleared for the
coming into the limelight of the question of Transylvania. That this was so
was made sure by the Hungarians who were convinced that the time had come
for settling that issue. As has been outlined above, the Teleki government
threatened war, hoping to force Hitler (and Mussolini) to intervene in the
dispute and put pressure on the Romanians to yield. While Hitler certainly
did not want to see a conflict develop in south-eastern Europe which could
threaten the flow of oil and other resources from that region to the Reich, he
was not willing to become a tool for Hungarian ambitions either. As has been
outlined above, he declined the Hungarian request to act as a mediator, and
told the two sides to resolve their differences through negotiations. When
these failed, Hitler decided to arbitrate. By this time he had found a plan that
was to solve his concern over the safety of his Romanian oil supplies: he
would attack and destroy the USSR in one massive military campaign in the
spring of 1941. To prepare for this great undertaking, he needed peace in
south-eastern Europe, and to achieve that peace, he had to see to it that the
simmering conflict over Transylvania was extinguished. The Hungarians
would receive some of their lost lands back, while the Romanians would have
to reconcile themselves to such a loss in return for a German-Italian guarantee
of the rest of Romania. Hitler probably suspected that both sides would be
unhappy about the outcome of a new Vienna Award, and that it would be
followed by both Romania and Hungary aligning their policies even closer
with those of the Third Reich. What he could not predict, was the degree to
which he would be able to exploit the “Transylvanian question” to Germany's
advantage in his dealings with Budapest and Bucharest after August of 1940.
The fact that the Second Vienna Award disappointed both the
Romanians and the Hungarians could be predicted, that it angered the Soviets
as well, might not have been expected by casual observers at the time. “Stalin
and Molotov were furious,” to use the words of Anthony Read and David
Fisher.39 They were displeased both with the way it was arrived at and the
provisions it contained. The Germans, with the cooperation of the Italians,
had once again re-drawn the map of a part of Eastern Europe and confronted
the Soviets with a fait accompli. In failing to consult the Soviet government,
Berlin violated both the spirit and the terms of the 1939 Pact. Furthermore, the
territorial guarantee that Germany and Italy offered to Romania as part of the
Award, was seen in Moscow as being aimed directly against the USSR. It is
not surprising that the Award's announcement was followed by weeks of
recriminations between Moscow and Berlin. Authors Read and Fisher remark
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that at this juncture the Transylvanian question caused “very serious strain” in
German-Soviet relations, and came “close to destroying the pact [of August,
1939].”40
Initially at least, the most disappointed in the Award were the Roma-
nians. No one had prepared them for the magnitude of the coming territorial
changes. They had abandoned their Allied orientation quite some time ago
and had done everything to please the Germans; accordingly, they did not
believe that Berlin would force them to make great concessions to Budapest.
For this very reason they had refused to make any such concessions during
their discussions with the Hungarians and offered to make only frontier
adjustments when they discussed the matter with the Germans.41 Illustrative
of the Romanians' shock at the final territorial settlement was Foreign Minister
Manoilescu's fainting when the map of the new Transylvania was unfolded
during the Award's announcement in Vienna. At home in Bucharest (as has
been mentioned) on hearing the news, people cried in the streets. Massive
demonstrations were organized against the Award, and demands were made
for the recovery of not only the lost territories but also the occupation of all
the territory that had been promised to Romania by the Allies in 1916.42
Romania's leaders, however, soon recovered from shock and accepted
the realities of the new order in Europe. Germany was now the dominant
power on the continent and her friendship had to be earned. The loss of
northern Transylvania was just a part of the price that had to be paid for
Romania's former association with the Allies, and now the last vestiges of this
orientation had to be rooted out. King Carol, now completely discredited, had
to leave the country. Power was transferred to Marshal Ion Antonescu who
became Prime Minister and Conducator, the Romanian equivalent for Duce or
Führer. Under his guidance the process of Romania becoming a satellite of
the Third Reich accelerated. The descent to the status of an Axis client state
would have many stepping stones, but the most significant one would be
Antonescu's request for German troops, ostensibly to train the Romanian
Army, but in reality to underscore Bucharest's acceptance of its new role as a
useful Axis ally.43 This step was accompanied by other measures in Romanian
domestic and foreign policy.
At home, the process of Romania's transformation into an Axis
satellite was accompanied by several changes. The most disturbing of these
was the resurgence of the Iron Guard, the formerly persecuted fanatical fascist
movement. Prominent Guardists were co-opted into Antonescu's government,
including Prince Mihai Sturdza, who became the new foreign minister. At the
same time, the Guard experienced an expansion of its membership and an
increase in its activities. The latter usually manifested itself in growing
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Guardist propaganda — usually aimed against liberals, Jews, capitalists, and
foreigners — as well as actual physical attacks against members of these
groups. In foreign policy the most important step Antonescu's regime took,
second only in importance to the stationing of German troops on Romanian
soil, was the country's accession, in November, 1940, to the German-
Japanese-Italian Tripartite Pact. Antonescu's prime motive for this move was
probably the demonstration of his devotion to the Axis, with an eye to paving
the way for a reversal of the Second Vienna Award, should the Hungarians
not keep up with him in the race for Hitler's graces.44
The Hungarians, however, were not about to allow Antonescu's
Romania to overtake them in this race. Not unlike in that country, in Hungary
too, the weeks and months that followed the Vienna arbitration witnessed the
growth of Nazi German influence and the further alignment of Budapest's
policies with those of the Third Reich. The first move in this direction came
hard on the heels of the announcement of the Vienna Award. The German
leaders asked Hungary to sign a protocol giving extensive rights and
privileges to the country's German minority. Beyond such guarantees as
access to minority education, the agreement gave Hungary's Germans the right
to profess the Nazi ideology. Who qualified as an ethnic German was to be
determined by an organization of Germans in Hungary. Next came economic
concessions, including promises of additional food exports to Germany as
well as of lumber from those parts of Transylvania that had been recently
transferred to Hungary. In the realm of military affairs, the Hungarians found
themselves acquiescing in the German demand for transit for the troops
destined for Romania. The operation was shrouded in secrecy — the trains
travelled at night to keep them from public view. In November these
concessions were capped by Hungary's accession to the Tripartite Pact.45 The
Hungarians had the dubious honour of becoming signatories before the
Romanians did. For now, they could assure themselves that they were ahead
in the race for Hitler's good will. But it would soon become obvious that the
race would have to be contested again and again.
An important factor in this race was the fact that in Antonescu Hitler
found a man to his liking. The little, red-haired general made a good
impression on the Führer at the time of his first official visit to Berlin in
November, and the two remained on good terms thereafter.50 That was in
sharp contrast to Hitler's relationship with Horthy, the admiral who in 1938
had the effrontery of telling the German leader that, if a war would break out
between Germany and England, the latter would prevail, because of her navy.
Not surprisingly, it would be during Antonescu's November visit that the
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Führer would make a hint to him about the possibility of a future revision of
the Vienna Award's terms in favour of Romania.51
The most serious consequence of the emerging race between the
Hungarians and the Romanians for Hitler's good will was their involvement in
Hitler's war against Russia. In this connection the Romanians stood to benefit
mainly because of the strategic importance of their country in any assault
against the USSR. Not surprisingly, Antonescu was asked to participate in the
preparations for Operation Barbarossa. No such invitation was extended to
the Hungarians. Hungary was strategically not as important, and Hitler
worried that any secrets passed on to the Hungarians would find their way to
London. One of Antonescu's motive for offering full-fledged participation in
the German attack on Soviet Russia was the recovery of the territories that
Romania had lost to the USSR the year before. His other motive has been
identified by one historian: “he... intended to demonstrate the superior value
of Romania's friendship to Germany as compared with that of Bulgaria,... and
of Hungary....”52
The Hungarians — with some exceptions, the most notable of which
was General Werth — had hoped to stay out of that conflict. They managed
to do so for a few days, until great pressure was brought on them from various
quarters. The most weighty consideration in the minds of decision-makers in
Budapest was undoubtedly the fear that, if they stayed out of the war, they
would fall out of favour with Hitler and might forfeit the territory they had
only recently regained from Romania.53
An Instrument of Blackmail
This rivalry between Romania and Hungary continued through most of the
war, and Hitler exploited it to the fullest.54 Whenever one side or the other
failed to live up to the German leader's expectations, it would be threatened
with territorial changes in favour of the other side. “The master of the 'New
Order' knew,” remarked the Romanian diplomat Alexandre Cretzianu, “that in
the Transylvanian question... he held the most perfect instrument... of
blackmail....”55 The most blatant use of this “instrument” was probably made
by Hitler in March of 1944 when he summoned Horthy to Salzburg to
demand an explanation for the Hungarian government's “treasonous”
behaviour, including its secret attempts to negotiate a separate peace with the
Western Allies. The Führer told the Regent that unless Hungary complied
with German demands — appoint a subservient government, allow German
troops and security forces to occupy the country, solve the “Jewish question”,
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etc. — she would be taken over by her Axis neighbours. In any such
occupation, Romania would not only regain northern Transylvania, but would
seize much additional Hungarian territory.56
Threatened with such dire consequences, the Horthy complied with
Hitler's demands, at least for the time being. By August of that year, however,
the Regent was once again making preparations for Hungary's exit from the
war. In this undertaking, however, the Romanians “beat him to it” and
managed to switch sides first. This time Hitler was ready to give all of
Transylvania to the seemingly still “loyal” Hungary. The entrance of the first
divisions of the Red Army into Transylvania quickly drove home the lesson
that the age of Hitler being the arbiter of the fate of Transylvania was about to
end. Indeed, by the time the Hungarians had tried to leave the war in mid-
October — in a pitifully unsuccessful attempt — an angry Hitler was in no
position to offer Transylvania to anybody: it was by then firmly in the hands
of the Soviets and their new-found Romanian allies. The new arbiter of the
future of that land was by now Stalin, the very man whose ambitions in that
direction had been so thoroughly disappointed only four years earlier. Before
the post-1940 Soviet policies are examined, however, attention might be paid
to the views on the Transylvanian question of the other major Allied Powers,
whose technical experts — and sometimes even leaders — also had opinions
on the matter.
British Attitudes
The attitudes of the Atlantic democracies to the problem of Transylvania
during the Second World War were influenced above all by the nature of the
relationship that existed between the Danubian states of Romania and
Hungary on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States on the
other. As long as Romania was under the Franco-British guarantee, for
example, she enjoyed British diplomatic support; however, when she began
drifting into the Axis orbit, she increasingly became treated as an enemy
country until, in December of 1941, Britain finally declared war on her.
Hungary's case was not very different. Contrary to what might be expected,
before the autumn of 1940 there had been some sympathy toward the
Budapest regime in London, despite Hungary's links to Italy and Germany.
This favourable assessment of Hungary had, in fact, pre-dated the war and
manifested itself occasionally. In the late fall of 1938, for example, the
British accepted the results of the First Vienna Award — which returned the
Magyar-populated districts of Czecho-Slovakia to Hungary — without
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protest. The British government, however, reacted differently to the Second
Vienna Award. Prime Minister Winston Churchill in fact declared that his
government could not recognize a territorial arrangement imposed by
countries that were at war with Britain.57 The transit of German troops
destined for Romania through Hungary, Budapest's accession to the Tripartite
Pact and, especially, Hungary's participation — even though belated and
limited — in the German assault on Yugoslavia in April of 1941, further
alienated the Foreign Office, yet an actual British declaration of war on
Budapest did not come until December of 1941.
The new official attitudes in London were not reflected in the first
relevant analysis that was produced by the British experts assigned the task of
preparing plans for a post-war world.58 The study, entitled “The Problem of
Transylvania,” was completed in mid-December 1942. It examined several
possible scenarios that might develop regarding Transylvania during the war
and, especially, at the peace negotiations. How any territorial settlement
between Hungary and Romania might be arranged, was to depend largely on
which of the planned confederation of states — the northern, the central, the
southern, or a variation of these — the two states in question might belong to.
In all of these, Hungary was to end up with a settlement that was more
favourable to her than the post-World War I territorial arrangement had been.
In the eyes of the British experts, Hungary was entitled to most of the lands
between the “Trianon border” and the western frontier of historic Transylva-
nia. Possibly, she could get the Székely districts of south-eastern
Transylvania as well, and even a “corridor” between the two. Failing this, the
Székely region was to get autonomy within Romania. And, in a final
settlement, the two countries were to possess minority populations of equal
size: about a million Hungarians for Romania, and the same number of
Romanians for Hungary.
The ideal solution, according to the study, would be the creation of a
sovereign Transylvania, organized on the pattern of the Swiss cantons, with a
great deal of cultural autonomy for the various districts and equality of the
local (Romanian, Magyar and German) languages. The authors of the study,
however, saw few prospects for the realization of this solution. They thought
that it could come about only if both Hungary and Romania belonged to the
same post-war East European confederation that the British experts (and
others) had in mind for the region, and they doubted whether either Budapest
or Bucharest would support such a solution.59
These recommendations were formulated while in British government
circles attitudes to Hungary were quite negative. After February 1943,
however, British views on Hungary began to soften.60 By this time Romania
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must have appeared to London a more stalwart Axis ally than Hungary, and
the Soviet Union began to show an increasing interest in Romania especially
for the purposes of the post-war reorganization of the region. This revival of
British sympathy toward Hungary proved of little benefit to her, as London's
ability to influence events in that part of the world kept diminishing. By early
1944 the British government could hardly have exerted influence there
without American support, but American interest in the region was marginal
at best and, by the time it had intensified somewhat, it was too late for the
Atlantic democracies to counterbalance the overwhelming influence that the
Soviets had acquired in Eastern Europe.
American Plans
In the United States interest in the Transylvanian question was confined, until
almost the very end of the war, to the experts who were charged with the task
of developing plans for the possible territorial reorganization of post-war
Eastern Europe. These experts discussed the Transylvanian question early in
1943, within the Territorial Subcommittee of the State Department's Advisory
Committee that had the task of working out recommendations for future
American peace proposals. The members of this committee quickly rejected
both the idea of giving all of Transylvania to Romania, and that of awarding
all of it to Hungary. The former was seen as leaving too many Magyars under
Romanian rule, the latter as leaving even more Romanians under Magyar
sovereignty. The 1940 arrangement was also deemed as unsuitable, partly for
economic and partly for ethnic considerations. The concept of an independent
Transylvania appeared attractive to some committee members, but they did
not think that there was much support for it either in Bucharest or in Budapest
— or, as a matter of fact, in Transylvania. Still another idea that emerged was
the concept of an autonomous Transylvania confederated with Romania and
Hungary. Later this idea was elevated to the status of a “recommended”
solution, along with another proposal that the Western border of post-Trianon
Romania be re-drawn more in line with linguistic realities.61
The Territorial Subcommittee's “recommendations” served as basis
for the plans of another State Department bureau, the Division of Political
Studies. This body's proposals regarding Transylvania envisaged the retro-
cession of the western parts of post-1919 Romania to Hungary — but they left
the Székely counties within Romania. In late 1943 and early 1944, it was the
Inter-Divisional Country and Area Committee's (IDCAC) turn to examine the
Transylvanian question. The IDCAC reiterated the idea of ceding a substan-
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tial strip of western Romania to Hungary — with a population of over one
million inhabitants — and recommended autonomy for the Székely region
within a post-war Romania. A later IDCAC document, dated 1 March 1944,
did not repeat the proposal for Székely autonomy and talked only of minor
border adjustments in favour of Hungary, but resurrected the possibility of
creating an independent or autonomous Transylvania.62
The IDCAC's recommendations were in turn examined by still
higher-level State Department committees during the late spring and early
summer of 1944. In this process they were also abridged. By the time they
were presented to President Roosevelt in September of 1944, they contained
only a single sentence which called for the return to Hungary of a “narrow
strip” of land along the western border of post-1919 Romania.63 By then, of
course, the strategic realities had reduced the American position on
Transylvania to not much more than academic theorizing.
Stalin: the Arbiter of Transylvania's Fate
From September of 1944 on, the country that was in singular position to
determine the future of Transylvania, was the USSR. By then gone were the
days when the Kremlin looked upon Hungary's interests in the region with
disinterest bordering on sympathy, as it did in the early summer of 1940.64
Since then, Hungary's leaders had committed many “crimes” in the eyes of the
Soviets: they had allowed the settlement of the Transylvanian issue without
consultation with Moscow, they had permitted German troops to move
through Hungary, they had participated in the German invasion of Yugoslavia
and, more importantly, in that of the Soviet Union itself.
Stalin's determination to exact revenge from Hungary for her
misdeeds became abundantly clear in late 1941, during the discussions that the
Soviet leaders had with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden during his
visit to Moscow in mid-December. The two sides were in the process of
drafting a treaty of alliance and military assistance when the Soviets revealed
their plan for a secret protocol to the treaty concerning the redrawing of
Europe's borders after the war. Here Stalin's plans for punishing Hungary
were revealed. Hungary was not only to relinquish any territories she had
regained before and during the war, but Czechoslovakia was “to be enlarged
in the south at the expense of Hungary which ought to pay the deserved
penalty for her behaviour...” Regarding Hungary's eastern borders, Stalin had
similar proposals. He announced his plan to have Soviet military and naval
bases in post-war Romania, which would be “somewhat expanded in the west
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at the expense of Hungary... [as] additional punishment to Hungary for her
role in the war.”65
While Stalin's suggestions of December 1941 may have been an
accurate illustrations of his vengeful attitude toward Hungary, they were not
entirely accurate prognostications of Soviet policy on the Transylvanian
question during the next four years — and they were certainly not precise
forecasting of wartime Soviet rhetoric on this issue. During the Anglo-Soviet
discussions of policy toward lesser Axis allies in 1943, reference was made to
the restoration of wartime conquests only, and not to further territorial
punishments for the vanquished. But when it came to Soviet propaganda,
even this principle was shunted aside. When liberation movements were
being established among POW officers in the USSR, the Soviets wanted to
have the example of the Free Germany Committee copied by Hungarian and
Romanian officers in their custody. For this purpose, they tried to make sure
that rumours reached the former that, after the war, Transylvania might end up
in Hungary, as an “autonomous” province. To the Romanians, however, they
told that “Transylvania will be Romanian.”66 Stalin proved himself a good
student of Hitler in exploiting the Transylvanian issue to his advantage.
By the summer of 1944 the strategic situation in Eastern Europe had
changed in a way as to make the Soviet leadership favour Romania over
Hungary in any negotiations over the future of Transylvania. The latter
country had been occupied by the Germans in March and a more compliant
pro-Nazi government had been installed in Budapest. In the meantime,
elements of Romania's elite began secret armistice negotiations with the
Soviets. The latter in the meantime made preparations for a massive Red
Army offensive into Romania — while ceasing operations on the Polish front
while the Wehrmacht prepared to liquidate the Polish Home Army. On
August 23, three days into the Red Army offensive, Antonescu was ousted
and the new regime under King Michael defected from the Axis. Soon,
Russian forces — and their new-found Romanian allies — made their way
into Transylvania from the south, where their entry had not been anticipated.
In the negotiations that accompanied these changes the Transylvanian
question occupied an important position. At first the Soviets offered to annul
the Second Vienna Award should Romania switch sides in the war. When the
actual armistice deal was signed, however, the transfer of northern
Transylvania (or a “large part” thereof) to Romania, was made subject to the
approval of the coming peace conference. Nevertheless, early in March 1945
the Soviets permitted a new Romanian government, dominated by then by the
communists, to establish control over all the Transylvanian lands that had
belonged to Romania between 1919 and 1940.67 Stalin's long-standing
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ambition to control Romania (including Transylvania) had at last been
realized. Theoretically, the acquisition of northern Transylvania by Romania's
Soviet-controlled regime was still to be approved by the peace conference, but
few in Eastern Europe expected that approval not to materialize in view of the
overwhelming influence the Soviets had achieved in that region.
Indeed, the post-war peace negotiations brought no change to the state
of affairs that had developed in Transylvania by early 1945. True, the
question of the Romanian-Hungarian border was on the agenda at both the
Potsdam Conference and at the subsequent series of meetings designed to
prepare the peace treaties with the vanquished Axis states, but nothing came
of the American efforts to keep this issue alive. The British government had
decided, even before July of 1945, to call for no more than the restoration of
the pre-1938 borders in Eastern Europe. The Americans persisted a little
longer, sometimes only half-heartedly, but could do little in the face of persis-
tent Soviet opposition. The issue was finally taken off the agenda in
September of 1946. Unlike the Versailles peace treaties in the wake of the
First World War, the treaties that followed the Second did not even contain
any guarantees of the rights of minorities living under alien rule.68 Sponsored
by the new European superpower of the post-war era, the Soviet Union, the
new solution for the Hungarian-Romanian territorial dispute sealed the fate of
Transylvania and her peoples for a long time to come.
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Escape from Transylvania:
September-October 1944
From the Diaries of Paul Diósady
Editors' notes: The following is excerpted from chapter 15 of the
autobiographical writings of Paul Diósady. The chapter is entitled: "We
have to flee again, this time from Marosvásárhely to Budapest, 1944."
Diósady was a young chemical engineer at the time who in September
1944 decided to flee the approaching Red Army along with his wife
Inci, a teacher of classics, and their infant son Levente. After many
adventures and despite great difficulties they made it to Budapest —
not long before the Red Army arrived there also. Eventually they ended
up in Toronto, Canada, where Levente grew up and became a profess-
sor of chemical engineering at the University of Toronto. The trans-
lation of this chapter was done by Nándor Dreisziger in consultation
with Levente Diósady.
At the end of August and the beginning of September the sound of artillery
fire from the southeast intensified. This signified that the Russians were
trying to take the mountain passes that were in that direction. This
development was made possible all of the sudden by the decision of the
Rumanians... not to resist the Red Army but to switch sides in the war.... After
this the Russian army absorbed the Romanian forces and arrived at the
Carpathian mountain ranges in short order. At this time it became obvious
that, no matter how many ties we have to Transylvania, we have to leave and
go to Hungary proper, if possible, to Budapest.
At the end of the school year I had taken my family from Maros-
vásárhely to Koronka to avoid the expected bombings of the city. For the
summer, we rented the home of the local superintendent of schools. We
owned a one-horse buggy with which I commuted to work — a distance of
seven kilometres. A co-worker of mine, Dezső Kádár, and his wife were good
friends of ours. They had no children and they stayed in the city. Dezső had a
well-built wagon and two strong horses, with which he used to visit nearby
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villages to buy raw hides for our [leather-processing] company, and whatever
he could re-sell in the city on his own. He was an excellent businessman who
could find something to talk about with anybody, a quality that would prove
very useful for us later. When the noise of shelling became lauder, we and the
Kádárs decided that will set out for Budapest, according to a plan we had
agreed upon earlier. In the capital there were two large and several small
leather-processing plants, where people knew us or at least heard about us,
and where we could probably find work....
Actually, to the very last minute we were hoping that we wouldn't
have to leave Marosvásárhely, as the few things that had been nice in our lives
we experienced here. It was here that we got jobs in line with our training, and
it was here that we could get married. We managed to get a nice, large apart-
ment here that we furnished with beautiful furniture hand-crafted my local
cabinet makers. And it was here that our son Levente was born who was not
yet a year old when we had to pull up roots. As we had to leave ore suddenly
than expected, we never worked out detailed plans as to what to take with us
and what to do with things we would leave behind. As it often happens with
refugees, we left with great hopes and in the end we had to deal with many
disappointments....
By the end of the week the situation had deteriorated. This was
indicated by the arrival to Marosvásárhely of the first horse-drawn wagons of
German settlers from the Ukraine. Our factory closed its doors. We paid the
workers and went home to begin our preparations.... Kádár loaded his wagon
with fodder for the horses and non-perishable food for ourselves.... We
stopped in Marosvásárhely to collect a few things: but aside from a few books,
critical documents, and some clothing there was no room for anything more.
My buggy had a collapsible roof but no sides. We compensated for this by
putting a rug over the top, which made the buggy into a big box. Its front was
still open, at least the rain could not come in at the sides. The wagon also had
a canvas roof which was important as it kept our belongings as well as the
food and fodder dry.
So we started with two carts and, much like a Gypsy caravan, we left
Marosvásárhely. The wagons of the Germans fleeing from the Ukraine
preceded us in an endless line. They were a terrible sight. I have no idea how
many hundreds of kilometres were behind them and for how long more their
horses would last, even though these horses were used to heavy work. Our
horses had never been used for a long journey.
Interestingly our thee horses seemed to have realised that they
belonged to one another. If one cart got ahead in the line, the horses in the
other became anxious and tried to catch up. On the way to Szászrég, we had to
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go up a steep, winding road. It was here that the two carts got separated for the
first time. On one occasion our horse went crazy. My wife Inci had to climb
from the back onto the driver's seat and with the baby on her lap, she tried to
hold the reins, while I got off and tried to restrain the horse holding its bridle-
bit, which was not easy as the horse was a strong, heavy Metlneburg-type
horse. Increasing our fright in situation was the fact that in midst of all this
Levente slid from Inci's lap. Fortunately, we calmed the horse and no harm
came to anyone, aside from the panic we experienced....
We got to Szászrég in the evening. We had covered 40 kilometres that
day. On this basis it seemed that we would be able to cover this much each
day as we had planned. Since Budapest was 600 kilometres away, we figured
on a 15-16 days' journey. Unfortunately, because of the interruptions, our trip
lasted more than a month.
We had already developed a routine for our nightly stops. We would
first look for accommodation for the ladies and the baby so that at least they
would spend the night under cover. While they took care of the baby and
prepared some food for us, we took the horses, preferably some place under
cover, gave them fodder and water.... We obtained hay and water on location
while the oats came from our wagon. With the horses satiated by pales of
water and food, they settled down to rest. We brought a lot of fodder with us
so that we wouldn't have to stop and spend time procuring this on our journey.
Levente was a good baby. He didn't cry a lot and slept well. The
adults discussed what had to be done next morning and tried to lock out their
concerns from their minds and tiredness soon made them sleep. Dezső and I
slept beside our horses.
The next morning we ate early, took care of the horses, and with
heavy hearts set out on the day's journey. We soon discovered that the breasts
of our horses became blistered... The problem wasn't visible yet, but it was
obviously bothering them. We had some medication which seems to have
relieved their pain. Still they didn't want to get going, usually we had to push
the wagons at first till they got used to their harness. After another day of a 40
km journey we looked after ourselves and the horses and everyone slept like a
log till the morning.
At least, for the first part of our trip, we had good weather. When the
rains first came, we decided that, for the sake of the horses, we wait. We
looked for better accommodation so that we could rest as well. Soon it became
obvious what we didn't bring with us that was needed and what we brought
needlessly. Nearly all documents that didn't seem necessary, including school
reports and photographs, we had left behind... while I brought with me some
German and French-language technical books and Inci a few of her favourite
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volumes including one by Homer. These weighed more than 50 kilos. On the
back of the wagon I had tied up our bicycle, which proved very useful when
we stopped in a village to do a few errands to get some supplies.
The flood of refugees resulted in prices going up, everything was ten
times more expensive than before. Hay cost us 40 pengős a day — 5 pengős
used to buy a dollar in those days. People took advantage of us as they
pleased, but without hay we wouldn't have been able to go on.
In the villages we passed through we didn't get the impression that
people were panicking, but those official who had been posted there from
elsewhere had already fled westward. In one village we knew the notary
public and his family, the Rápoltis. We stayed with them. They also decided
to come along. In the evening they called together all their trustworthy
neighbours and acquaintances and distributed among them the belongings
they were not planning to take with them. This was a much better way of
handling this than we had done: this way possessions went to people more
worthy of them....
One larger community we went through was Dés, a county seat with
some 6-7000 residents. By the time we reached this place warplanes appeared
in the sky above. There were air-raid shelters built into the hills opposite the
railway station. All of us took refuge there except me — someone had to stay
with the horses.
At the station there were huge piles of firewood arranged in rows
about two meters apart. I positioned the two wagons in between two rows and
could do nothing but wait for the bombing of the station. Those in the shelter
didn't know what was going on outside. When someone took a peak, on
closing the shelter's iron doors these made a sound similar to an explosion —
causing panic inside every time. In the end the station was not bombed, it was
probably not an important military target....
We continued our journey toward Nagykároly. One night, from a
village near this city we witnessed the awesome sight of a city being bombed.
This was Szatmárnémety and we saw it from 20-25 kilometres. It was like a
beautiful but horrific star-burst: from the ground the planes were being shot at
and from the sky fell the bombs....
On the second of October we stopped outside a village in the Nyirség
and, on blankets spread under a roadside tree, we celebrated Levente's first
birthday. Instead of a birthday cake we had a watermelon.... The horses
enjoyed the unexpected rest.
We took lodging in the village and in the morning we set out for
Debrecen. Kádár owned an estate near Debrecen, complete with farm buil-
dings and close to 100 acres of fine cultivable land. It was leased by a reliable
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family. They received us very warmly. Here we were supplied with
everything we needed and we rested for four days, almost forgetting about the
war.
Then the artillery fire again became audible in the distance. The
Russians had been stopped for a while but soon after they had penetrated the
passes of the Carpathians... they reached the borders of pre-1940 Hungary....
The country became a war-zone.
On hearing the gunfire, we resumed our journey. We first stopped in a
village in the sandy, north-eastern part of the Hortobágy. The carts sank into
the sand almost to their axle, the horses couldn't pull them and we got stuck.
Some local peasants brought a couple of oxen. These managed to pull the
wagons, along with the horses, out of the sand. We were lucky that the
Russians did not catch up with us, as the Axis Powers decided to make a stand
at the eastern border of the Hortobágy. Both sides assembled powerful tank
forces on the two sides of the puszta. It was here that one of the remarkable
battles of the war, the tank battle of the Hortobágy took place. It lasted two
weeks. Though the Axis Powers suffered heavy losses, they managed to hold
up the Russians for a long time till they replaced their [even greater – ed.]
losses. Both sides lost many men and hundreds of tanks. The remains of these
lay scattered throughout the sandy soil for many years after the war. While
this battle raged the Russians crossed the Tisza River at Szeged and opened
another front in the south of the country.
In the meantime we managed to make our way all the way to Tisza-
füred where we got lodging that appeared to be very good. Nevertheless,
Kádár and I again slept with the horses to make sure nothing was stolen.... In
villages it was common for small animals and fowl to sleep in the barns... and
these were full of flees. Thus during the whole night we were trying to get rid
of flees, slept little and continued our journey the next day tired. The horses
were also tired and didn't greet the morning preparations with enthusiasm....
The bridge on the Tisza here had been bombed and had been replaced
by a pontoon bridge the military had constructed. On one side of this the road
went down steeply, on the other, it went up on a steep incline. This was not
the main problem. The real problem was that our horses, by the time we have
arrived to Tiszafüred, were full of blisters. We were caring for them much as
the injured are treated in hospitals. But the three horses had decided not to go
any further. They didn't want to get started. The locals surrounded us looking
on as we struggled with the horses. None of them offered to help.
In the meantime the officers from the troops guarding the bridge came
over and told us that every able-bodied man was needed for the war-effort and
no such person would be allowed to proceed further west from here. It was
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here that Kádár's diplomatic skills became obvious. He managed to convince
the officers that he would be able to get each of them a pair of fancy high
boots... the kind German officers were wearing. Kádár told the officer that he
would ship each of them these boots from his warehouses in Debrecen or
Budapest, and they believed him, even though we didn't have single sample of
leather in our possession.
Kádár also managed to convince the peasants standing nearby to help
push our wagons to the bridge. They eventually did, but as soon as they
stopped pushing, the horses stopped. We pleaded, and they pushed some
more. They asked, "how far should we push? to Budapest?" ... At last we
made it on to the bridge. The next problem was how we would get off the
bridge. Kádár once again got together those milling around on the shore,
onlookers, soldiers, etc., and got them to pull us off the bridge. This went a bit
easier, after all we had to be moved from here as at any moment the bridge
could have been needed for military purposes....
After this we proceeded as fast as possible toward Budapest, avoiding
any big cities on the way. We reached Fót. We got very good accommodation
here and began thinking that we'll stay here and commute to Budapest where
we were hoping to find jobs. Alas, on the first night it was announced that
everyone had to partake in the digging of ditches as part of defence-works.
Upon this we harnessed the horses and left Fót, and that same night we arrived
in Pest. I left my wife and child with the family of József Csóka, a relative of
Inci, who was luckily at home when we arrived. Kádár also left his family
with acquaintances and by next afternoon we were in the factory district of
Újpest, just to orient ourselves for the time being.
Kádár's trade didn't tie him to a place. He soon purchased a quantity
of finished leather and took it to the nearby countryside to trade it for raw hide
and while there he bought food. Within a day he was continuing the work he
had been doing in Marosvásárhely. For me matters seemed more difficult
because I didn't want to get trapped in an insignificant job. So I prepared
myself for doing several interviews so that I get a suitable position and my
salary would not be worse than what I had in Vásárhely. I was not aware of
the fact that in general large firms and positions with a wide scope of
responsibilities required more experience than I had been able to obtain in the
past....
First I talked to one of the managers of the Wolfner firm who told me
that the nearby Mauther leather-making factory was looking for a technical
director. I went there and at once I was able to speak to the chief director,
János Lengyel, who immediately offered me an excellent contract with the
customary one month probation time. This had been made possible by the
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resignation and departure of the company's technical director. Thus, without
much further stressful job-search, I managed land a position with one of
Hungary's, indeed Europe's biggest leather manufacturers.... Lengyel outlined
the tasks that awaited me and described my compensation package. The latter
we discussed in detail the following day and put on paper. It was obvious that
I had assumed heavy responsibilities, but I always prefer climbing uphill to
walking on plain ground.
I asked Lengyel to give parking place for my buggy and horse, let me
start work the next day, and have someone take me home and bring back the
buggy. He immediately arranged everything so I could take the good news
home.
After this the most important thing for us was for Inci to get a transfer
from the Ministry of Education to teach in Budapest — and to find out what
happened to our relatives while we were on our journey. The newspapers were
full of ads by people looking for their friends and relations. We joined these
people, although we were not hopeful that we would get news soon as much
of Hungary east of Budapest was either cut off or was occupied by the Soviet
army....
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Balázs Balogh and Zoltán Illyés, eds. Perspectives of Diaspora Existence.
Hungarian Diasporas in the Carpathian Basin B Historical and Current
Contexts of a Specific Diaspora Interpretation and Its Aspects of Ethnic
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The Institute of Ethnology, and the Research Institute of Ethnic and National
Minorities, both of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, in collaboration with
the Kriza János Ethnic Studies Association of Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár in
Romania, has organized a conference about the Hungarian diaspora in the
Carpathian Basin. It was held on June 8–11 of 2006, in the school and
orphanage of the Hungarian Reformed Church of Romania, in the western
Transylvanian town of Zsobok (Romanians call this place Jebucu). The con-
ference was interdisciplinary with a wide variety of disciplines being represen-
ted (ethnology, cultural anthropology, sociology, history, theology, pedagogy,
linguistics, political science, etc.). The proceedings of the conference consti-
tute a selection of the papers given. They were selected by the editors with an
international audience in mind. The result was the volume at hand. It contains
more studies of interest than can be reviewed in a review article such as this
one.
It should be stated in advance that in the region between the Baltic
and the Balkans, which includes the Carpathian Basin, the primary though not
exclusive factor that determines national and ethnic identity is language.
Because of this, observations about diaspora existence there are always
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closely linked to theories about linguistics and cultural concerns. Several of
the studies in this volume suggest that in this respect two paradigms face each
other. The idea is perhaps best expressed by János Péntek, a professor of
linguistics at Babes-Bolyai University and a native of the region (Kalotaszeg)
where the conference was held: “The difference in recognising variability or
diversities conspicuously clear in the paradigm, in theory and in minority poli-
tics: one regards linguistic and cultural diversity as a value while the other
aims at uni-lingual reductionism...” (p. 75)
Professor Péntek analyses not only the themes pertinent to the con-
ference but also the experience of his region, Kalotaszeg. Until 1918 this
region of a particular local Magyar culture existed in the vicinity of the
cultural centre Kolozsvár (now Cluj-Napoca) and as a result was the subject of
many sociological studies. Knowledge about it and its place in Hungarian
national consciousness reach far beyond the place's local geographic even
Transylvanian boundaries. Professor Péntek, relying on his own linguistic
researches, calls attention to valuable conclusions that are important not only
from the academic point of view but also for the sake of the survival of dias-
poras.
The preface to the book as well as many of its papers emphasize that
one weakness of Hungarian diaspora research, both in the past and in the
present, is the lack of a solid theoretical basis. For this reason special praise
must be paid to the four introductory theoretical studies that try to remedy this
situation. The very first one, Gábor Biczó's “Transnational Dimensions of the
Diaspora Issue and Hungarian Diaspora Research,” outlines various, mainly
American (R.E. Park, Colin Green) diaspora theories, then deals with their
impact, and then weighs the possibility of their universal application. Unfor-
tunately however, despite the title of his study, he does not as much as outline
briefly Hungarian research relevant to the subject.
The word “diaspora” (in Magyar diaszpóra) has no commonly accep-
ted definition in Hungary. The participants of the 2006 conference understood
it to be no more than a word that refers to something related to ethnicity.
Hungarian definitions of the word have traditionally been heavily influenced
by politics and historical consciousness. It is important to keep in mind that up
to the end of the 19th century, in the Hungarian language this word was used
in connection with migrant minorities (Jews, Armenians and Greeks) and the
emerging Hungarian immigrant community in the United States. It was also at
that time that Hungarian intellectuals began paying attention to Magyar mino-
rities living in the historic Kingdom of Hungary among larger minority (i.e.
non-Magyar) populations, minorities that, despite their being situated in Hun-
gary, faced the possible loss of their Magyar language. The Hungarian word
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szórvány was used to describe their case, which is officially at least a precise
translation of the word diaspora, but its meaning in practice diverged. This
term became more widely used after 1920 when as a result of the post-war
peace settlement (the Treaty of Trianon), a third of Hungary's people with a
Magyar identity and Magyar language ended up in neighbouring countries
where many of their smaller communities definitely faced the prospect of
assimilation.
All the conference's participants had taken a stand, overtly or covertly,
directly or indirectly, regarding János Péntek's paradigm referred to above.
The paper of Zoltán Ilyés is based on the Hungarian scholarly literature on the
subject and the author's extensive expertise in anthropology and sociology. It
suggests numerous approaches to diaspora studies. Among the models he
examines are the various and greatly differing minorities that had come into
existence as a result of the truncation of both Hungary and Germany in the
post-World War I peace settlements. The examples he uses are constructed
both through his knowledge of the historical circumstances and Ilyés's own
experiences in the regions discussed. At the end of his study the author urges a
change in diaspora studies to the effect that the conceiving of assimilation as a
loss must be reassessed. This conclusion however, does not necessarily and
logically flow from the arguments presented in the body of his paper.
A very different approach to the problem is taken by political scientist
Barna Bodó. His subject of interest is the Hungarian and German minorities of
south-western Romania, the region known as the Banat (Bánság in Hunga-
rian). The examples he refers to pertain to this area. He makes no secret of the
fact that the efforts aimed at the sustenance of minority cultures in this region
bring meagre results. His call for more effective action is not the act of scho-
larship; nevertheless he urges scholars to help in the formulation of a Hun-
garian strategy for diaspora studies.
The problem of minority assimilation was touched on not only by the
above-described papers but almost without exception by the other papers in
the volume. The vast territorial rearrangement of Central Europe after the First
World War resulted in millions of people acquiring new citizenship without
having left their homes. The accompanying regime changes also caused new
tensions between peoples and countries. As a result the problem of linguistic
and ethnic assimilation became a key question of diaspora existence ― and not
only for minority Hungarians.
The loss of language by children born from mixed marriages has
always been seen as a demographic loss or gain for one or the other side of the
ethnic rivalry, a loss or gain that had significant political, economic, social and
cultural implications for both sides. During the time of the Austro-Hungarian
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Dual Monarchy, Hungarian society looked upon the assimilation of non-
Magyar minorities positively and their cultural persistence negatively. The
minorities viewed these processes in the opposite manner. Much of Hungary's
urban German and Jewish population constituted an exception to this genera-
lization, as most members of these two groups approved and even encouraged
assimilation to the Hungarian nation.
Only one paper in the volume, the study by Tamás Kiss, is devoted in
its entirety to the phenomenon of assimilation. It deals with the demographics
of Hungarians in Transylvania, more precisely, those Hungarians of the Car-
pathian Basin who live under Rumanian rule. This excellent study concludes
that much of the assimilation of Hungarians results from ethnically mixed
marriages.
Vilmos Keszeg in his study analyzes the careers and life-histories of
minority Transylvanians. He had asked his informants not about diaspora
existence but about discussions of it. The histories he reveals chronicle indivi-
dual diaspora lives. The strategies his informants use for cultural survival are
full with examples of continuous compromising of original values. Typically,
these individuals at first oppose and repudiate mixed (both the ethnic and the
religious kind) marriages, but in time they make peace with the idea and adopt
to their new circumstances.
Folklorist Zoltán Magyar based his study on extensive field-work.
The many examples he uses suggest that historical folklore is a fundamental
constituent of the ethnic consciousness of people living in a diaspora situation,
especially where there are no ethnic schools and ethnic churches to foster such
consciousness. An oral tradition of stories about atrocities against an ethnic
group, or about struggles waged to avert such atrocities, also play a role in the
maintenance of ethnic consciousness.
We have mentioned the Kalotaszeg region where the place that hosted
the conference is situated. The Hungarian population of this district was the
subject of the study of Balázs Balogh and Ágnes Fülemile. From the point of
methodology, this is the most accomplished work in the volume. It uses
original sources as well as the results of anthropological, sociological, ethno-
graphic, linguistic and historical researches. It also speaks of its authors'
personal knowledge of the situation. We will discuss only those aspects of
this study that pertain most to the main themes of the volume. The authors
argue that the decline and disappearance of the peripheral Hungarian ethnic
islands of this region and the transformation of solid Magyar settlements into
diaspora ones had been taking place even during the time the region belonged
to Hungary. At that time these processes were caused by two factors: one, the
majority population was already Romanian, and two, by the conflicts between
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the two ethnicities. In recent decades these processes accelerated. This was
brought about by urbanization and the drastic political measures of the
Romanian regime — such as the coerced collectivization of agriculture and
the forced promotion of manufacturing. These processes impact not only the
region's isolated Hungarian communities but also almost all parts of Kalota-
szeg.
The village of Oltszakadát (now Sacadate) in south-Transylvania rep-
resents in some respects the opposite of what is happening in the Kalotaszeg
region. Its Hungarian population lives in isolation as the nearest Hungarian
community is dozens of kilometres from it. Its Hungarian population is under
200 and forms a minority in this mainly Romanian settlement. The evolution
of this community through the twentieth century is examined by Edit Kádár
through the eyes of the historical demographer and sociologist. Her study,
illustrated by tables rich in demographic and sociological data, conclusively
argues that the village's Hungarian minority has survived because of its strict
adherence to the use of the Hungarian language and the region’s unique
Lutheran religion.
Most of the volume's studies, for obvious geographic, historical and
demographic reasons, deal with the situation of Hungarians in lands belonging
to Romania. We have to bemoan the paucity of studies regarding diaspora
situations in other parts of the Carpathian Basin. For this reason we applaud
the one study in the collection that deals not with a Romania-related theme.
This is the paper of cultural anthropologists Virág Hajnal and Richard Papp
who did their research in a village of the historical region of Szemérség, now
a part of Serbia. Most of the Hungarians of the area had settled there some
eight or nine centuries ago, but those of the village of Dobradó got there only
some 120-130 years ago — into a village of mixed ethnicity and mixed
religion, but with a majority of Slav population. Till 1918 it belonged to the
Lands of the Holy Crown of Hungary, in particular to the autonomous
Kingdom of Croatia. The linguistic situation of these people was determined
by these circumstances. The authors of the study did their research her after
the break-up of Yugoslavia, just when the question of ethnic identity, and
relationship to the “mother country” (Hungary), became a more relevant one
for the village's Magyar residents. This was also the time when Hungary
“discovered” the Hungarian diaspora even though making contact with this
particular Magyar ethnic island was not successful for various reasons.
Pál Péter Tóth offers thought-provoking data related to ethnic identity
in the diaspora. From working with questionnaires among immigrants to
Hungary, he concludes that most of these people come not from Magyar
diaspora communities but from large, predominantly Hungarian ethnic
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islands. This is not surprising in view of the fact that most Magyars in the
neighbouring countries live in such ethnic islands. The author remarks how-
ever, that the emigration of many people from these tends to turn them into
diaspora communities, ones in which Hungarians become minorities. This
phenomenon gives rise to the question: why is it that Hungarians tend to leave
their ethnic islands while their co-ethnics in diaspora existence tend to stay?
We have no answer to this question.
The last paper in the volume is by Balázs Borsos. It uses the data
provided by the volumes of the Magyar Néprajzi Atlas (Budapest, 1989-1991)
to provide a picture of the situation of the Hungarian diaspora communities of
the Carpathian Basin primarily during the beginning of the 20th century. It
does so mainly through the use of maps.
The author of this review had attended the conference and can say
that the presentations were often followed by comments and discussions that
unfortunately are not presented in the proceedings. It is also regrettable that
the conference paid little attention to the Hungarian diaspora living in towns
and cities as well as industrial districts. The role of the churches has also not
received enough attention during the conference.
There can be no doubt that the disputes that emerged as a result of the
differing interpretations presented at the conference will continue. In the
matter of assimilation vs cultural survival we have to agree with those who
consider the assimilation of Hungarians into other ethnic groups as a loss to
this ethnic group. The warning given in the conclusions of János Péntek's
study should be heeded, that is policies aimed at the equality of opportunity
among nationalities for culture maintenance should be respected (pp. 76-78).
In the 20th century the Magyar ethnic group has produced so many
examples of diaspora existence that their study could be the theme of not one
but a series of scholarly conferences. The international scholarship could
benefit from the examination of these examples. As has been mentioned
above, a comprehensive survey of Hungarian inquiries into these situations
during the early part of the 20th century is missing from the volume. This is
regrettable as there had been initiatives during the interwar year whose
achievements, regrettably, have been largely forgotten. I refer to the journals
Magyar Kissebség [Hungarian minority] and Látóhatár [Horizon], the
minority studies institute of the University of Pécs, the Hungarian Institute of
Sociography, as well as Transylvanian initiatives mentioned at the beginning
of Vilmos Keszeg's paper. The next era of Hungarian history, the post-World
War II communist dictatorship, produced nothing as during much of this time
not even plans could be made for the scholarly study of Hungarian minorities
in the neighbouring countries. It is not a consolation that the situation in this
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respect hardly differed in the other Soviet satellites. In the Soviet Union
however, in particular in the Maklai Mikluho Institute in Moscow, numerous
researchers studied the question of assimilation — in reality the processes of
the birth of the communist “melting pot”.
We write this to emphasize that Hungarian diaspora studies took root
really only after 1990. This explains the unevenness (and other problems that
we did not touch on) that we pointed out in our evaluation of this volume.
Whether we call this a beginning or a renewal, scholarship only explains but
does not excuse the problems, theoretical shortcomings, the obscurity of ideas,
as well as the contradictions of diaspora research. Nevertheless the thought of
organizing the 2006 conference and the publication of the proceedings in
Hungarian as well as in an abridged English edition must be seen as welcome
developments. It should also be mentioned that the life-spans of the partici-
pants covered almost six decades, even though the majority belonged to the
younger generation (those between 30 and 40) of middle-aged researchers.
This bodes well for the future.
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Béla K. Király, László Veszprémy, et al., eds. History of Transylvania. Trans.
Bennett Kovrig, Péter Szaffko, et al. Toronto and New York: Hungarian Re-
search Institute of Canada and Atlantic Research and Publications, East
European Monographs, No. 581 and Atlantic Studies on Society in Change,
No. 106. Distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2001. (A
translation and re-edited version of Erdély története originally edited by Béla
Köpeczi, László Makkai, Zoltán Szász, et al., 1986.), Vols. 1-3….
The History of Transylvania being reviewed here is a thorough compendium
of studies collected in three volumes. It is a scholarly achievement that evol-
ved over decades and has a seminal history of its own. A perusal of the front
piece of the three volumes provides a hint of the complex organizational effort
that went into the production of the English translation of the three-volume
Erdély története published in 1986. Yet the English version is at the same time
something more and something less than the Magyar version published by the
Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
The publication of the Magyar version in 1986 had the effect of a
bombshell in East European historical studies and also in the state-to-state
relations of Romania and Hungary. It represented a break with the past and a
significant fracturing of the post-World War II monolithic, ideological control
of Romanian historians over Transylvania's past. Up to 1986, under the aegis
of proletarian internationalism, but more significantly under the influence of
Soviet hegemonial demands, nationality issues and conflicts were swept under
the rug. They were the concerns of each satellite state, the internal matter of
the respective communist party states. In Romania under Gheorghe
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Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceauşescu the country became more and more a
Romanian nationalist party state.
The Romanian reaction to the 1986 publication of Erdély története
reflected much passion because Nicolae Ceauşescu's political order depended
on Romanian nationalism to bolster an otherwise faltering and discredited
dictatorial system. As early as on 27 February 1987 the Council of Nationali-
ties convened in Bucharest addressed this “historical” challenge. President
Ceauşescu provided the keynote address and described the three volumes as a
“falsification of history.” He went on to accuse the authors ― and the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences ― of disturbing the “harmonious relations”
between brotherly socialist states. But, he was not satisfied with this political
condemnation. He also put his personal authority on the line as a historian,
reaffirming the veracity of the theory of Daco-Roman continuity as well as
presenting the official Romanian perspective on a number of other contentious
issues that had been raised or challenged by Erdély története. Ceauşescu was
followed onto the podium by other political, minority, and so-called scholarly
leaders who continued the tirade of denunciation from prepared texts con-
cerning a work that had not been read by the members of the platform party.
This official party statement was supported by the frenzied attacks of
Romanian historians with the intent of informing the outside scholarly world
about this “scholarly travesty.” On 7 April 1987 a full-page advertisement
appeared in the London Times which accused the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences of supporting the “falsification of history.” This was followed by
reviews and review articles in the Romanian Review and the publication of a
special English-language pamphlet entitled “A Conscientious [sic] Forgery of
History of Transylvania under the Aegis of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences” under the authorship of Stefan Pascu, Florin Constantiniu and
others. According to Béla Köpeczi's introduction to the new English version
of Erdély története, History of Transylvania, the authors of this pamphlet
...reiterated the basic tenets of Romanian historiography with
regard to Daco-Roman continuity, the autonomy of the Transyl-
vanian voivodeship, the national endeavors of the voivode Mihai
Viteazul, the justified rebellion of Transylvania's Romanians
during the Hungarian War of Independence in 1848-49, and the
oppression of Romanians by Magyars in the period of the Dual
Monarchy.... They credited Transylvania's Romanians for the
annexation enshrined in the Treaty of Trianon, evoked the opp-
ression of Romanians and the deportation of Jews between 1940
and 1945 in Northern Transylvania, and reiterated that the
nationality question had been satisfactorily settled in Romania.
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They branded Erdély története a revisionist and chauvinist work
reminiscent of Hungarian historiography in the Horthy era. (pp.
10-11)
The general international scholarly reception of Erdély története was
the opposite of this official Romanian line. Extensive reviews appeared from
the pens of Norman Stone, Gerhard Seewann, Martyn Rady, James Niessen,
Thomas Szendrey and others that put the appearance of the three volumes in a
much more positive light. Although the reviewers provided both positive and
negative critiques of certain aspects of the three volumes, they also observed
that this work was a welcome, even invaluable addition, to the study of
Transylvanian history.
Two scholarly conferences were also devoted to the assessment of
these volumes, one held in Debrecen, Hungary, in October, 1987, the other in
Paris in November, 1992. The Debrecen conference provided the forum for
twenty-eight historians. It permitted a thorough survey of the three volumes
with critiques of the major subjects, methodology, themes and time periods of
the work. The great merit of the conference was that the critiques appeared
under the editorship of István Rácz in a collection published in 1988 under the
title Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről [Studies on the history of Transylva-
nia]. This work provided detailed critiques which became invaluable for the
newer editions of the series as well as for the publication of the abridged
one-volume versions of Erdély története appearing in Magyar in 1989, in
German in 1990, in French in 1992, and in English in 1994.
The Paris Conference, although more limited in participation, but re-
corded on videotape and subsequently broadcast on television, included three
French participants as moderators/commentators, three Romanian participants,
two of them signatories of the Times advertisement, and three Hungarian
authors/editors of the original three-volume work. Although the position of
the Hungarian authors and the Romanian participants had not changed drama-
tically since 1987, the tone of the discussion was much more civilized and
informed. At least two factors were responsible for this. First, the political
climate changed after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the death of
Ceauşescu in 1989, and the presence of the French historians as moderators
and commentators acted as brakes on extremist dialogue. The end result of
these discussions and of the reviews which appeared at that time was that the
authors/editors now felt justified in attempting to have the entire three-volume
set translated into English. In this effort it is important to note that a trans-
Atlantic effort came into being including not only the Institute of History of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, but also the Hungarian Research Insti-
tute of Canada, the Atlantic Studies on Society in Change series and the East
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European Monograph series, with the financial support of the Soros Founda-
tion.
In the short-run, the publication of the English language History of
Transylvania in 2001, did not have the kind of polarized response either at the
level of scholarship or interstate relations as did its Hungarian predecessor.
The changed political climate was one reason, but probably more significant
was the fact that the work was now in a language easily accessible to scholar-
ship on a global level. This also means that in the long-term this English
version will have greater impact on the perceptions and scholarship of the
Western world. While this result is in itself to be applauded, it also throws into
stark relief the great obstacle that faces scholarship appearing only in Magyar.
Scrutinizing Transylvanian history through the English-language window
means missing much of the original message, because History of Transylvania
(2001) is both something more and something less than Erdély története
(1986).
The English version is less than the original because its physical
limitations are more pronounced. The original had a 7" by 10" per page
format whereas the new version has only 5 1/2" by 8 1/2" of space per page.
Although this increases the overall number of pages of the English version, it
eliminates the wealth of maps, diagrams, charts, and pictures that appeared in
the original version. Erdély története had an exuberant collage of visual docu-
mentation, including 783 black and white photographs, 127 colour photog-
raphs, 58 maps, 38 tables, and 27 charts and diagrams. History of Tran-
sylvania retains only the maps, but even those appear only in black and white
and usually only on the 5 1/2" by 8 1/2" reduced space of the individual
pages, i, e., there are no fold-out or coloured maps.
History of Transylvania is less than its predecessor in one other way.
It does not try to cover developments since the Treaty of Trianon (1920). In
the introduction to the compilation Béla Köpeczi excuses this omission by
presenting two arguments: first, the political constraints of the time when it
was written provided a distorted perspective. Therefore, this section did not
deserve to be translated; second, historical objectivity is unattainable in the
analysis of "recent events." This is a weak excuse and the result is unfortunate.
The 1920-1989 section should have been rewritten just for the English edition.
This would have counteracted the negative effects of a study such as that of
Kurt W. Treptow's edited volume on A History of Romania (New York,
1996), which continues to perpetuate the time-worn dogmas of the past.
Treptow's edited volume of 1996 was almost a direct but unstated
response to the English one-volume abridged version of Erdély története. It
provides a basic summary of most of the Romanian arguments discussed
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above. The appearance of the three-volume History of Transylvania in 2001 is
therefore a welcome addition to the literature because in a real sense it
approaches Transylvanian history from a new perspective, even if it lacks a
discussion of many important twentieth-century developments, including the
Second Vienna Award (1940) and the nationality policies of the respective
governments from 1920-1989. It emphasizes the history of the region,
including all the peoples that have contributed to the formation of its history.
In other words, it does not regard Transylvania as the stage on which only one
people enacted their aspirations. It uses a comparative approach, which
enables the reader to appreciate the region's events from the perspective of all
the major actors — Magyars/Szeklers, Romanians and Germans/Saxons and
Swabians — as well as the contributions of Jews, Armenians, Bulgars, and
others, even peoples who have stepped off that stage, or have been absorbed
by others, such as the Goths, the Huns, or the Gepids, and the Avars.
The strength of this approach becomes evident when it is compared to
Treptow's A History of Romania, which tries to construct the history of the
region as if it had always been a Romanian "country." This approach is a
unilinear interpretation that deposits into history the present political borders
of Romania and lets these borders dictate the content. In other words, it
assumes that the "Romanian countries" were destined to become Romanian
even before the unification of Wallachia (Oltenia) and Moldavia with
Transylvania following World War I. It assumes that a national destiny was
already unfolding in the mind and the actions of Michael Viteazul (Michael
the Brave) during his brief voivodeship of the "three countries" at the
beginning of the seventeenth century (1599-1601).
The contrast between these two approaches is reflected in the number
of pages of text devoted proportionately to the different phases of the region's
history. History of Transylvania devotes approximately 330 pages to the
prehistory of Transylvania, 250 pages to its medieval evolution, and 300
pages to the period from the 1526 battle of Mohács to the end of the Fifteen
Years War (1591-1606). It devotes the entire second volume to the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with a slight overlap into the beginning
of the nineteenth, leaving the third volume to confront the problems of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (to 1920). Compared to this,
Treplow's volume devotes a scant fifty pages to ancient history, mainly to
develop the Daco-Roman thesis. His study then devotes the next eighty pages
to the Middle Ages ending with the "First Unification of the Romanian
Lands" (1599-1601). The next chapter devotes seventy pages to the "Early
Modern Age" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, whereas 160 pages
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are devoted to the modern age (1821-1918), and 185 pages to the twentieth
century from 1918 to 1989.
History of Transylvania contains an evolved discussion of the region's
past and relates it to the struggles of its peoples. It avoids the pitfalls of an
ethnocentric bias. Overall, it succeeds in achieving this purpose. Its weakness
is in part a consequence of human fallibility and mortality. The original
authors/editors are not the ones who reedited the English version. Many of the
authors had passed away by the early 1990s, including András Mócsy, Zsolt
Trocsányi, and László Makkai. Many new authors joined the ranks of the
reediting process including Gábor Vékony, Ambrus Miskolczy and István
Bóna. Furthermore, the translation and reediting also added Béla K. Király,
László Veszprémy, Bennett Kovrig, and Péter Szaffko to influence the final
refornnulated text and content of the three volumes. The influence of the
content and translation of the abridged 1994 version also had its impact. In
terms of the format, this resulted in a better final product. In terms of content,
it led to an overly cautious presentation. The dropping of the analysis of the
1920-1989 period indicates this fact.
The English translation of History of Transylvania is generally good,
with the exception of some unfortunate weak points in the preface and in the
acknowledgments which were probably added at the last moment without the
benefit of a stylistic review. The volumes are also marred by some typo-
graphical and spelling errors. These — or, at least, many of them — could
have been screened out with the help of additional proofreading. But an
enterprise of this magnitude is bound to retain such imperfections regardless
of the efforts to eliminate them.
The content of History of Transylvania also requires some specific
reflections to pinpoint its merits. First, the addition of brief biographical
sketches of prominent individuals as an appendix (Vol. I, 807-815, Vol. II,
799-810, and Vol. III, 810-819) is definitely beneficial. Second, the retention
of the diversity of interpretations is also an asset. Unlike the homogenized
nationalist versions of the region's history, the Béla K. Király-edited volumes
continue the diversity of its predecessor. Just two examples may suffice. First,
the two interpretations of the Hungarian settlement of Transylvania differ.
István Bóna's interpretation, presented with archaeological evidence, argues
that the Hungarians entered Transylvania from the east and used it as a base
for conquering the Pannonian lowlands and the central plains. László Makkai
presents the contrasting argument that the Hungarians had first conquered the
plains region and Transdanubia and then spread eastward, incorporating/
consolidating Transylvania in the eleventh rather than the tenth century.
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A later section, Vol. I, 593-769 of the History of Transylvania
presents two other conflicting interpretations, relating to Suleiman the
Magnificent's policies of expansionism into central Hungary and Tran-
sylvania. Two historians, Katalin Péter and Agnes R. Várkonyi, argue that
Ottoman Turkish policy at the time was not driven by an insatiable appetite
for new territories but by rational considerations, and by a flexible application
of Ottoman power. This included, among other considerations, a willingness
to depend on indirect control through local princes, as in Transylvania, or
through voivodes in Wallachia and Moldavia. But the counterarguments are
also presented by Gábor Barta, who contends that much of Ottoman policy
was driven by an irrational desire for expansion. These are characteristics of
the three volumes that indicate a rejection of dogmatic interpretation on all the
significant issues of Transylvanian history.
This openness and commitment to listen and to present a balanced
view of existing interpretations is one of the principal merits of the three
volumes of History of Transylvania. As Péter Takács points out in his critique
of the first version of the compilation (Tanulmányok Erdély történetéről):
The authors have approached historical problems in a scientific
way. This approach should take the place of those arbitrary
interpretations which have led millions of people to accept a
distorted image of their past. The authors have also smashed a
taboo. So far even historians themselves have ... believed that if
they keep quiet, they will not do any harm to the past. Today the
authors convince us that silence is no remedy for injustice,
misinterpretations and false evidence. (p. 283)
This same conclusion also applies to the Béla K. Király-edited version! These
three volumes should be on the bookshelves of all Central and East European
research centres and in the collections of all major universities in the
English-speaking world.
Editor's note: A slightly different version of this review article appeared in the
Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 31, 1-2 (2004): 127-30. We're indebted
to this journal's editors for permission to re-print the review here.
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Editor's note: In the appendix below we reproduce most of the review of the
original, Hungarian version of Erdély története by the late Thomas Szendey
(1941-2003). It appeared in vol. 16, nos. 1-2 (Spring-Fall, 1989) of our jour-
nal, pp. 137-50.
APPENDIX
A History of Transylvania:
Its Impact and Reception
Thomas Szendrey
Béla Köpeczi, ed. Erdély története. 3 vols. Budapest: Magyar Tudományos
Akadémia, 1986.
History should be written sine ira et studio, but that is never wholly
possible; nor can it ever measure up to the Rankean ideal, but nonetheless
should attempt to approach it. These volumes on the history of Transylvania
certainly attempt this in spite of the great temptations and difficulties involved
in writing about this part of the world and its competing nationalisms.
However, there is another factor in the writing of history than the
scholarly intentions of the historians, namely the political-cultural context in
which one of necessity must live and work. Then there is also the network of
world politics and the particular place in it occupied by both reader and writer,
which in turn gives rise to interpretations and evaluations, indeed misinterpret-
tations and re-evaluations based upon subjective interests. This is something
no writer or historian can fully anticipate or control. The work has a life of its
own and becomes a part of the consciousness of its readers, living on and
influencing life in its myriad dimensions. This review is thus an expression of
this consciousness in the life of one historian, hopefully a fair and meaningful
one.
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A detailed and comprehensive three volume history of Transylvania
has been published under the aegis of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences
and edited by the then minister of cultural affairs Béla Köpeczi, a literary and
cultural historian of some renown. The work has generated more controversy
among historians, politicians, and the public in Hungary, Rumania, and indeed
throughout the world, mostly on account of the bitter response it has elicited
from Rumanian academic and political circles. This has been augmented and
followed by the defence of the volumes by spokesmen for the Hungarian
government as well as those by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.1
Furthermore, scholars throughout the world, especially those concerned with
the history of East Central Europe and also those dealing with minority issues,
have also responded to the volumes and the controversy surrounding them in
both the media and scholarly publications.2 One needs to add that if the
interest extends beyond purely academic circles and is perceived of in political
terms, even the language of publication, i.e. Hungarian, mostly ceases as an
issue of concern. After all, numerous significant and controversial books have
been published in the Hungarian language without generating interest and
controversy of this magnitude, extending from the pages of leading world
newspapers to the halls of the U.S. Congress and beyond.
Obviously, there must be a number of reasons for this vast interest in
a rather lengthy (almost 2,000 pages) and detailed scholarly work dealing with
a small and isolated geographical entity populated mostly by Hungarians,
Rumanians, and Germans (Saxons); a part of Rumania since the peace treaties
after World War I, it was for most of its history a part of the Hungarian
kingdom and also for approximately 150 years an independent principality
quite conscious of its Hungarian ties. The interest is certainly not evoked
either by the style and detail of the three rather hefty volumes, representing
difficult reading even for one well versed in the history of the people and
nations involved. Perhaps the interest can be explained in part because
nothing comparable has been written or published in Hungary for more than
forty years; this, however, would only explain the interest in the volumes by
Hungarians and Hungarian-reading specialists and scholars dealing with these
topics….
The concern and interest of Rumanian historians and the reading
public in Rumania should be and is self-evident. The volumes deal with
topics which involve their ancestors in Transylvania, the development of the
Rumanian nationality there, and their status in the region, among other issues.3
Nonetheless, the volumes deal with these topics in a way which often
challenges the assumptions of Rumanian national sentiment and especially
Rumanian nationalist historiography. Indeed, the response to these volumes
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border on politically induced hysteria, by no means a proper response to
volumes from which the Hungarian chauvinistic mentality and tone, which
had marred some other writings on this theme, are decidedly missing. One
cannot but believe that the Rumanian response, especially by its political
leaders and many of its historians and writers, is unwarranted and unjustifi-
able.4
There must be more to the generally expressed Rumanian attitude
toward these volumes than a concern with scholarship and alternative inter-
pretations; the tone of the writings and polemics directed against the work
certainly points in such a direction. In the judgment of this reviewer this
something else is the politization of scholarship, especially history, to serve
the goal of creating a unitary national state by the current regime at the
expense of destroying the national past of the major ethnic minorities in
Rumania today, namely the Hungarians and Saxons of Transylvania. The
changes in nationality policies the past twenty years certainly point in this
direction. Consider the following; many local archives, especially in
Transylvania have been gathered together and forcibly removed to Bucharest
and other locations; decrees have limited education in the languages of the
minorities and publication opportunities have been greatly restricted. The list
could be extended to include political and socio-economic decisions which
have impacted negatively on the quality of life in Rumania, but these have
also affected all citizens of the state regardless of nationality and have led to
some limited manifestations of dissatisfaction with the regime and the
unparalleled and unprecedented number of refugees (and not just ethnic
Hungarians) seeking refuge in Hungary and elsewhere.
All of these events have had an impact on the conscience of peoples
throughout the world, especially in Western Europe, the United States, and
Canada (which together with Hungary sponsored a resolution on human rights
at the Vienna conference on cooperation and peace) and which has resulted in
some unpleasant and damaging political publicity for the Rumanian regime.
Quite simply, the fate of the largest national minority in East Central Europe
— the Hungarians of Transylvania — is a matter of some concern and this is
by no means totally unrelated to the history of Transylvania and its peoples.
Thus, the publication of this three volume Erdély története, by the publishing
house of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, has once again focused
attention on an issue which for the past forty years has been kept alive mostly
outside of Hungary. It is to this situation that we must now turn.
With the imposition of the Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe
in the immediate post-World War II era, it was stressed that the imposition of
a new internationalist ideology would remove or at least alleviate the national
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antagonisms of the region. Given the extent and depth of nationalist
sentiment this did not and has not happened, but two consequences of the
somewhat altered nationality situation in post-war East Central Europe must
be noted nonetheless. First of all, the peoples of the region suffered a similar
fate under native Stalinist regimes. Secondly, the Hungarian minority in
Rumania obtained more autonomy, especially in educational and cultural
matters, than during the Ceauşescu years. It was undoubtedly the situation of
the Hungarian minority, especially during the past few years, which led to the
decision on the part of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (with the
necessary consent of the government) to proceed with the publication of this
work.
In a preliminary unpublished review of this work, Nándor Dreisziger
noted that the publication of these volumes was a "debt paid in Budapest,"5
after more than forty years of official silence about Transylvania. One might
extend this observation by noting that the historical consciousness of the elder
generation had not forgotten about Transylvania, but had no forum to express
its concern. The younger generation, meanwhile, generally only knew about
Hungarians living in Rumania and was mostly unaware of the historical
connection between Hungary and Transylvania. It was the joint activity (still
mostly unrecognized) of Hungarians in the western world and the writings and
activities of writers such as Gyula Illyés and Áron Tamási on behalf of the
Hungarian minorities which awakened the consciousness of many Hungarians
and brought about a renewal of interest and concern with Hungarians beyond
the borders of Hungary in the early 1970s.6 Hungarian writers and scholars in
the western world had not been affected by caesura of official non-concern for
Transylvania and the Hungarian minorities generally and had kept alive in
their consciousness the historical connection of Hungary and Transylvania,
even if not always with the necessary critical spirit. One could thus argue that
the confluence of concern for Transylvania by Hungarians throughout the
world was united by the rising intolerance of the Ceauşescu regime toward its
minorities generally and the Hungarian one specifically. The most recent
manifestations of this concern were the huge demonstration at Budapest on
June 27, 1988 and the ongoing activity of the Hungarian Human Rights
Foundation and other such organizations in the United States and elsewhere.7
All of these and other activities are tied in with the renewed interest of
Hungarians with Transylvania and the publication of these three volumes is
also tied in with this, even if only indirectly, with the consequences of its
publication, and certainly not with the intentions of its writers who con-
sistently maintained a sense of scholarship and a moderate tone in their work.
In spite of the extent and quality of the three volumes (and the large number
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of copies sold and distributed), for many people it still remains a mostly
unread symbol of care and concern resting on their bookshelves for others to
see. It should be noted that the scholarly level and sometimes turgid style ill
suits this work for a popular audience. For academics and scholars, however,
it is and remains an essential and latest component of an on-going tradition of
historical writing on Transylvania….
* * *
Even a cursory examination of the development of Hungarian historiography
will confirm that the history of Transylvania has always been a significant
component of it. From the earliest chronicles, through the writings of the
Renaissance and humanist scholars, the accounts of seventeenth century
memoir writers, and extending into the era of modern and contemporary
historical scholarship, Hungarian and Transylvanian history have generally
been treated as parts of an integral entity, even when some parts were inde-
pendent or under foreign rule at different times in a more or less common
past. One should also add that this common history included the past of the
non-Magyar peoples who also live in Transylvania.
These historical writings before the eighteenth century generally dealt
more with the monarchy and aristocratic and military elements of the society
and did so generally without sharply distinguishing ethnic or national back-
ground; that was not their primary consideration. With the eighteenth century
— and accelerating in significance — there commenced a great interest in the
past which resulted in the formulation of national histories for the various
peoples of Europe generally, but especially for those who lacked a distinct
historical tradition of their own. It was thus during the late seventeenth and
mostly during the eighteenth century that there developed distinct historio-
graphical traditions in Transylvania among Hungarians (in addition to the
already developed currents of Hungarian historiography), Rumanians (in
conjunction mostly with the Moldavians and Wallachians), and Saxons (also
distinct from other German historical developments). Needless to say, these
emerging traditions could best be described as incipiently self-conscious,
leading eventually to a fully developed romantically inspired nationalism.
Some examples of this development can be pointed out here, but it is
not possible to provide a comprehensive account of these historiographical
traditions.8 Nor do these volumes discussed in this review provide more than
an episodic and scattered historiographical account — one of their most
obvious shortcomings. A distinctive historiographical tradition emerges from
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the writings of Gábor Bethlen, prince regnant of Transylvania in the early
seventeenth century, including especially the writings of Bethlen himself, that
of his court historian Bojthi Veres Gáspár and also János Kemény among
others.9 This tradition was continued apace during the balance of the century
and even beyond. A few examples may be noted: Péter Apor,
Metamorphosis Transylvaniae (1736); Péter Bód, Magyar Athenas (1766);
also the historical writings of Mihály Cserei, Pál Ember Debreczeni, József
Benkő, and János Kénosi-Tőzser. Among the Saxons one must take note of
Marton Schmeizel who taught a generation of Saxon historians in Tran-
sylvania. Hence in the centuries during which modern historical scholarship
developed, the Hungarian and Saxon scholars of Transylvania produced
valuable work.
Rumanian scholarship in Transylvania also began to develop in the
early and mid-eighteenth centuries and found support among the Rumanian
aristocracy and clergy. Especially significant was the political and scholarly
work of Inochentie Micu-Klein and his activities were significant for the
subsequent development of Rumanian historical consciousness,10 specifically
the first formulation by him of the theory of Daco-Roman-Rumanian continu-
ity in 1735. There were hardly any other significant formulations before this
time.
The ongoing interest in and concern with the past of the various
peoples who populated Transylvania through the centuries received an
obvious impetus from the gradual extension of nationalism to more and more
elements of the population. Historical writings increased in number and
became the foundation of those historically based ideologies which became
and continue to be significant for shaping and influencing the histori-
ographical tradition and historical-political consciousness of these peoples.
The more strict devotion to scholarly canons characteristic of many (by no
means all) eighteenth century works gradually gave way to historical writings
and attitudes characterized by a sense of romantic nationalism; this may have
been helpful for the development of literary and cultural life in a national
context. It was certainly not favourable for the maintenance of the com-
mitment to finding out what happened, so essential to the continued writing of
sound history. Indeed, the historical works of the first half of the nineteenth
century (with very few exceptions) were characterized more by a love of
nation than dedication to historical truth. A romanticized version of the
history of the peoples of East Central Europe became — and continues to
persist in some form — as a component part of the respective historical
mythology of these peoples. This has not been salutary for either scholarship
or the promotion of understanding among these peoples. The political history
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of Transylvania is certainly a telling and instructive commentary of this
situation.11
Late nineteenth century historical writing (and this historiographical
tradition continued certainly until 1914) found itself ensnared in a political-
cultural conflict. As it moved away from many of the illusions of romantic
historiography toward a more positivist and scientific historiography, the
historical consciousness of their readers (the educated public generally) was
still informed — indeed captivated — by prior vision. Thus scholarship,
while moving away from that vision found itself out of touch with a
nationalist inspired political system. The activities of scholars and writers
such as Sándor Szilágyi, Henrik Marczáli, and Imre Mikó among others, thus
did not always mesh with popular ideals and aspirations about past, present,
and future. Rumanian historical scholarship also became substantially more
nationalistic (cf. Xenopol, Iorga, etc.) for the reason that historical studies and
consciousness emanating therefrom served well Rumanian nationalist
aspirations.
This politization of historical scholarship led to mutual recriminations
and fostered attitudes of hostility and misunderstanding. All of this was then
caught up in the throes of World War I and its all too well-known consequen-
ces, specifically the division of Austria-Hungary by the peace treaties of St.
Germain and Trianon.12 Nor did this fail to have an impact on scholarly life
generally and historical writing specifically. While some attempts were made
to maintain the necessary dedication to the principles and moral demands of
historical scholarship, the shock of Trianon — probably the greatest tragedy in
the history of the Hungarian nation13 — was simply too much and the revisi-
onism born of the dismemberment of Hungary acted as an impetus to poli-
ticians and very many scholars and historians to point out the injustices of the
changed situation of Hungarians in this region of Europe. Thus, a new revisi-
onist historiography was born and while in the hands of competent historians
(such as Gyula Szekfü, Bálint Homan, Sándor Domanovszky, and Imre Luki-
nich among others) it retained a sense of qualified professionalism, qualified,
however, only in the context of revisionist attitudes; the other characteristics
remained on the same high scholarly level as previously.
Revisionism became the central concern of the political and cultural
life of inter-war Hungary and resulted in some very obvious dislocations in
the historical consciousness of very many Hungarians; often it led to highly
unrealistic political and cultural attitudes and fostered the acceptance of
catastrophic and radical historical and political visions.14 For example, at the
time of the second Vienna Award (1940), when a part of Transylvania was
restored to Hungary, a commemorative album entitled Erdély (Transylvania)
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was published with the participation of many of Hungary's most esteemed
scholars and politicians and this undoubtedly reflected rather evidently the
revisionist program and its attitudes.15 However, even this volume still
exhibited a substantially more moderate tone and was characterized by more
respect for the standards of language and scholarship than the most recent
(since the mid-sixties) Rumanian government sponsored historical or other
writings on Hungary.16 Needless to say, not all writings produced by Ruma-
nian and Hungarian writers and scholars about each other are characterized by
such invective. It is precisely these three volumes which provide numerous
examples of understanding and cooperation among the various peoples
inhabiting Transylvania.
Movement away from excessively revisionistic attitudes on the part of
Hungarian scholars and historians can be noted by the early 1940s; one must
mention the establishment and work of the Teleki Institute; also, Gyula
Szekfü's book Etat et Nation (1942) represents a movement away from revisi-
onism as did the writings of László Gáldi and László Makkai; the latter wrote
a number of books including Erdély története (1946) and edited the second
volume of the work under review.
The changed attitude was in no small measure the result of World
War II; revisionism — or, at the very least, its most outspoken version — was
tempered by the crucible of war and defeat, the consequence of which was the
reconfirmation of the Trianon frontiers at the Paris peace conference of 1947.
The imposition of Soviet hegemony over East Central Europe after the war
engulfed both Rumania and Hungary and this common condition caused more
concern for the Hungarians and Rumanians respectively than the nationality
disputes; immediate post-war relations between the various peoples were
better, though by no means free of conflict and controversy. Hungarian
historians in post-war Transylvania carried out some historical work charac-
terized by sound scholarship and a somewhat more conciliatory spirit, espe-
cially the work of Lajos Kelemen and his students, but this nonetheless
remained the work of a tolerated minority; the same is true with regard to the
work of Imre Mikó.
The Rumanian historical attitudes were mostly maintained, but mar-
ked gradually by an ever increasing Marxist character. This also occurred in
the case of the scholarly work of the national minorities; Marxist hegemony
became the order of the day. Although hampered by the restrictions of this
ideology, the internationalist attitudes of the Soviet imposed regimes some-
what attenuated nationality conflicts, at least until 1962. Since that time the
increasingly intolerant nationality policy of the Ceauşescu regime has weighed
ever more heavily on the nationalities, especially the large Hungarian
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minority. Indeed, there has been and continues to be a strongly chauvinistic
tone to Rumanian political and cultural policies. This was also evident in the
planning and execution of the International Congress of Historical Sciences
held in Bucharest in 1980.
On account of the close connection between some elements of Hunga-
rian revisionism and Nazi Germany, most manifest in the German role in the
two Vienna awards, the post-war regimes were not particularly receptive to
the revisionism of the pre-war years, but were nonetheless somewhat
concerned with the fate and future of the Hungarian minorities. This changed
abruptly with the imposition of the Soviet-backed communist government in
1948 and revisionism — and even nationalism — became in effect taboo
subjects. Hungarian nationalism and concern with Hungarian populations in
the so-called former succession states were neglected and proscribed. The
struggle against nationalism and its manifold manifestations occupied the time
of many historians and ideologues. Although there remained some minimal
evidences of concern with the minorities, the issue continued to be neglected
and even actively discouraged until the early 1970s, at which time a few
studies on Hungarian minorities once again appeared and some public
attention was once again focused on these issues.17 With the exception of a
few relatively minor and highly specialized historical writings on the
minorities, the three volume Erdély története published in 1986 was the first
comprehensive history of Transylvania produced in Hungary since the volume
entitled also Erdély története by László Makkai some forty years earlier. His
scholarly activity thus provides the only continuity of writing on Transylvania
in Hungary today....
[Erdély története]... [had] angered and provoked the Rumanian
government; thus this history of Transylvania not only became a scholarly
concern but entered the political arena. Rumanian government reaction to
these volumes has been virulent in the extreme and the academic and cultural
media have taken their cue from the government response.
* * *
In this connection it may be useful to examine the motivation of Hungarian
historians for producing this work; it should be evident from the amount of
work and effort that went into it that it has been in the planning and writing
phases for a number of years and thus could not have been motivated by strict
political considerations alone. In another sense, however, it represented an
ongoing concern which had been kept under political wraps for quite some
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time; the history of Transylvania, after all, has always been a part of or
intimately related to the history of the Hungarian peoples for a thousand years
and has always been studied or written about by Hungarian historians as they
dealt with the history of Hungary. The publication of a separate or specific
history of Transylvania, however, has been subjected to political restraints for
many years since 1946. Hence, the publication of these three volumes now is
not totally unrelated to either the political vicissitudes of the last forty years in
Hungary specifically and the Soviet bloc contextually; nor is it unrelated to
the much longer tradition of Hungarian historical writing about Transylvania.
The reasons motivating the publication of these volumes were stated
and specified in a lecture given by Zsigmond P. Pach (academician and
director, Institute of History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences) entitled “Why
do we write the History of Transylvania,” presented to a professional con-
ference devoted to this topic and published in the literary-cultural weekly Élet
és Irodalom (Life and Literature).18 Pach makes three key points in his lecture.
First of all, he rejects any association with prior Hungarian nationalism and
revisionism, stating in the process that they as Marxists are opposed to all
kinds of nationalism and also reject nationalist Hungarian historical writings.
Secondly, Pach rejects with equal vehemence the older, newer, and most
recent formulations of Rumanian nationalist historiography as well, specifi-
cally the theory of Daco-Roman continuity and the related “historical rights”
of the Rumanians to Transylvania. This brief critique is then concluded with
a third point, namely the unwillingness of Hungarian historians to engage in a
nationalist dispute, stressing instead that the history of Transylvania forms an
integral part of both Hungarian and Rumanian history and that historical
scholarship should not be used to deny the existence or rights of the other.19
This statement, while undoubtedly academic in tone, and not dealing
specifically with the political dimension of the conflict over Transylvania and
the human and national rights of the minority populations, nonetheless stands
out in bold relief from the bulk of the Rumanian statements and reviews of
these three volumes. The reaction of the Rumanian party and political leader-
ship, as first formulated by Ceauşescu and repeated by numerous others on
many levels and at different forums, accused the Hungarian government of
fascist tendencies, Horthyite revisionism, and the utter falsification of history,
among other similar charges and characterizations. Many of the statements
were then repeated in not only the popular, but also the professional and
academic media and official government publications in foreign languages.
The vehemence and tone of these responses and reviews have even been noted
by western scholars who have reviewed these volumes in literary and profess-
sional reviews. Herewith are but two examples. Norman Stone, writing in the
The Historiography of Transylvania148
Times (London) Literary Supplement, concludes as follows: “Meanwhile, the
sheer hardship of life, in terms of hunger and cold and darkness, is the one
thing that has remained genuinely internationalist in present-day Rumania.
That darkness, to judge from the over-reaction of the Rumanian Academy of
Sciences to a scholarly work of high standard, goes far.”20 Another reviewer,
Martyn Rady, writing in the Slavonic and East European Review, writes the
following: “Nevertheless, despite the evident scholarship of its contents and
the impressive — and hitherto unsullied — reputation of its individual
contributors, Erdély története has been roundly condemned in Rumania as a
mischievous work which deliberately falsifies the historical record.”21 It
should be noted that this review attempts sympathetically to understand the
Rumanian version of Transylvanian history and their point of view.22
Professional reviews of this work inevitably praise its scholarly tone,
comprehensiveness, organization, and the conscious effort to incorporate the
history of the Saxons and Rumanians. While written from a Hungarian
perspective, its discussion of the Rumanian role in the history of Transylvania
is quite detailed and balanced; there is no denial of their role and place in
Transylvania and the chauvinism expressed by some Hungarian statesmen and
writers in the latter nineteenth century is as roundly condemned as the
formulations of Rumanian historical mythology. There is evident some dis-
agreement on the interpretation of the role of the Rumanians in the 1848
revolutions, but then Hungarian historians are not agreed on similar issues
concerning 1848 in other parts of Hungary either. There is a very detailed
discussion and analysis of the early settlements which conclude, on the basis
of archaeological and historical analysis, that the theory of Daco-Roman
continuity is not tenable; it should be stressed that some Rumanian archaeolo-
gists also dispute that point on the basis of archaeological and historical evi-
dence.23
It may be instructive to point out that the periodization and some of
the discussion is based upon self-confessed Marxist categories, but this is
generally subdued and thus only marginally evident. Furthermore, the books
are supplemented by comprehensive bibliographies; further documentation
can be found in the notes which are not as extensive as one is used to in
historical monographs. However, this is not so much a monographic study
than a synthesis and if viewed in that context the documentation can be judged
as sufficient. There is one disturbing element and that is the excessive role
assigned to the history of economic affairs and the vast amount of such detail;
this is especially evident in the third volume covering the period since 1830.
Intellectual and cultural affairs are not given as much prominence as one
would have desired and the role of the churches is mostly limited to their
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political role. The rich spiritual and theological heritage is not given its
proper estimate. These comments notwithstanding, the work achieves its
major goal of presenting a synthesis of the history of Transylvania.
Having previously noted the response of Rumania's political leader-
ship to this work, a brief characterization of the reviews and statements of
some Rumanian scholars may also prove instructive. Sadly, however, these
statements in their essentials follow the lead and tone of the political
declarations; indeed it was expected, even mandated that this be so. The work
under discussion is generally characterized as a malevolent work which
deliberately falsifies history in the service of Hungarian revisionism. An
essay by Titus Popovici entitled “Deliberate Falsification of History: Method
and Style” manages to gather more invective — punctuated by personal
insults against one of the major authors, László Makkai — and distortion into
fifteen pages than most writers. Just one example, and by no means the most
offensive, is the following: “I shall endeavor to describe the content of Erdély
Története, a still-born product of a gang-rape of history, showing no leniency
to the 'intellectual' stature of the authors of this hybrid concoction which
displays a distressing simplicity and lack of sophistication even in the use of
nuances.”24 One should add that the description of the content assumes the
work to be a cheap pulp novel, a characterization varied and repeated any
number of times. Obviously, this kind of writing is best left without
comment.
Another such critique, while somewhat more subdued in tone,
discusses mostly the first volume, specifically the archaeological chapters
written mostly by András Mocsy. Not satisfied with disagreeing with Mocsy's
conclusions, which is after all a right any reviewer and critic possesses, they
constantly characterize it as tendentious and non-scientific; however, the
constant repetition of charges without substantial other or contrary evidence
does not qualify as a critical assessment.25
The attribution of ill will, obvious chauvinistic attitudes, the falsifica-
tion of history — charges constantly repeated — is also typical of an article
entitled “A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.”26 After a brief review of some contested points
typical of most Rumanian critical observations on these themes, the authors,
including Stefan Pascu, a leading Rumanian historian specializing in the
history of Transylvania, assert “that the national question has been fully and
finally settled,”27 thereby denying even the very existence of minority
populations in Rumania. After this political assertion, the review goes on to
castigate some of the writers personally and bemoans the lack of attention to
twentieth century developments, specifically noting that the volume does not
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mention what the reviewers characterize as the “great” industrial accomplish-
ments of socialist Rumania.
While it is correct that the history of Transylvania published by the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences treats the history of Transylvania beyond
1918 only very briefly in a postscript type of chapter, even that fact may be
explained by other considerations. The historical sources and the necessary
critical analysis of those has not as yet been completed and finalized, but more
to the point; these events are still too close in time to allow the necessary
perspective for a nuanced, sound, and balanced analysis. The events of World
War II, the passions engendered by human rights issues, the current situation
of the Hungarian minority there, are all factors which make it emotionally
difficult to achieve the necessary scholarly striving for some semblance of
objectivity.
The history of twentieth century Transylvania still remains to be
written. In this connection, it should be stated that the publication of these
volumes has already engendered a renewed interest in the past and present of
Transylvania. This interest must be maintained and it is surely to be hoped
that cooperation with historians from Rumania, and especially, the involve-
ment of historians from Transylvania's minorities in the future will be possible
once the tone changes and the minorities in that country can once again
continue to develop their cultural identity. In spite of the hope here expressed,
the prospects appear even dimmer if one examines the future of education and
cultural life for the minorities there. The destruction of villages planned by
the Ceauşescu regime, which elicited a huge demonstration in Budapest, also
pushes the possibility of intellectual and cultural cooperation further into the
future. Even in this context, one of the marchers in the Budapest demonstra-
tion carried a sign which read: “We do not wish the return of Transylvania,
but rather the restoration of a more human life in Transylvania.”28 This
sentiment should be read in the light of the statements cited from the reviews
published in the Rumanian media….
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The Historiography of Transylvania 151
5 Preliminary, unpublished review by Nandor Dreisziger.
6 The writings of Gyula Illyés were instrumental in awakening interest in
the fate of Hungarian minorities. Some of his essays and poems encouraged many
others, such as Sándor Csoóri and István Csurka.
7 The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, and organization of mostly
young Hungarians in the U.S. and Canada has been involved in the political arena,
relief work, and publications. It has issued a number of reports on the situation of
Hungarian minorities, and established a broad base of support. There are also nume-
rous other organizations active in the support of human rights in Transylvania in the
western world.
8 Two articles by the current writer may be of some interest in connection
with these matters: "Hungarian Historiography and European Currents of Thought,"
in Society in Change: Studies in Honor of Béla K. Király, ed. S.B. Vardy (Boulder,
Co.: East European Quarterly, 1983), 391411.; "Inter Arma: Reflections on Seven-
teenth Century Educational and Cultural Life in Hungary and Transylvania," in From
Hunyadi to Rákoczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary,
ed. Béla Király and János Bak (New York: Brooklyn College Press, 1982), 315-334.
9 László Makkai, ed., Erdély öröksége (Budapest: Franklin Társulat, 1941),
vol. 4.
10 Erdély története, vol. 2, pp. 1030-1034.
11 Much of the historical mythology can still be found in the public
consciousness.
12 Trianon formed the basis of the Hungarian revisionism and the attempt to
undo some of it was the basis of inter-war Hungarian revisionism.
13 The comment that Trianon was the greatest tragedy in Hungarian history
was once made to this reviewer by John Lukacs. It is certainly comparable to
Mohács. Hungarian historians are finally coming to terms with it once again. See the
text of a radio interview conducted with a number of Hungarian historians by András
Gerő, "Trianon a történelemben és a történeti tudatban," Világosság, April 1988, pp.
219-237. It should be stressed that only 3 pages deal with Trianon in the three
volume Erdély története, which is almost shockingly disproportionate.
14 Some of these would include the various theories about the supposed
Turanian and Sumerian origins of the Hungarians; also evident were the number of
right radical political organizations.
15 Erdély (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 1940). The volume was
also published in a number of foreign languages.
16 Compare with some of the Rumanian reviews of the Erdély története cited
later in this review.
17 It is only now that there is ready acceptance of books on minority issues
in Hungary.
18 Élet és Irodalom, Oct. 23, 1987 as reprinted in Látóhatár, Jan. 1988, pp.
147-152.
19 Ibid., pp. 151-152.
20 Stone, review in Times Literary Supplement, cited in note 2.
The Historiography of Transylvania152
21 Review of Erdély története by Martyn Rady, The Slavonic and East
European Review, 66, 3 (July 1988), p. 482.
22 Ibid., pp. 484-485.
23 Erdély története, vol. 1, p. 301.
24 Titus Popovici, "Deliberate Falsification of History: Method and Style,"
Romanian Review, vol. 41, no. 5, p. 87.
25 Dumitru Berciu et al., "Fallacious Theses on the Making of the Romanian
People and Language," Romanian Review, vol. 41, no. 7, pp. 74-88.
26 Stefan Pascu et al., "A Conscious Forgery of History under the Aegis of
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences," Romanian Review, vol. 41, no. 4, pp. 3-21.
27 Ibid., p. 19.
28 Tüntetés a Hősök Terén (Budapest: Eötvös, 1988), p. 15.
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXXVI, Nos. 1-2 (2009)
The Székelys:
Ancestors of Today’s Hungarians?
A New Twist to Magyar Prehistory
Nándor Dreisziger
Székely szülte a magyart
[Székely begot the Hungarian]
József Thury (1861-1906)
Vékony Gábor. Magyar őstörténet − Magyar honfoglalás [Hungarian pre-
history – Hungarian conquest]. Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 2002. 224 pages.
Gyönyvér Tömöry, Bernadett Csányi, Erika Bogácsi-Szabó, Tibor Kalmár,
Ágnes Czibula, Aranka Csősz, Katalin Priskin, Balázs Mende, Péter Langó, C.
Stephen Downes and István Raskó. “Comparison of Maternal Lineage and
Biogeographic Analyses of Ancient and Modern Hungarian Populations.”
American Journal of Physical Anthropology. 134 (2007). Pp. 354-368.
Bernadett Csányi, Erika Bogácsi-Szabó, Gyönyvér Tömöry, Ágnes Czibula,
Katalin Priskin, Aranka Csősz, B. Mende, P. Langó, K. Csete, A. Zsolnai, E.
K. Conant, C. S. Downes and I. Raskó. “Y-Chromosome Analysis of Ancient
Hungarian and Two Modern Hungarian-Speaking Populations from the Car-
pathian Basin.” Annals of Human Genetics, 72 (2008). Pp. 519-534.
Bagácsi-Szabó Erika et al. “Genetika és (magyar) őstörténet” [Genomics and
(Magyar) Prehistory]. Magyar Tudomány, 169, 10 (2008).
In recent years a new science has become available for the study of pre-
history: genomics, the study of human inter-relatedness through the exami-
nation of DNA. Genomics is sometimes also described as the science of deep
ancestry.1 Genomics was introduced to Hungary just about the time Gábor
Vékony’s book, Magyar őstörténet − Magyar honfoglalás, went to press.2
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Because the results of the first genomic inquiries into the Hungarian past did
not become public until years later, Vékony was not able to use them to
support his theories. Since Vékony died in 2004,3 he never had the chance to
find out that the results of these inquiries lend emphatic support to the most
dramatic and probably also the most controversial of his conclusions.
The first purpose of this review will be to acquaint the reader with
Vékony’s book and its unconventional arguments. The second and perhaps
more important aim of this review article will be to outline the results of the
recent genomic research in Hungary which reinforce Vékony’s extraordinary
theories regarding the role of the Székelys in Magyar ethnogenesis.
The writer of these lines is not a historian of the pre-modern age. He
is not a geneticist by training. Nevertheless, his long-term interest in pre-
modern Magyar history and his passion about the new science of genomics
hopefully offer some justification for his bringing this book to the attention of
an audience that has no knowledge, or has only a limited knowledge of
Hungarian, and cannot read Vékony’s book in the original Magyar.
Many Hungarians are intensely interested in their national origins and
ancient homeland. Not surprisingly, in the past few centuries, and especially
in the past several decades, many books appeared dealing with these subjects.
Some of these were written by people who had no training in any or most of
the relevant disciplines of history, linguistics, archaeology or anthropology ―
and the conclusions they came to were often exotic or even fantastic, espe-
cially as to the question of the ancient Magyar homeland’s location. Acade-
mics better trained in the relevant disciplines were more reluctant to endorse
unconventional theories, but some of them did. In Vékony’s book we have a
work from an academic who was not reluctant to come to conclusions that
most readers will regard as dramatic or even provocative.
We must say in advance that Vékony, a former member of the faculty
of the Institute of Archaeology at Budapest’s Eötvös Loránd University, does
not belong to that very numerous camp of mostly amateur writers who deny
the Magyar language’s linguistic affinity to the other Finno-Ugric languages
and trace the ancient Hungarian homeland to the land of Sumer. He is an
ardent believer of the Uralic linguistic ancestry of the Magyar language.
Regarding Sumerian, he proclaims that it has no connection to any known
tongue, let alone Hungarian. Vékony’s unconventional conclusions are made
in connection with other aspects of Magyar prehistory.
In his lifetime Vékony published numerous books, mostly in Hungari-
an but also in English.4 He wrote the one at hand late in his life, and it sums up
many decades of his researches. It begins innocuously enough, with an outline
of the beginnings of Hungarian interest in Magyar prehistory in the 13th
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century, in particular with the circumstances of Dominican friar Julianus’
travels, in what is now European Russia, in search of the ancient Magyar
homeland and “relatives left behind”. He then continues with descriptions of
the works of the 13th century priests Anonymus and Simon Kézai as well as of
the lesser-known Franciscan friar Plano Carpini, Benedictus Polonus. The
writings of Anonymus and Kézai have served as the chief sources of informa-
tion for generations of Hungarian historians on the occupation of the Carpathi-
an Basin by the Magyars at the end of the 9th century. Later in his book
Vékony will tell us that he, in writing his version of the “conquest” story,
refused to use these works, since much of what they say has been proven
erroneous. The unreliability of these sources should come as no surprise to
anyone. They were written centuries after the events, and they were also
influenced by the political views, one might say the propaganda, of the masters
(King Béla III and King László IV respectively) whom these authors served.
Vékony then continues with the historiography of the “Hungarian
conquest” in the post-13th century period. He notes that attention to the
uniqueness of the Magyar language was first paid in the 15th century by
Galeotto Marzio, a courtier in King Matthias Corvinus’ entourage. Vékony
also traces the evolution of knowledge of Hungarian prehistory outside of
Hungary, mainly at the Vatican and some European (including Russian) royal
courts.
There is not much to write about Hungarian historiography during the
age of Ottoman occupation. Scholarship declined in much of Hungary during
this age, as did the study of history. Nevertheless it was in this period that the
comparison of the Magyar language to other languages garnered increased
interest, and the first language to be focused upon became Hebrew. Similari-
ties between these two languages preoccupied scholars into the 19th century.
In time Magyar became compared to other Near Eastern and Asian languages
as well. It would not be long before attention would be shifted to the relation-
ship of Hungarian to other Finnno-Ugric languages.
According to Vékony, the fist writer to proclaim the similarity of
Magyar and Finnish, and even some Samoyed languages, was the 17th century
scholar Georg Horn. Other Germans who followed were Martin Fogel and
Johann Georg Eckhard, and then in Hungary, Dávid Cwittinger and György
Pray. The most influential of the non-Hungarians were Gottfried Wilhelm
Leibniz and Philipp Johann von Starhlemberg. The latter’s work prompted
Jószef Torkos, the Lutheran minister in Győr, to conclude in 1747 that the
Vogul language was closely related to Magyar (Vékony, p. 25). Though a few
Hungarian scholars were aware of the studies of their German colleagues,
according to Vékony in the 18th century the study of Finno-Ugric linguistics,
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and even to some extent Hungarian prehistory, was primarily a “German
science.” It remained so for many decades, despite the fact that in the 19th
century interest in Hungary in Hungarian linguistic relationships and in the
ancient Magyar homeland (őshaza) increased, as illustrated by the travels of
Sándor Kőrösi Csoma in Tibet and India. The age of the French revolutionary
wars, Napoleon’s conquests, the reactionary regimes that followed the
Congress of Vienna, all contributed to a decline in interest in research about
prehistory not only in Hungary but in the German world as well. The excep-
tions were the Hungarian legal scholar Antal Reguly and the Finnish resear-
cher Matthias Alexander Castrén. These two men, according to Vékony, foun-
ded the modern science of Finno-Ugric comparative linguistic studies (pp. 30-
31).
Reguly’s researches were evaluated and presented to the scientific
world by Pál Hunfalvy, mainly in his book A vogul föld és nép [The Vogul
land and people] (1864). By the end of his career, Hunfalvy had come to the
conclusion that the Magyar language was closest to that of the Voguls (better
known today as the Mansi) and the Ostyaks (the Khanti or Hanti). József
Budenz, a professional linguist, also came to a similar conclusion, abandoning
gradually his earlier belief that Magyar was closest to Turkish (pp. 31-32).
Vékony next describes the prolonged debate that took place in Hungary at the
turn of the century and early during the 20th, regarding the advocates of the
Turkish or Ugric linguistic connection, pointing out that the Orientalist scholar
Ármin Vámbéry at one time was on one side of this debate and later on the
other.
In the meantime the search for the ancient Hungarian homeland
continued. Numerous individuals including Miklós Révai advanced their
theories concerning the whereabouts of this land. Most of them placed it west
or south of the Ural Mountains, while a few in South-Central Siberia. The last
to do so was Erik Molnár, the 20th century Marxist scholar (pp. 34-35). Later
historians began using the methods of paleo-ontology and linguistic analyses
to determine the place of the ancient homeland. By analysing names of plants
and animals in various Finno-Ugric languages, and comparing these to the
estimated homelands of these, they sought to gain insights into prehistory and
the prehistoric homelands of these peoples. The conclusions they arrived at
varied greatly.
In the chapters following these essentially historiographical descrip-
tions Vékony outlines the similarities that can be observed between Hungarian
and other Uralic languages. He concludes that the Magyar language is related
only to these tongues, since the existence of non-Uralic loan words in Magyar,
and Magyar loan words in non-Uralic languages, is no proof of their being
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related (pp. 40-49). He then gives his version of the Uralic linguistic family
tree and next offers descriptions of the peoples that speak or have spoken these
languages (pp. 49-90). This part of his book offers few surprises to believers
of the Uralic nature of the Magyar language. Vékony devotes his next chapter
to an outline of the methodologies used for the research of prehistory.
The next chapter Vékony covers the history of the ancient homeland
of the Uralic and then the Finno-Ugric peoples ― which he places on the
plains southeast of Moscow, roughly between the present-day cities of Riazan
and Tambov.5 He also describes life in these lands as it can be reconstructed
by archaeologists and historians today. Most of this area was a part of the
Middle Volga River basin and was characterized by numerous lakes,
meandering rivers, and wetlands. Not surprisingly, Vékony speculates that
fishing constituted an important activity for the land’s inhabitants, second only
to hunting. He also suggests that Finno-Ugric peoples were introduced to
agriculture and animal husbandry already in this homeland of theirs, by their
Indo-European neighbours.
Vékony’s next chapter deals with the “Ugric” age, the time after the
separation of the Finnic (Finno-Permian) and Ugric peoples. The reason for
this separation is not known to the author. He also has to speculate rather than
to say with any degree of certainty that the Magyars and their Ugric relatives
continued to live together for quite some time after this separation. One great
change in the lives of the Ugric peoples came when they became familiar with
horse breeding and the use of the horse as a daft animal as well as a means of
transportation. This new, now horse-focused Ugric community lived on the
lands south, south-east and east of the previous, the Finno-Ugric homeland ― 
while the ancestors of the Finnic peoples had moved to the north, north-west,
and west. Ugric unity in the lands between the Donets Basin and the Ural
Mountains continued till about 2,000 b.c. when it gradually began to dis-
integrate ― with the ancestors of the Magyars remaining in the lands between
the Don and the Dnepr Rivers, while the ancestors of the Ostyaks (Khanty)
and Voguls (Mansi) moving further north.
Vékony’s next chapter is devoted to what he calls the “Dark Ages” the
early age of Hungarian pre-history. This age lasted from about 1,300 b.c. to
the 5th century a.d., that is till the time of the ancient Magyars’ increased
interactions with Turkic-speaking peoples. This is another age about which we
know very little, and we don’t even know from what languages some of the
loan-words that entered Hungarian had come from, as these languages (and
their speakers) have since disappeared. Archaeology also fails to throw much
useful light on this period. Still, according to Vékony, there are some
glimpses of evidence that makes a cursory outline of this age possible. These
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speak of interplay and interaction with numerous peoples, including some
Finno-Permiens, Iranians (Skythians, Sarmatians, Alans) and Indo-Europeans.
All of these left larger or smaller imprint on the Hungarian language, mainly in
terms of loan-words. In the beginning of this age the ancestors of the Hungari-
ans lived in the Donets River Basin. Where they lived at the end of this period
Vékony is reluctant to guess, as the arrival of the Huns rearranged the ethnic
map of Eastern Europe which fact makes it impossible for the students of this
age to track peoples for about two centuries (p. 166). Nevertheless Vékony
speculates that the earliest forms of the name that Hungarians later began to
call themselves, in its various forms (the Slavic skul, sikulu, sikülü, sakul, and
the Germanic Zokel) which eventually gave rise to the name Székely, origina-
ted in this period (pp. 169-170).6
Vékony’s next chapter deals with the last phase of Hungarian pre-
history, a period that lasted from the middle of the first millennium a.d. to its
end. For the author what characterizes this period most, were contacts and
relations with Turkic peoples. In fact, such contacts continued well into the
13th century. The Turkic peoples with whom the Hungarians of the age had
the most contacts, judging from the number and kind of Turkic loan-words in
the Hungarian language, were the Bulgars. In this connection Vékony remarks
that most of these words must have been borrowed in the Carpathian Basin
(pp. 174-177). Did Hungarians live there before the end of the 9th century?
Vékony answers this question by saying that as far as Hungary’s public is
concerned they did not, but he adds that the majority of historians who studied
this age have come to the conclusion that Hungarians probably did live there.
As to the question of the ethnogenesis of Hungarians (how they eventually
became a people) however, Vékony argues, there has been no agreement
among historians (p. 177). The reason for this, according to the author, is the
existence of two kinds of source materials that made for two differing versions
of Hungarian prehistory.
The “Hungarian conquest”
When carefully considered according to Vékony, these sources actually tell the
history of two different peoples: the ancestors of the Hungarians and the
ancestors of the people who entered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th
century. Vékony next outlines the history of each of these as he sees them (pp.
178-185). In connection with the history of the people who moved into the
Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century ― who were known to their
Muslim contemporaries as Madzsgirs ― he speculates about the language they
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spoke. It was not a Bulgar Turkic language, but one related to the language of
the Bashkirs (p. 185). Vékony is not sure about the language of the Madzsgirs’
Kavar (Kabar) allies, but believes that it was another Turkic language, one of
the several spoken in the empire of the Khazars (pp. 187-188).
The chapter’s last pages speculate among other things about the
relationships between the newly-arrived Madzsgirs and the autochthonous
Székelys ― as well as those between the latter and the region’s Slavic popula-
tions. In connection with the former Vékony guesses that the Székelys inter-
acted and intermarried with the newcomers only or mainly after these became
assimilated (p. 189). Indeed, early interaction was probably difficult between
the rulers and the ruled, that is between those who lived a primarily nomadic,
marauding life, and the locals who were settled and were probably less
warlike.
The book’s last chapter is entitled “A honfoglalás kora” [the age of
the conquest] and deals first of all with the historiography of the so-called
“Hungarian conquest” of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century.
Here the author outlines the shortcomings of the works of the 13th century
chroniclers Simon Kézai and Master P., better known as Anonymus. He notes
that no one has ever found any solid evidence that would support these two
scholars’ linking of the Huns and Árpád’s people. In fact Vékony blames the
continued acceptance of the old theory of the conquest on the fantasy-laden
myths presented by these two men. When faced by such historical evidence,
Vékony feels obligated to reject these stories in their entirety, even if that
makes Hungarian history less colourful and thinner, i.e. more vékony [thin], to
use the pun he favours.
Next Vékony reminds his readers of the massive movements of
peoples Europe experienced from the 4th century to the 9th. In the early decades
of this age it was the still existing Roman Empire that acted as a receptor of
this migration. By the time of the 9th century, it was often the Byzantine
Empire. Vékony argues that the arrival of Árpád’s people should also be seen
as part of this same phenomenon. These people ― whom (as has been menti-
oned) contemporary Muslims called Madzsgirs, the Byzantines Turks, and
most Europeans Ungrus or Hungarus ― from their early 9th century location
east of the Urals began their migration westward and by the second half of the
century they turned up, always on the go, in various places in Central Europe.
Their behaviour was typically nomadic: they engaged in marauding expedi-
tions to all corners of their known world, and they “rented” their armies to
anyone who could pay for them handsomely. As to the size of their army
Vékony gives the estimate of “approximately” 5,000.
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While Árpád’s people were nomadic and Turkic-speaking, the majo-
rity of those living in the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century were
agriculturalists and Finno-Ugric, i.e. Hungarian speaking. Their descendents
would be known as Magyars, a name that was originally that of the new-
comers. Such name-change can also be observed in the case of the Bulgarians,
a Slavic-speaking people who inherited their name from their nomadic,
Turkic-speaking conquerors, and the Russians who got their name Rus from
the Scandinavian, i.e. Varangian elite that founded their first ruling dynasty
(pp. 213-214).
The ancestors of today’s Hungarians, Vékony reminds us in his con-
clusions, had an earlier name and that name eventually transmuted into the
word Székely. Today it denotes the culturally but not linguistically distinct
Hungarian ethnic group living in the easternmost counties of Transylvania in
the Republic of Romania. In the 9th century the ancestors of these people, and
of all Hungarians, lived in various regions of the Carpathian Basin. Further
evidence of their presence, in particular in western Transdanubia, was dis-
covered shortly before Vékony wrote his book. This was an inscription found
written in Székely runic script dating from the 860s a.d. (p. 214).
While most of Hungary’s present-day population descends from these
pre-895 inhabitants of the Carpathian Basin (as well as the great variety of
peoples who had joined them as immigrants since the 9th century), the
Székelys we know today are a distinct group. Vékony suggests that their
cultural separation from the rest of Hungarians had started with the Carolin-
gian conquest of the western regions of their lands. Later, as we know, the
country’s early Árpádian kings invited those among the Székelys who had
been guarding the kingdom’s western frontiers (roughly the region known
today as the Burgenland), to settle in Transylvania to help consolidate the new,
Christian and feudal order in that part of their realm and to guard its by then
more threatened eastern approaches.7
The conquest of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century did
have significant impact on the future history of Hungarians. In Vékony’s
opinion the most important of these was the establishment of a dynasty, under
whose members, in particular Prince Géza and King St. Stephen, a Christian
medieval kingdom could be established and the enthogenesis of the Hungarian
people could be completed. In this process the rulers, the “conquerors” and
their immediate descendents, first became the same as the community they
ruled in their language, and later in other aspects of their existence as well (p.
215). They became the elite of a settled, Christian nation ― linked to their
subjects by their new, common religion and their new, common language.
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Vékony adds a postscript to his book in his comments on his sources.
Here he says that while his book was in preparation for printing new evidence
had come to light ― through linguistic, historic, anthropological and demogra-
phic research ― that should finally put an end to the false interpretation of
history that places the arrival of the Magyar language in the Carpathian Basin
only at the end of the 9th century, with the so-called “Hungarian conquest”.
He continues by saying that the people who arrived at that time made up only
about one percent of the region’s total population, and, according to “every
piece of evidence” were Turkic in speech, Turkic in their ethnicity, and
nomadic in their lifestyle ― while most of the ancestors of today’s Hungarians
had been living in the Carpathian Basin for three or four centuries (p. 219).8
Not surprisingly because of the radical nature of these conclusions,
reactions by the Hungarian scholarly community to Vékony’s theories were
highly sceptical. Journalist-historian István Riba devoted an entire article to
Vékony’s claim, made on various occasions even before the publication of his
book, that the inscription found in Transdanubia (mentioned above) was
written in the Székely runic script (and pre-dated the conquest). He concluded
that there was no consensus among Hungarian archaeologists that this indeed
was the case.9 In another publication archaeologist László Kovács, disputed
Vékony’s estimates (given in this book and in some of his previous publica-
tions) of both the pre-895 population of the Carpathian Basin and the number
of the “conquerors”. In connection with the latter Kovács remarked that 5,000
armed men would not have been able to accomplish the conquest and keep the
subjugated population down, enemies out, and part-take in the newcomers’
military expeditions outside the region.10 What Kovács seems to forget, is that
the Varangians had managed to impose themselves and keep themselves as
Kievan Rus’ rulers with fewer armed men, and William the Conqueror of
England defeated Harold I and founded the beginnings of centuries of Norman
rule with an army that was not more numerous. Nor is it likely that the pre-
vious rulers of all or parts of the Carpathian Basin, the Bulgars in the south-
east, the Franks in the West, Svatopluk in the north-west, or even the Avars
who for some time ruled all these lands, had larger or better armies. We have
to keep in mind that Árpád’s warriors were veterans of many campaigns and
battles, and were much-feared horsemen who rode horses superior in tough-
ness to those available to most of their enemies.11
In any case, the conquerors of the Carpathian Basin held on to their
lands long enough to see the rise of a Christian feudal kingdom under Árpád’s
successors in which they could count on the support of large sections of the
local population to defend what by then became “their” country. This was so
until the 13th century when internal dissention and an extremely powerful
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enemy, the Mongols, brought disaster to the country. By then the legacy
Árpád’s nomadic horsemen had been forgotten and the new Hungarian army
of knights in medieval armour was no match for the light cavalry of the Mon-
gols and their Tatar allies.
The new genomic research
We have no idea what Vékony referred to when he talked about the “new
evidence” supporting his conclusions that had surfaced while his book was
readied for publication. But we know that a few years later such evidence did
come to light. This happened when the results of the genomic research men-
tioned in the introduction of this review began to be published. There were
several publications, both academic and popular, that outlined the findings of
this project, but we focus mainly on two, the two most detailed and as a result,
most important ones. Both of them are in English and both appeared in
internationally-renown journals. Both are available on the internet.
The one I would like to discuss first is the study that examined and
compared the mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) of conquest-era women with the
mtDNA of present-day women in Hungary and the Székelyföld. Mitochondrial
DNA is passed on by women to their children, but it is not passed on by men
to their offspring. It is, accordingly, a means of studying the blood-lines of
women. The researchers, Gyönyvér Tömöry and her associates, extracted
mtDNA from two groups. One of these was made up of slightly over one
hundred women living in present-day Hungary along with 76 women from the
land of the Székelys in Transylvania. The other group was made up of post-
conquest age women. In their case mtDNA was extracted from bones of
women buried in post-conquest era graves. This group was further divided
into two categories. Some bones came from graves of the elite, presumably
wives and daughters of the “conquerors.” These graves were identified by the
rich grave goods they and adjacent graves contained. The other group repre-
sented commoners whose bones were found in graves of the common people,
as identified by the lack of rich grave-goods and/or by their location in places
reserved for poor people in cemeteries.
When the mtDNA of the modern Hungarian (including Székely)
populations were compared to the two groups of the ancient ones, interesting
results emerged. It became evident that the variance between the present-day
populations’ mtDNA and that of the occupants of graves of the elite was
considerable, while variance between the mtDNA of people found in common
graves and the mtDNA of modern Hungarians was “negligible.” This suggests
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that modern-day Hungarian and Székely women are not descendants of the
“classical conquerors” as the researchers call the post-895 elite, while no
significant distances exist between the mtDNA of women in post-conquest age
commoners’ graves and the mtDNA of modern Hungarian and Székely
women. Since most of the occupants of commoners’ graves must have been
members of the subject peoples (they made up the vast majority of the
Carpathian Basin’s population in the 10th century), these findings clearly
indicate a genetic link between the region’s pre-conquest population and its
present-day people.
The finding that many present-day women in Hungary and the
Székelyland are related by blood or may even be directly descended from the
common people of the Carpathian Basin in the 10th century is significant. It
means that immigration into this part of Europe in the last millennium, how-
ever substantial it had been at times, did not result in a complete replacement
of the region’s population. “Genetic drift” to use the scientific jargon of
genomic research, in the Carpathian Basin in the last eleven centuries was by
no means total.
The other article under consideration resulted from the research that
examined the DNA of men. In this project the researchers looked for the
incidence of Tat polymorphism, i.e. the marker Tat C allele, in the Y chromo-
somal DNA of two populations: male occupants of 10th century elite graves
and modern-day Hungarian and Székely men. It should be noted here that Y
chromosomes are passed on by men to their sons and as such are sources of
study for male blood-lines. In the case of the ancient DNA, extraction took
place from the bones of men resting in “rich” graves identified by grave goods
(often weapons, horse harness or even the head or all of a warrior’s horse). In
the case of present-day residents, DNA samples were collected from nearly
200 Magyar and Székely men. The results of the investigation were startling.
The research revealed that while in the ancient DNA the Tat polymorphism
was common, among the modern samples it was virtually absent. Only one
man, a Székely, carried the Tat C allele.12
The researchers also described the nature of the Y chromosome DNA
found in the modern samples. They concluded that their research allowed the
classification of today’s Hungarian and Székely male populations into a large
number of haplogroups, most of them typically European. These were the
groups E, F, G, I K, N3, P and the R1 group, the last one being the most
common. They also noted some differences between the Y DNA of men
living in present-day Hungary, and those living in Transylvania’s Székely
counties. The most notable is the difference between the frequency of R1b1b2
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(formerly R1b1c, R1b3) haplotypes in the two populations. In the Hungarian
sample this frequency is 15%, while in the Székely it is close to 20%.13
It should be explained that frequency for most R1b subclades is much
higher in Western Europe, including the German lands, than in Eastern
Europe. The greater frequency of the R1b1b2 haplotype among the Székelys is
surprising as it was Hungary proper that had received massive influxes of
Western and Central European settlers throughout the ages and especially in
the three centuries of Habsburg rule. The exception to this was the 12th century
when a great many German-speakers (later called the Saxons) immigrated to
Transylvania, at the invitation of King Béla III. Is the unusually high frequen-
cy of Rb1 types among Székely men due to this particular migration or is it a
legacy of their prolonged proximity to western European peoples during the
time they lived in western Transdanubia under Frankish rule? It is difficult to
say. We do not know the social circumstances of the Székelys’ lives during
their stay on the western frontiers of the Carpathian Basin. We know however
that in the centuries since the arrival of the Saxons in Transylvania the two
groups lived in social isolation from each other. They had no common
language. The Székelys were agriculturalists while the Saxons were
predominantly urban dwellers. Since the Reformation, furthermore, the two
peoples belonged to different religions.14
The most important of the findings of Professor István Raskó’s team
is emphasized in all of their reports, namely that their research points to the
fact that the “conquerors” who arrived in the Carpathian Basin at the end of
the 9th century were not numerous. In one of the studies the team concluded
that, once they established themselves there, the “invaders” made up only a
“small fraction” of that land’s total population.15 We have to keep in mind that
this interpretation is not new. More than a century ago, the internationally
renowned archaeologist József Hampel (1849-1913) came to the same conclu-
sion, i.e. that the conquering Hungarians were “only a small minority” of the
Carpathian Basin’s population.16
Despite the opinion reached by Raskó and his associates that the
invaders of 895 were few in numbers, the team did not come to Vékony’s
conclusion that the conquerors were not Hungarian-speaking. Raskó and his
team-mates assumed that, because of their superior position as rulers, the
conquerors were able to impose their language ― or more exactly one of their
languages as they were a federation of tribes of assorted ethnicities ― on the
vastly more numerous local population. But this is not how societal evolution
worked in the 9th and 10th centuries. There was no mass media or schools to
implement such a drastic socio-cultural change, even if the conquerors cared
what language their subjects spoke. The contemporary examples of the
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Scandinavians in north-eastern England, or those in northern France (the
future Normans of Normandy), the Varangians in ancient Rus, the Bulgars on
the Lower Danube, and somewhat later the Normans in England, speak to this
point. In all these cases the conquerors sooner or later “melted into” the more
numerous, indigenous populations. True, at least two of them, bequeathed to
the ethnic groups they subjugated their name: Rus (Russian) in the first
instance and Bulgar (Bulgarian) in the second. The conquerors of the
Carpathian Basin did the same: the peoples they conquered became known by
their name: Magyar. They also bequeathed the Hungarian nation their first
dynasty of rulers, as Vékony pointed out ― and much of their mythology,
including the myth that they, the conquerors, were genetic founders of the
Hungarian nation.17
The main title of this review article is slightly misleading. It suggests
that the Székelys were the ancestors of today’s Hungarians. What really
happened, however, according to the evidence outlined in this study, is that the
ancestors of today’s Hungarians were known as Székelys before they came to
be known to themselves as Magyars, and to others as Ungari, Ungar, Hungari-
ans, etc. The subtitle of the article also has to be qualified. Vékony did not
give a new twist to Hungarian prehistory. He gave numerous twists to the old
version of the story ― which culminated in his new explanation of the “con-
quest” of the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century.
Few authors of radically novel historical theories received such
massive endorsement as a result of new research within a few short years of
their passing as Vékony did. This happened when the genomic research
project, that had started probably just at the time his book Magyar őstörténet
went to press, was completed. Only time will tell whether this fortuitous
circumstance will be enough to elevate Vékony’s theories from relative
obscurity to the limelight. We have to keep in mind that what he had sug-
gested, that Hungarians had lived in the Carpathian Basin before the so-called
“Hungarian conquest,” is not new. The people who said so, however, are
unknown or forgotten. Not only foreigners such as the Italian paleo-linguist
Mario Alinei but Hungarians as well, including the teacher and museum
worker Lajos Marjalaki Kiss (b. in 1887) and the writer and amateur
archaeologist Ferenc Móra (1879-1934) ― and we do not even mention the
supporters of the “dual conquest” theory such as Gyula László, his predeces-
sors and followers, since their ideas are not endorsed by Vékony and are not
supported by the researches of István Raskó and his team.18
Old theories, once endorsed and cherished by entire nations, do not
die easily. Nevertheless, we hope that, at the very least, this review of
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Vékony’s book and of the evidence that had surfaced since its author’s passing
will foster a new debate about the subject.
Prehistory is a complex field of study. It involves numerous discip-
lines none of which can do much to elucidate the past. As Csanád Bálint
warned us, it is full of insurmountable difficulties and innumerable pitfalls.19
This warning should be kept in mind when we search for new explanations to
old, time-honoured theories. This admonition, however, should also apply to
the sources that had been the building blocks of the old theories. In the science
of genomics we have a new instrument to do this, yet we have to keep in mind
that this tool too, has shortcomings and imperfections ― that might not be
eliminated for some time, perhaps never. Only much new research, in this new
field – as well as in the traditional disciplines ― can bring us a little closer to
the truth.
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their Germanic vernacular for the proto-Romance language spoken by their subjects.
Their kingdom fell to the Moors in the early 8th century, who were also unable to
impose their language on the local population. Another example is that of the
Germanic-speaking Lombards who, in the decades after their arrival in northern Italy
around 568 a.d., assimilated to the local population.
18 Mario Alinei’s book, originally published in Italian, is available in
Magyar:Ősi kapocs: A Magyar-etruszk nyelvrokonság [Ancient link: the Hungarian-
Etruscan linguistic relatedness] (Budapest: Allprint, 2005). Alinei places the arrival
of a proto-Hungarian population in the Carpathian Basin in the 9th century B.C. Lajos
M. Kiss concluded in one of his studies of place-names in the Carpathian Basin that
the “population” of this region “at the time of Árpád’s conquest could only have been
Hungarian.” See the website http://www.acronet.net/~magyar/english/96-07/kisshist
.html . For Móra’s comments on this subject, see his work entitled Igazlátók (karcola-
tok) [Truth seers (sketches)] (Budapest: Móra Ferenc könyvkiadó, 1979), pp. 20-31 in
passim. While the “Double Conquest” theory is not supported by the results of recent
genomic research, some of the evidence marshalled to support it also underpins
Vékony’s arguments. After Gyula László’s retirement of from active academic life the
most articulate supporter of this theory became János Makkay. See his “Embertannal
kapcsolatos adatok a ‘kettős honfoglalás’ vitájához” [Anthropological data concer-
ning the debate about the ‘dual conquest’], Anthropologiai Közlemények, 35 (1993):
213-219. The research of Raskó and his team also doesn’t support the theory, advan-
ced by Adorján Magyar (1887-1978) and others, that Hungarians have been living in
the Carpathian Basin since the end of the last Ice Age but groups of them had
migrated to the East. According to these writers, Árpád’s people were the descendents
of one of these groups ― who had come “home” in 895. On Magyar’s writings see
the website http://yamaguchy.netfirms.com/magyar_a/adorjan_index.htlm
19 Bálint, op. cit. See also Bálint’s essays in the 2008 no. 10 issue of Magyar
Tudomány, pp. 1166-1187, 1217-1218. Much of this volume is devoted to genomics,
with other essays by Gusztáv Mende Balázs, István Raskó and his team, and Péter
Langó (co-author). The volume is entitled Genetika és (Magyar)Őstörténet [Genetics
and (Magyar) prehistory] and is guest-edited by Csanád Bálint.
P.s. Since this review was written I published a summary of my views: “The
Lessons of Genomic Research,” Hungarian Quarterly, 50 (winter 2009): 50-
55. It is available in part at http://hungarianquarterly.com/no196/8.shtml





Mária Krisztinkovich was an art historian, writer, librarian, art collector and,
together with her second husband Eugene [Jenő] Horvath, a generous patron 
of artistic and scholarly causes. She was born in Budapest where she attended
the prestigious preparatory school of the Angolkisasszonyok [English Ladies]
and later the Academy of Commerce. An important part of her education was
language training. As an adult, Mária spoke four of Europe’s major languages:
English, German, French and Italian.
Several of Mária’s ancestors were involved in what she would value
in life: art collecting and writing. György Ráth, a great-great-uncle of hers,
founded a museum; István Ráth-Végh was a writer. Béla Krisztinkovich, her
father, was an avid collector of Anabaptist-Hutterite pottery. He introduced
Mária to this activity ― that later became her passion as well.  
The young Mária’s life was full of unexpected turns. In 1946 she
moved to Bucharest where her first husband, István Gyöngyössy, became the
head of Hungary’s post-war diplomatic mission to Romania. During the height
of Stalinist rule in Hungary Gyöngyössy was imprisoned while Mária and her
infant daughter were exiled to a small Hungarian village. In 1959 she managed
to leave Hungary, immigrated to Canada where she found employment at the
University of British Columbia’s Library in Vancouver. While at UBC she
pursued her earlier scholarly interests and continued her research into the
history and artistic legacy of Central Europe’s Hutterite (Anabaptist) com-
munities. In this work her knowledge of the relevant languages served her very
well.
She, often in collaboration with J. Eugene Horvath, published nume-
rous bibliographies and papers on these and other subjects. The latter appeared
in learned journals such as Kerámos, Mennonite Quarterly Review, Ungarn
Jahrbuch, as well as in this journal, in which her work appeared twice. Her
first paper was on “Historical Hungary as Background for Hutterite Needle-
work in Canada” (Vol. 8 [Spring 1981]: 11-23); while the second was entitled
“Prince Rupert, Godson of Gábor Bethlen” (Vol. 13 [Fall 1986]: 11-19).
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There can be little doubt that her scholarly magnum opus was An
Annotated Hutterite Bibliography (1998) on which she worked for three
decades. This 312-page volume contained some 2,600 entries. With the help
of Professors Werner Packull and Peter C. Erb, as well as the Reverend Olivér
E. Szebeni of Hungary, the work was made into an electronic database.
Another of Mária’s major contributions to knowledge was her compilation of a
Dukhobor bibliography. Still another of her major works, produced in col-
laboration with J. Eugene Horvath, was A History of Haban Ceramics: A
Private View (2005).
In the realm of belles-lettres her writings included poetry, some of it
written during her exile from Budapest in the early 1950s. Her favourite
volume was Nevetek Sírva [I laugh crying] published in 2006 (with drawings
by Ildikó Lansonius and a CD of readings by actress Györgyi Hegedős). Mária 
also wrote a book-length novel entitled Híd a víz alatt, 1937-1945 (Budapest,
1996). Its English version appeared first, Bridge Under the Water (1993).
Mária was a persevering member of the Hungarian Studies Associa-
tion of Canada, from the organization’s beginnings until old age and illness
made visits to the HSAC’s annual conferences difficult. She was also a
member of our journal’s editorial staff ― who sometimes bemoaned the fact 
that few if any papers were submitted to the journal in her fields of expertise.
The last decades of Mária’s life were filled by her struggle with ill-
health but such an adversity did not break her spirit and prevent her from her
writing, artistic and art-collecting pursuits, nor from keeping her home’s
grounds in magnificent horticultural order as well as being an engaging host
mainly to the members of Vancouver’s — and the North American Pacific
rim’s — Hungarian artistic and intellectual community. As one visitor to the
Krisztinovich-Horvath home, the Hungarian poet György Faludy remarked,
Mária was a woman with expertise in everything, from writing poetry to
preparing scrumptious meals from a newly-slaughtered pig. The latter art, as
well as that of vegetable gardening, Mári no doubt learned during her exile in
the Hungarian countryside.
Mária Krisztinkovich, or Mári as she was known to her friends, lived a
long and eventful life. Through her work and activities she had enriched the
lives of others — from the members of her family, to her circle of friends, to
the artistic and scholarly communities of North America and Central Europe .
She will be missed by many — in the city where she had lived for half-a-
century, in her post-1950s homeland, as well as elsewhere.
Nándor Dreisziger




László László was known to his English-speaking acquaintances as Leslie
while his Magyar friends called him Laci. He was born on 6 May 1925 in
Kőszeg, westernmost Hungary, to Antal Jesztl and Etelka Kelemen. He was
the third of four children. His father was an inn-keeper first in Kőszeg, then in
Szombathely and later in Sopron. In 1950 he changed the family name from
Jesztl (originally Jestl) to Lászlói. Young László received his early education
mainly in these towns, in the local Benedictine schools. In good burgenlander
tradition (his mother was from Alsópulya, after 1920 known as Unterpullen-
dorf) for some time he also attended a school where the language of instruc-
tion was Croatian. From western Hungary his studies took László to various
schools scattered in Hungary. He completed his secondary schooling with the
Premonstratensiens of Keszthely. For some time he was an aspirant member
of the Carmelite Order. In the meantime he attended various post-secondary
religious schools in Budapest, and in 1948 and after, in Vienna and Innsbruck.
In the latter place his studies focused on law, political science and history.
In 1950 he emigrated to the United States. At first he took on odd jobs
and saved his money to continue his schooling. During the mid-1950s he
studied at Columbia University in New York. In 1956 he won a Ford Fellow-
ship to study in Europe. While in Europe he did research but also worked for
Radio Free Europe. He obtained his M.A. degree and the diploma of the
Institute on East-Central Europe from Columbia University. Next he taught at
various American military bases in Europe and North Africa. After returning
to New York he completed his doctoral studies. For a while he taught political
science at the University of Virginia. Next he became a member of the
Department of Political Science at Montreal’s Loyola College, and when that
institution became a part of Concordia University, in that institution’s Political
Science Department. He continued teaching there till his retirement from aca-
demic life in 1988. The two sabbaticals he received there, in 1975-76 and
1983-84 respectively, he spent in Paris, France, and in Rome, Italy. During
the latter occasion he did research at the Vatican Archives.
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Before his retirement from teaching Dr. László made arrangements
for the continuation of his training as a priest of the Roman Catholic Church.
He completed his theological studies at the Université de Montréal and St.
Paul’s University in Ottawa. He was ordained a priest in January of 1991. He
was appointed chaplain of Ottawa’s Blessed Sacrament Church, as well as the
priest in charge of the city’s Hungarian Roman Catholics. Later for some time
he became the administrator of the St. Ignatius Parish while continuing to
serve Ottawa’s Hungarian community at St. Elizabeth Church. In 2004 he
retired from St. Ignatius but continued his work at St. Elizabeth. For his work
among Hungarians and on behalf of Hungarian causes, in 2008 Father László
was awarded the Republic of Hungary’s Knight’s Cross of the Order of Merit.
Dr. László was active in academic publishing throughout his
academic as well as his ecclesiastic career. He published numerous papers
including some in our journal. One of these was “Fighting Evil with Weapons
of the Spirit: The Christian Churches in Wartime Hungary,” in vol. 10, nos. 1-
2 (1983), 125-143; while another appeared as recently as two years ago: “A
Sign that Communism Is Not an Inevitable Destiny: The Revolution and the
Churches,” in vol. 34, nos. 1-2 (2007), 55-80. The crowning achievement of
his academic career was the publication of the book, a revised and expanded
version of his doctoral dissertation, Church and State in Hungary, 1919-1945
(Budapest: METEM, 2004). The volume also appeared in a Hungarian edi-
tion. In this work, as well as many of his other publications, László defended
the record of Hungary’s Christian Churches in the interwar, post-war and
especially, the war-time period. He kept reminding those who accused the
Churches of remaining “silent” during the Holocaust that the deportation of
Jews to Nazi concentration and death camps was halted at one point and the
majority of the Jews of Budapest in the end survived ― and that in this
development the Churches played an important role. At that time and especi-
ally during the last few weeks of 1944 when life became very perilous for the
Jews of Budapest, Church institutions sheltered thousands of them, as did the
Christian population at large, contributing to the fact that close to 200,000
Jews lived to see the end of Nazi rule in Hungary, the largest number in any
country where that rule existed during the war. To this he would add that the
men and women responsible for these efforts put their freedom or even lives
on the line, while politicians in the free world who could have done more to
save Jews, did precious little.
László László died Christmas Day 2008. He will be missed by his
Magyar parishioners in Ottawa as a priest, by Hungarian Christians as a
spokesman for their country’s religious institutions, and by the Hungarian
scholarly community as a church historian.
Hungarian Studies Review, Vol. XXXVI, Nos. 1-2 (2009)
Béla K. Király
1912-2009
in lieu of an obituary, a biographical essay:
Improving the Image of Hungary in the
English-Speaking World:
Béla Király's Lifelong Passion
Mario Fenyo
In North America hundreds of people of Hungarian descent have taken upon
themselves the mission of speaking on behalf of Hungary and Hungarian culture.
These self-appointed spokespersons, scholars or otherwise, keep track of any and
every“home-boyand home-girl” with claims to celebrity, of everyonewithaHunga-
rian surname, of everyone whose surname is an anglicized or Americanized version
of what may have been a Hungarian name at one time. After all, they have to try
harder; persons of Hungarian descent are outnumbered by Polish-Americans, by
American-Jews who do not have a Hungarian background, by so many other ethnic
groups who began crossing the Atlantic in large numbers as part of the immigration
“revolution” at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.1
In the 1920s the United States adopted, in stages, an immigration policy
where there had been none; this policy, based on quotas, resulted, for all practical
purposes, in the exclusion of East Europeans.2 Except for a smatteringofdisplaced
persons (DPs) in the aftermath of World War II.3 There was no major shift in the
patterns of immigration or in the pertinent federal policies between the1920sand
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the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Then the government of the United States,
perhaps prompted byfeelings of guilt,4 and more likelybypropagandaconsiderations,
realizing it had done little or nothing collectively to assist the freedom fighters in their
fight, relented and admitted over thirty-five thousand Hungarian refugees out of
turn,5 beyond the so-called quota, in one “fell swoop” — about two-thirds of whom
settled permanently in the country. At the risk of alienating several colleagues of
Hungarian background who have legitimate claims to the same title, this brief
essay focuses on the person who, in my opinion, has done the most for the cause
of promoting and disseminating Hungarian culture, including a knowledge of
Hungarian history, in the United States and in English: namely General and
Professor Béla K. Király.
Perhaps the crowning achievement of Király's career, as scholar and as
sponsor of Hungarian causes and culture, are the two series of publications he
initiated twenty years after his arrival in the United States, starting in 1977: the
“Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change,” soon renamed the “Atlantic
Studies on Society in Change,” including the sub-series “War and Society in East-
Central Europe.” The series was printed at first at Lisse by the Peter de Ridder
Press, but was soon taken over and distributed by the more prestigious Columbia
University Press. Retroactively, all of it is part of the undertaking of Atlantic
Research and Publications, headed, of course, by editor-in-chief Béla K. Király. At
the same time, many of the volumes are part of the series “East European Mono-
graphs” published by the historian and scholar of Romanian background Stephen
Fischer-Galati.
In conversation, Király summed up the objectives of the series — especially
applicable to War and Society in East-Central Europe6 — as follows: “to cover all
aspects and periods of Hungarian history for the benefit of the English-speaking
public” (personal communication, Béla Király to author). His published state-
ment is somewhat more circumspect: the Preface to one of the more recent
volumes notes that the “series intends to present a comprehensive survey of
many aspects of East Central European history”7 a variant of which reads “a series
which, when completed, will constitute a comprehensive survey of the many aspects
of East Central European society.”8
Of course, there is no such thing as the definitive history, or even a
“comprehensive survey,” of anything, for (a) historical interpretations are sub-
ject to revision, in accordance with the spirit of the age (sometimes in spite of it),
and (b) hitherto unnoticed gaps become visible, as ever-new fields and specialties
cater to fresh perceptions of the human condition. Scholars who have chosen
history, or some other social science, as their discipline often feel the urge to
justify their choice by challenging the latest interpretations and by uncovering,
then covering, previously unimagined gaps.
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If we assume that 1990 was the year of regime change in Hungary (as in
much of the region), we may break down the topics addressed in the series as
follows: from 1977 until that year 32 of the 65 volumes sponsored by Király do not
deal with Hungary or East-Central Europe in general. Of the 63 volumes that have
been published since that year only three do not have Hungary as the protagonist
country. The volumes were printed in seven hundred to one thousand copies, albeit
only about half of these were sold within the first year of printing (personal
communication, Peter Pastor to author, April 8, 2007). As is the case with scho-
larly monographs in general, apart from some of the major public libraries,
most copies were purchased by universities, which means that the readership —
more precisely, the perusal — goes far beyond the number of copies sold.
As an experiment, I picked a volume from the series, more or less at
random, to ascertain the availability over the internet. Eva Haraszti's Kossuth
as an English Journalist is available for purchase, possibly as a second-hand copy,
as are most of the other volumes in the series, for $69.00. It has been reviewed as a
blog 537 times (www.allbookstores.com/book).
It may be argued that there was greater interest on the part of the West,
and funding was more readily available for publications on East-Central
Europe, during the Cold War. Yet the numbers above belie that assertion. Whether
or not Király considered himself a cold war warrior (probably not, in the later stages
of that war), he was able to organize and find subsidies for the series at a time when
the region — at least the region north of the Balkans — was no longer the focus of
Western and international interest and preoccupations. Peter Pastor confirms that
Király deserves most of the credit for the fund-raising and for the painstaking
organizational work involved in publishing such a long series of books, on topics
which may not have been particularly topical.
In all fairness, it must be noted that such a gigantic undertaking cannot be
the work of a single individual. Stephen Fischer-Galati took on the respon-
sibilityof printing most of the series under the aegis of “East European Monographs.”
Indeed, many of the volumes receive a number as part of that series. Istvan Deak,
the head of the East-Central European Institute at Columbia University for
many years, used his power and prestige for the cause. Peter Pastor played a
major role in recruiting and recommending Hungarian authors; Pastor and Király
have parted ways since, and Pastor has launched yet another series of scholarly
monographs. The translators, myself included, deserve credit, for making many
of the Hungarian works available to the public at large, and turning them into
readable products, sometimes more readable than the original, for minimal “mate-
rial reward.”
Not surprisingly, the quality of the scholarship and writing is consistently
high in these monographs, most of the authors being American and Hungarian
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scholars of distinction. To mention some of the distinguished Hungarian scholars in
random order, there are works by György Péteri, Domokos Kosáry, Géza Perjés,
György Borsányi, Ignác Romsics, János Mazsu, György Csepeli, András Gerő, Tibor 
Glant, Tibor Frank — half of which I had the privilege of translating.9 My name
appears on the title page of several of the 120 or so monographs, and it would
appear on a few more if Béla bátyám — as he permitted me to address him —
had not forgotten to mention it in a few more of the publications, including his
rather successful history of Hungary;10 indeed, he was somewhat casual in his
approach to attributions (in my case, justifiably so, on the grounds that I did get
paid, what more could I expect?). On the other hand, it may be simply that Király
attached less importance to the work of the translator as opposed to the creative
contributions of an editor.
Manyof the authors involved in the series are not of Hungarian extraction.
Thus, volume 30 of the series, entitled The First War between Socialist States:
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact has an array of distin-
guished international contributors such as Hannah Arendt, Albert Camus,
Milovan Djilas, or Jean-Paul Sartre.11 The same authors' contributions are re-
printed in the monumental volume dedicated to the revolution of 1956 and
issued at the time of the fiftieth anniversary, in 2006.12 On the other hand, the
Festschrift in honor of Király, published under the title Society in Change, Studies in
Honor of Béla K. Király,13 is a collection of unrelated essays written by thirty-five
scholars, the majorityAmericans of Hungarian descent. The latter volume includes a
short biography of Király by Béla Vardy and a bibliography of his works by Agnes
Vardy. It is part of the East European Monographs series but, appropriately enough,
does not figure among the series edited by Király.
I recall only one exception to Király's norm of high standards: volume
66, a posthumous work by Sándor Biró, entitled The Nationalities Problem in
Transylvania, 1867-1940 was an error in judgment on Király's (and myown) part.14
Apparently the manuscripthadbeensubmitted tooneof thestatepublishing
houses in Hungary during the previous regime and was duly rejected. Pre-
sumably, it was a case of censorship, or at least we jumped to that conclusion. After
announcing, in the introduction, that his intention is to "finally" restorebalanceand
objectivity to the treatment of the subject, Biró proceeds to exonerate the Hungarian
governments of any discrimination vis-à-vis the Romanian ethnic group during
the period of the Dual Monarchy, while castigating the Romanian government for its
maltreatment of the Hungarian minority after 1919. I do not know how Ceausescu's
media reacted to this rather crude and wordy diatribe. One American reviewer
apostrophized — somewhat unfairly—“whenwill thiseverstop?”Obviously, thefact
that a book has been censored is no guarantee of high merits.
Biró's analysis was a distortion of historical reality; this does not mean
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that Király is remiss for meaning to safeguard the good name of the Hungarian
nation. When I suggested that he should sponsor my father's diary, written during the
German occupation in 1944 and published in 1946, but only in Hungarian,15 he
remained silent. Clearly, my father's perception of Hungarian subservience to Nazi
Germany, fromone of his manyhiding places during that annee terrible, would not
redound to the credit of the nation.
Béla Király was born in 1912 at Kaposvár, the son of the stationmaster.
Pressured by his father, he competed for and won a scholarship to the Ludovika
Military Academy (which bears a distant resemblance to West Point). He was
an officer of the Hungarian general staff during most of World War II, although he
spent several stints on the Eastern Front. At one point, he was in a position to
intercede on behalf of the Jewish conscripts serving in the so-called labour battalions
(for which he would eventually receive a commendation from Yad Vashem in
Israel). In early 1945 he surrendered to the Red Army at Szombathely, was taken
prisoner, escaped from POW camp, made his wayback to Budapest and returned
to military service. Appointed commander of a new Military Academy, he was
arrested in 1951 and sentenced to death on trumped-up charges. Although his
sentence was commuted, he was not informed of the commutation, and sat on death
row until late in the summer of 1956, a few weeks before the revolution broke
out.16
During the October 1956 revolution Király was appointed Commander
of the National Guard by Prime Minister Imre Nagy. As Soviet forces re-
entered Budapest he fled westward with some troops, and crossed the border into
Austria a few days later, where he was “debriefed” by the Americans.17 Upon his
arrival in the United States he continued to study English and soon enrolled at
Columbia University, to pursue a doctorate degree in history. His dissertation,
Hungary in the Late Eighteenth Century; the Decline of Enlightened Despotism,
waspublished byColumbiaUniversityPress.18 At thesame time he took up the cause
of the freedom fighters, relentlessly denouncing Soviet intervention. Sponsored by
the Department of State (and, possibly, other agencies of the United States govern-
ment), he traveled on speaking tours across the United States, and in Asia. Even-
tually, he became a spokesperson not only for the revolutionaries, but for the
Hungarian nation. “None is more distinguished”asaculturalambassador,writesBéla
S. Várdy, who is a cultural ambassador in his own right.19
Thus, in the aftermath of 1956 Királyplayed an important role — perhaps
the most important among all-time Hungarian refugees since Lajos Kossuth —
as speaker and teacher. For many years after his arrival in the United States, he
was the foremost spokesperson for the revolutionaries — at least those revoluti-
onaries who found refuge abroad — at the United Nations andothervenues. Irecall
his account of an address he was supposed to deliver to an assembly of high school
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and middle school students in an auditorium, somewhere among the yellow
cornfields of Kansas undulating in the summer breeze, in the middle of America.
Confronting several hundred rowdy teenagers who had little incentive to listen,
much less to learn, he was nevertheless able to find the right tone, thanks in part to
his imposing physical stature. The studentscameawayfromthesession,knowingwhat
Hungary is, knowing that Hungary mattered.20
KirálytaughtEuropean and militaryhistorytoseveralgenerationsofstudents
at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, and elsewhere. I am
sure he impressed them with his commanding, yet fatherly appearance: he was
well into his sixties when he started to teach. He brooked no indiscipline. When he
hired me to teach a summer course, he told me in no uncertain terms to make
sure I met my classes regularly and on time. His staff, who eventually received
medals of knighthood from Király and the new Hungarian government, perceived
him as a taskmaster.
Király was also a founder of the Association for the Advancement of the
Study of Hungarian History, recently and more elegantly renamed the Hun-
garian Studies Association. The Association has a distinguished record as a
lobby for Hungarian history, within the confines of the American Association
for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.21
It should redound to the credit of Király and of the Association that they
have gone out of their way to preserve or establish positive relations with sister
historical organizations of Slavic and Romanian scholars.
In 1990 Királyreturned to his homeland. While the commonassumption is
that politicians (and generals) in exile rarely affect the course of events,
because it is those who stayed behind who suffered the brunt of persecution, he
proved that there are exceptions to this rule. He ran for a seat in Parliament in the
district of Kaposvár and won.
I hope I may be permitted some autobiographical notes to help explain and
justify my claim of “expertise” on the subject of Király's contributions. I had
met Béla bátyám shortly after his arrival in United States, in the apartment my
parents occupied on Madison Avenue at 91st Street, in Manhattan, New York
City. I amnot sure whyKirálycame to visit, unless it was to “payhis respects” toold-
time, so-called liberal politicians in exile, such as my father.22
I was to meet Király again a few years later, at his home in Highland
Lakes, New Jersey, and remained in touch almost till his death.
At one point single, homeless and unemployed, I abused his hospital-
ity for two months at a stretch. I have fond memories of Béla bátyám and his cozy
abode. Apart from his memorabilia and the valuable pieces of art and keep-
sakes sent to him by his admirers, the place was modest. The plumbing never
worked. Béla kept a pail of water next to the commode, which I and other guests
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were expected to use to flush the toilet, military style (and refill the pail after each
use). He owned no dishwasher; I was instrumental in introducing him — after he
became an outstanding chef in his own not-for-profit restaurant — to the kitchen
utensil known as a dish-rack, which facilitates the draining of water from dishes still
wet. I gained his respect by expressing curiosity about his collection of beloved
pigeons and doves, one of his areas of interest since early childhood — which he
was forced to relinquish upon his return to Hungary from the United States.
I went back to Highland Lakes many times over the years, to discuss
the translation of monographs or some other subject. When I found myself in
exile at the University of Khartoum in the Sudan, he invited me for a summer
term to Brooklyn College, where he became chair of the History Department,
not long after receiving his doctorate fromColumbiaUniversity. Iwasstayingfree of
charge at the Roters' nearby. Since Király's return to Hungary in the aftermath
of the change of regime in 1989-90, I was able to visit him — and abuse his
hospitality again — in his old-new home in Budapest. I encouraged himtowrite
his memoirs, and he rewarded me by asking me to translate it into palatable English;
the truth be told, I incurred his displeasure by repeatedly mixing up the English
equivalents of Hungarian military ranks.
These memoirs constitute volume 127 in the series. Another volume
has been issued since. Although the entire series is in English, some of the recent
volumes have also appeared in Hungarian. A complete multi-volume history of
Hungary (in English) is in the offing, co-sponsored by the Hungarian Aca-
demy of Arts and Sciences.23
It is not easy to assess the reputation of Hungary and of Hungarians in the
English-speaking world. It would be even more difficult to tell how much of
the positive reputation can be traced to the contributions of Királyand his publishing
ventures. Obviously, Hungarian exiles disagree with one another; so do some of
their children and grandchildren. There were plenty of Hungarian chauvinists, and
others who maybe described as right-wingers, who were incapable of appreciating
what Király was doing for their motherland. When the Congress of the United
States was debating whether to return Saint Stephen's Crown into the custody
of the Government of the People's Republic of Hungary, he was one of only
two witnesses to testify and advocate the return (this was long before the change
of regime) against several dozen die-hard “conservatives” who claimed to represent
the Hungarian ethnic group in America.
Király's voice was always one of moderation and tolerance. Perhaps all
we can conclude for certain is that, were it not for his efforts, the country's
name abroad would have suffered even more than it has.
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